Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/4–752

No. 549
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] April 7, 1952.

Subject:

• State Department Interest and Participation in Matters Concerning Japanese Rearmament.

Problem

To assure that the Department of State is consulted by the agencies of the Department of Defense in Washington and in Tokyo regarding all important matters that concern Japanese rearmament. Such matters should include basic plans, general policies and important decisions. There should be no withholding of such information.

Discussion

Japanese rearmament is and will continue to be at least as much of a political problem as a military one, in as much as the development and expansion of Japanese military forces go to the very heart of Japan’s future and explore the sensitive nerves of Japan’s political life. By way of illustration there are the following matters regarding Japanese rearmament which raise critical political issues:

1. The very question of rearmament is an acute political issue in Japan since it involves the complicated question of constitutional amendment, alignment of political parties and basic Japanese foreign relations, particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States. Any action by us in this connection can create serious political repercussions in Japan. The nature and timing of an announcement of the letting of munitions contracts or of an intention to turn over heavy military equipment to the National Police Reserve could have a profound influence upon a Japanese domestic election, and could threaten the overthrow of the present Japanese Government.

2. The expansion of Japanese defense forces—ground, air and naval—creates an equally acute issue in international relations. Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, the Philippines, and Indonesia have all expressed at various times their concern lest Japanese rearmament proceed too rapidly and Japanese militarism revive. Japan’s relations with Korea will likewise be vitally affected by what is done to rearm Japan.

3. The construction of facilities in Japan from United States funds will affect the economic and social life of the Japanese people in many areas of Japan. The State Department should be fully informed, and should be consulted, regarding the size, location and timing of such construction. As a result of questions raised by the Bureau of the Budget, this problem is on the way to solution.

4. The allocation of Japanese funds either for the construction of United States facilities or for Japanese defense forces involves Japanese budgetary questions that affect other public activities in Japan as well as the general political issue of rearmament and expansion of the National Police Reserve. Relations between the Japanese and United States Governments on this particular question cannot be left solely to United States military channels.

5. The utilization of Japanese industrial resources for military and other purposes will be a complex arrangement of many interrelated factors. Competition for scarce materials and facilities as well as the possibility of price rises owing to competitive bidding can seriously affect the Japanese economy.

The responsible military authorities in the United States Government are anxious to build up Japanese forces as a counterweight to Communist military strength in the Far East. There is a constant tendency on the part of American military officials to surge ahead on Japanese rearmament with little regard for its political impact. With all due respect to the important and cogent military requirements of the situation in the Far East and in Japan, the interests of the American people will benefit from close understanding between both Departments on this matter. Skillful handling of its explosive potential will be possible only with such understanding.

A Specific Issue

Telegram 2079 of April 1, 1952, from Tokyo (attached as Tab A)¹ describes a specific situation in this general field in which it is desirable that there be intervention by the Department of State, since there are important political implications to the actions now being taken by General Ridgway.

The Japanese budget for their fiscal year which began April 1 includes 57 billion yen for the National Police Reserve. It also appropriates 56 billion yen for undisclosed security objects. General Ridgway has been urging Prime Minister Yoshida to double the size of the National Police Reserve during this fiscal year and to use all of the 56 billion yen for that purpose. Yoshida is wary of the serious internal political problems involved in moving rapidly ahead with such an expansion program, and has never committed himself—at least publicly—to anything more than an increase from the present strength of 75,000 to a strength of 110,000.² This increase would not require all of the available funds, so he has proposed that some portion of the money be used to construct facilities into which United States troops could be moved as part of the program of relocation outside of major metropolitan centers. Probably as a means of blocking this suggestion, General Ridgway recently announced in Tokyo that the Japanese Government would not have to pay a cent for the relocation of United States troops.

In the meantime, the Department of Defense is endeavoring to secure the release of approximately $50,000,000 of this year’s funds and the authorization of $80,000,000 in the Public Works Authorization Bill for the next fiscal year for the construction of new facilities in Japan. The new authorization would be added to a continuing authorization of $50,000,000 in this year’s budget for which no appropriation has yet been made. We have informally told both Defense and the Bureau of the Budget that we are heartily in favor of the immediate release of the $50,000,000 and that subject to a review of the general scope and nature of the proposed program we would support the request for funds in fiscal year 1953. Arrangements have been made for such a review.

To the extent that the Japanese can construct facilities out of their own budgeted funds, the United States will be relieved of an item of expense. In addition, the political factors involved in Japan are so serious that too rapid an expansion of the National Police Reserve before the Liberal Party has had time to prepare the way might cause the downfall of the present government. Since the very presence of United States troops in Japan creates an incentive for the Japanese to move ahead with building up their own forces and thus rid Japan of foreign troops, it does not seem desirable to exert pressure upon them to move at a rate which they believe to be politically suicidal.

Recommendations

I recommend:

1. That you sign the attached letter (Tab B)³ to the Secretary of Defense. It sets forth much of the foregoing material and urges consultation between representatives of State and Defense to determine a United States Government position on these matters prior to further discussion with the Japanese Government.

2. That in all discussions with the Department of Defense of related matters—for example, the relations between the Ambassador and the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, in the post-treaty period—the Department of State representatives consistently maintain the position that there must be complete consultation and coordination between the State and Defense Departments, both here and in Tokyo, on plans and policies with respect to Japanese rearmament.⁴

1. Not printed.
2. In Topad 2079 Bond commented: “Jap tactics appear to be continue dodging CINCFE pressure in effort avoid any commitment prior effective date peace treaty. Thereafter, Japs presumably hope to be in a position deal only with Emb on this question as being policy matter outside scope CINCFE’s responsibilities.” (611.94/4152)
3. Not found attached.
4. In the letter as sent by the Secretary to Lovett on Apr. 14 (drafted Apr. 8) there is a specific recommendation that a coordinating group be set up between the two Departments, with Allison as the chief State representative. (611.94/4–752) Additional documents in file 611.94 for May and June 1952 indicate that agreement was reached to establish a Joint State–Defense Working Group on Japan and Korea, with Young and Sullivan as the principal State and Defense representatives, respectively. The group held its first meeting on July 8, 1952. Minutes of meetings held through Jan. 7, 1953, are in NA files, lot 57 D 149, “Japan–Korea 1952: State Defense Working Group”.