Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

694.001/4–152

No. 548
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President¹

confidential

[Washington,] April 14, 1952.

Subject:

• Ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty

In accordance with your memorandum of April 1, 1952,² the Department of State is withholding any announcement establishing an irrevocable date for bringing the Treaty of Peace with Japan into force.

For the following reasons I strongly recommend that every possible effort be made to bring the Treaty into effect on or about April 16 or within not more than ten days thereafter:

1. Since the beginning of the negotiations for the Treaty the United States has consistently urged the great importance of concluding peace with Japan as quickly as possible. The Treaty provides that it will come into effect when the ratifications of six named countries, including the United States, have been deposited with the United States. Five countries other than the United States have now completed the ratification procedures and it is expected will very shortly deposit their ratifications. This fact is well known to the Japanese and therefore any substantial delay by the United States in bringing the Treaty into effect will receive prominent attention in Japan, and unless the reasons therefor are such as to appeal to the Japanese as being of overwhelming importance the reactions against the United States can well be expected to be very adverse.

2. The desire of the Japanese that the Treaty be brought into effect as soon as possible was a major factor in expediting recent negotiations on the Administrative Agreement for stationing of United States forces in Japan in accordance with the Security Treaty and the undertaking by the Japanese of negotiations of a peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government. Those steps having been taken, the Japanese Government and people would be very disturbed at any material delay by the United States Government in bringing the Treaty into effect, and elements unfriendly to the United States and Japan could be expected to exploit the situation to the maximum.

3. Extensive political and administrative arrangements have been made by the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the United Nations Command, the Government of Japan, and other foreign Governments on the assumption that the Treaty would be coming into effect by the first half of April. Many of these arrangements, such as agreements with foreign Governments on the termination of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan; reductions in force by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; turn back of responsibilities to the Japanese Government by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; personnel arrangements; and other such actions, many of which it is impossible to reverse, have necessarily been in progress for some months past. A major delay in bringing the Treaty into effect will seriously interfere with these plans for an orderly transition from the present occupation status to peacetime relations with Japan. In this connection, it is essential that the Japanese Government and the Departments and Agencies of the United States Government concerned, and desirable that the foreign Governments concerned, be given not less than ten days, and preferably two weeks, advance notice of the firm date of coming into effect of the Treaty.

4. Urgent negotiations are now being carried on with the Japanese concerning the arrangements for Japanese support of the United Nations operations in Korea and for the presence in Japan of troops of United Nations countries other than the United States engaged in the Korean hostilities. There have been some indications that the Australian and New Zealand Governments may attempt to withhold deposit of their ratifications of the Treaty in an effort to bring pressure on the Japanese to accede in such arrangements to some provisions that are repugnant to the Japanese and considered undesirable by the United States Government. The United States Government is not in a position effectively to oppose these efforts until such time as it, itself, is clearly prepared to bring the Treaty into effect as far as it is concerned and thereby place upon the Australian and New Zealand Governments the full onus of any delay. Also, if the Japanese are aware that the United States is not in any event bringing the Treaty into effect for some time the present incentive to expedite the completion of negotiations of this agreement on terms satisfactory to the Unified Command is removed.

Therefore, I strongly recommend that a Joint Resolution extending your Emergency Powers for sixty days, as suggested in the last paragraph of the memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget enclosed with your memorandum,³ immediately be sought from the Congress on a most urgent basis. I have discussed this matter with the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of State and Defense will be prepared to give all possible assistance in obtaining prompt and favorable action by the Congress in this regard.⁴

Dean Acheson

1. Drafted by Johnson.

2. In this memorandum to the Secretary, the President stated that important powers of the U.S. Government would lapse if the Japanese Peace Treaty was brought into force prior to enactment of the Emergency Powers Continuation Bill then before the Congress. The President added:

   “In view of the serious doubt, as matters now stand, whether that act can be enacted before April 16, the date on which it was hoped the Treaty could be brought into effect, I would like your immediate recommendation as to further postponement of the effective date of the Treaty. Until we can discuss this, please make no announcement that will establish irrevocably a date for bringing the Treaty into force.” (694.001/4–152)

3. Not found attached to the President’s memorandum. In a memorandum to the Secretary dated Apr. 3, Allison summarized it as follows:

   “The memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget enclosed in the President’s memorandum notes that the Emergency Powers Continuation Act is now in subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the House and that unless extraordinary measures are taken, at least three to four weeks will be required by the House to act on the legislation, following which at least a similar period of time will be required for consideration in the Senate. Therefore, if the Treaty of Peace with Japan is not to be brought into effect until normal legislative action is completed on the measure, it appears that the coming into effect of the Treaty may be delayed for at least several months.”

   Elsewhere in his memorandum Allison stated:

   “As early as October, 1951 the Bureau of the Budget expressed to the Department the realization that enactment of legislation for continuation of the President’s emergency powers would probably be required if those powers were to be continued into the post-treaty period. All such planning has been based on the assumption that the Treaty of Peace with Japan would be brought into effect not later than April of this year and at the time the question was first discussed in October of last year it was the understanding of the Department of State that the Bureau of the Budget was undertaking whatever arrangements it considered necessary.” (694.001/4–152)

4. In his memorandum of a conversation held Apr. 7 with Truman, Acheson stated that the President had approved the recommendation above and was that day sending requests to both Houses for enactment of the 60-day extension. The Secretary concluded: “We should be prepared to give all possible assistance to the pushing of these bills.” (694.001/4–2752)

   Extension of the Emergency Powers to June 1, 1952, was enacted in P.L. 313, a Joint Resolution approved on Apr. 14. For text, see 66 Stat. 54.