State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
No. 547
Memorandum of the Substance of
Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,
Held in Washington, April 2, 1952, 11 a.m.1
[Here follows a list of the persons present (14). All of the Joint Chiefs attended. The Department of State group was led by Matthews.]
Ryukyus2
Mr. Matthews: We thought it would be useful to talk over the Ryukyus problem. We don’t expect a decision, but we thought with Ambassador Sebald and Ambassador Murphy here it would be useful to exchange views.
Mr. Allison: The issue was brought to a head by the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement. Article 3 reserves our rights and powers over the Ryukyus and gives us authority to set up a trusteeship if we should want one, and to administer the islands pending our decision. We realize that the fundamental U.S. policy is to [Page 1225] retain long-term strategic control of the Ryukyus, and we take this as our basic objective. There has been, however, great to do in Japan over the Administrative Agreement. We must take Japanese opinion into account. There are some obvious disadvantages to a trusteeship. It would make us responsible for one million people, it would create expenses for us in maintaining the islands, and it might have an adverse effect in our long term ties with the Japanese. Our feeling has been that it would be useful if we could make a political gesture of agreeing to Japanese sovereignty over the islands and obtain agreement with the Japanese for any military rights that may be necessary. These rights would not have to be limited to those provided for in the Administrative Agreement. There is also the possibility that we might make definite arrangements for Okinawa as against those for the other islands. The decision should be made soon, and we believe it would be useful to set up a joint committee between State and Defense to work out our position.
Ambassador Sebald:3 As matters stand now, the Japanese have residual sovereignty over the Nansei Islands. There are many unresolved questions as to what this means. For example, who issues travel documents, etc? There is also a political problem—the rising desire on the part of the inhabitants to return to Japan. There is a petition from the Amani-O-Shima to this effect, which was signed by a large percentage of the population. There is also interest in the problem of Japan itself. If we don’t settle it soon, we may have considerable irredentist feeling in Japan. From my talks with Japanese officials, I believe there is no problem in our securing control over anything we actually need. The Japanese realize Okinawa is important to the United States and also that our presence there is important to them. At the present time and for the next three to six months, our negotiating position is strong. The Japanese, however, don’t want us to have a trusteeship. I believe that if we made some political gesture to the Japanese along lines of sovereignty, it would help Japanese reaction to the Administrative Agreement.
General Vandenberg: What effect would this have on court martial rights? Supposing an airman runs down a native. Who would try him? Or what would happen if we wanted to move a considerable amount of the population away from some dangerous area, or to move people to build additional airfields?
Ambassador Sebald: Things like this could be worked out in negotiations. We might set up a joint board.
General Vandenberg: Our experience in Newfoundland and elsewhere has been difficult. If we are going to wage atomic war, which [Page 1226] might be unpopular with the Japanese, we would have to have a free hand. If we didn’t have a free hand we would lose 90 per cent of the value of the base.
General Collins: I can see major problems. There are five airfields there now. Supposing the Okinawans say there isn’t enough farm land and we should have only one. They would appeal to the Japanese Government and we would be in all sorts of difficulties.
General Vandenberg: Or else we might want seven airfields or we might want to make extended airfields and we would get into more problems.
Ambassador Sebald: Couldn’t this be worked out by a committee to meet the terms of your actual requirements?
General Bradley: There are some other problems in this. We would like to have a base at Okinawa. The question is, can we get it other than by agreement for trusteeship. Maybe we can work out an agreement with the Japanese Government. The example of Egypt and the British isn’t a very hopeful one, and Japan may not always be in our corner. Moreover, it isn’t just Okinawa. We need warning services if we have a major base on Okinawa and this would mean we would need facilities on the other islands.
General Collins: We don’t envisage staying in Japan indefinitely, but if we build up Okinawa into a major base we do envisage staying there indefinitely.
General Bradley: There is the other question as to whether we can get funds from Congress for anything short of this sort of permanent base that a trusteeship would involve.
Admiral Fechteler: I wonder if I could ask why Ambassador Sebald puts emphasis on our bargaining position in the next three to six months.
Ambassador Sebald: Just because the more time that elapses the more Japanese political pressure will grow and it may reach a point where no Japanese government can stand up against it.
Mr. Nitze: As long as the question is unresolved, public interest will build up.
Ambassador Murphy: General Bradley mentioned the need for other islands. Can you say specifically what other islands you mean?
General Vandenberg: During the war we had airfields between Okinawa and Guam. It’s hard to tell what you need for air warning, but early warning facilities are imperative.
Ambassador Cowen: How much pressure is generated by the desire of the people of the islands to return to Japan, and how much pressure comes from the desire of the Japanese to have them returned.
[Page 1227]Ambassador Sebald: The people of the islands are practically unanimous in their desire to return to Japan.
Ambassador Cowen: Are the Japanese people able to provide the deficit assistance that the islands need?
General Bradley: I doubt it. Three years ago I rather thought Okinawans liked the setup under U.S. Administration. As I see it, it really boils down to whether or not we pull back our Pacific defense line or not. I agree with General Collins—I doubt if the local people would want to be part of Japan and still have the U.S. around.
General Collins: I don’t think we should rush into a decision to give Okinawa back. The Japanese are going to have differences with us about trade with the mainland. They are not going to want U.S. troops in Japan indefinitely. We are liable to have real differences of opinion with the Japanese, but in Okinawa we already have permanent constructions and we should think seriously about giving up our base there.
Mr. Allison: There is no question but that we want to have a base there. What we want to do is work out with you your specifications.
Admiral Fechteler: What’s the pressure for the return of the Bonins?
Ambassador Sebald: No real pressure, it’s just sentimental reasons.
Admiral Fechteler: The Bonins are of real value to the Navy.
Mr. Cowen: But a naval base does not go into the interior of the island.
General Bradley: If you give back all places except a few, wouldn’t you be under pressure constantly to give up the rest. Our position in Japan is temporary, but if we are going to stay in Okinawa we should stay there permanently. If you want a joint group to work up our position we could designate our plans committee.
Mr. Matthews: Cowen can work for us.
Mr. Cowen: I think the study should be based on the assumption that we want a permanent base in Okinawa.
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Korea.]
- The source text bears the following notation: “(State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.)”↩
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In a memorandum to the Secretary dated Mar. 31, Allison stated: “On March 24, 1952 you requested that a survey be made within the Department to ensure that all interested offices still support the position that the United States not seek a trusteeship over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, but make bilateral arrangements with Japan for the return of the islands to Japanese control provided the United States may retain control over such military facilities therein as are deemed essential by the JCS. It is understood that arrangements have now been made for a conference with the JCS on April 2, 1952 in order to discuss this problem.”
In the remainder of the memorandum Allison stated FE’s desire that the Department continue the policy just quoted. (NA files, lot 54 D 539, 15.5 Ryukyus)
↩ - Ambassador Sebald left Tokyo for Washington on Mar. 18.↩