Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

795.00/4–2952: Telegram

No. 551
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Department of the Army

secret
routine

Tokyo, April 9, 1952—3:37 p.m.

C 66619. 1. With the early coming into force of the Peace Treaty and the changing status of Japan from that of an occupied country to that of a sovereign nation, I feel it incumbent upon me to present for your consideration my views on certain matters relating to US military policy in the Far East.

2. A. The most vital factor in the achievement of US objectives in the Orient is the continued maintenance of Japanese faith in our commitment to guarantee the essential security of Japan, until it is capable of assuming that responsibility of a sovereign state. During my service as SCAP I have several times heard influential Japanese express such deep concern over the possible lack of continuity of US intentions to protect Japan as to amount almost to fear. On each such occasion I have sought to impress upon the individuals concerned, and later upon the highest Japanese governmental authorities, the firm intention of the US to provide essential protection to Japan during that period when Japan is creating the essential forces to permit her to assume responsibility for her own defense. With the effectuation of the treaties it will, I think, become more than ever important to US interests that our long range intentions be made positive and clear, and that this be done from time to time so as to preclude the building up in the Japanese mind of any idea, however weakly founded, that we do not in fact intend to continue our protective shield over them until they can substitute one of their own. The factor of possible political pressure for economic advantage, in this expressed concern by Japanese, is of course recognized.

The Japanese, in common with other Oriental peoples outside the Soviet orbit, will be subject to steadily mounting internal and external pressures directed from the Kremlin. They will be ever mindful of their close proximity to a Communist dominated Asiatic mainland and ever alert to any indication of a weakening in our political or military policies toward them. Japanese response to US leadership will be predicated upon a constant realistic appraisal of US intentions and commitments on a positive and long range basis. What they think our intentions are, may be even more important than what these intentions actually are.

Therefore I suggest that at an appropriate time shortly after the coming into effect of the Security Pact, the Japanese be publicly and authoritatively reassured of our firm intentions. While such a statement should go far toward allaying any trepidation on the part of the Japanese, there must necessarily be continued concrete assistance toward the development of essential Japanese Security Forces, and continued insistence that Japan shall make proper and timely contribution thereto.

B. The programs for development of the security forces of Japan and Korea are closely interrelated and a proper and controlled balance must be maintained. US support and maintenance of ROK Military Forces, if unrelated to similar assistance to Japan, could have serious adverse effects on our relations with both governments, and consequently upon our Far East position. It may be that a bilateral security pact between Japan and the ROK, however infeasible at this time, could later eventuate, and even perhaps, at a still more distant date, be a prelude to a more encompassing Pacific security pact embracing the other free nations of the Orient. If so, then the interrelation of US programs for arming Chinese Nationalist and Southeast Asian forces likewise has important bearing, political as well as military, on our Japanese and ROK programs.

C. In due time Japan may be expected to seek membership in the UN.¹ That her people have an awareness of the responsibilities which such membership entails, and a desire to meet these responsibilities, has been adequately demonstrated both spiritually and materially. Despite subversive efforts intended to spread disunity in Japan there has been conspicuous accord if [in?] the manner in which the great majority of Japan’s agricultural and industrial workers have thrown themselves behind the UN’s war effort in Korea. Her churches and charitable institutions, from their own meager resources, responded immediately to alleviate conditions among war ravaged Korean families, and thousands of Japanese have given their blood for the care of our wounded. Japan’s request for membership in the UN organization should, I think, be provided full US support. While realizing the objections to be overcome, our support would further provide positive proof to the Japanese as to which nations were friends and which enemies.

3. These views are submitted because of the imminent and unlamented demise of SCAP. Summarizing:

A. I consider it of signal importance that our government, as often as may be necessary, seek to reassure the Japanese people that our policy toward Japan will remain constant, and that our security interests in the Pacific are inseparable from their own.

B. We must be ever alert to the intimate relationship between the development of the Japanese and ROK security forces and the need for their joint alignment against a common foe. Moreover, the development of Chinese Nationalist and Southeast Asian military forces is in turn a closely related problem.

C. We must continue to press vigorously for completion of the desired expansion of Japanese security forces, and at substantially the rate now programmed.

D. Japan should receive strong US support in her endeavor to secure membership in the UN, including, I believe, an authoritative US government statement to that effect, published shortly following the effective date of the treaties. Even though membership should be long delayed, our support would emphasize the integrity of US intentions toward the Japanese people.

E. Finally, we must by word and deed do everything within our power to overcome any feeling in the Oriental mind that our interest in Asia is casual, temporary or overshadowed by our interests in other regions.

1. For documentation on this question, see vol. iii, pp. 802 ff.