Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–1952: Telegram

No. 523
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret
niact

Tokyo, February 19, 1952.

1736. CX 63920. This is Sebald’s 1736 rptd Secretary of Defense. Number 29 from Rusk. Further discussions with Okazaki have produced fol text¹ Art 22 which I believe to be maximum we can obtain from Jap Govt this subject. Text fols:

• “1. In the event of hostilities, or imminently threatened hostilities, in the Japan area, the US may take such actions as may be necessary to insure the security of its forces in the Japan area, and shall take steps at once to inform the Govt of Japan of the action taken or to be taken by it, and the Govt of Japan and of the US shall immediately consult together with a view to taking necessary measures for the defense of that area and to carry out the purposes of Art 1 of the Security Treaty.
• “2. Pending the coming into force of such arrangements or dispositions envisaged in Art 4 of the Security Treaty as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area, the Govts of Japan and of the US may consult and prepare the necessary measures, including combined command, for the defense of Japan to be taken jointly by them in the event of hostilities or imminently threatened hostilities in the Japan area, and may put jointly into effect those measures as occasion arises, subject to the constitutional provisions applicable to each party.”

Comments:

1. For background, see my Nos. 14² and 28.³

2. Above text obtained after much consultation Jap polit leaders and over PriMin’s strong objection make any mention combined command.

3. Focus Jap polit debate likely to be on implications this Art; Jap Govt negotiating agreement under full impact daily bitter discussions Diet this and related issues: Editorial comment concentrating same subject, with emphasis on equal status Jap and constitutional issues.

4. Our second draft Art 22 contains no important agreement or commitment going beyond above text.

5. Right of US forces to act in own security in emergency is nailed down; such action must be immediately followed by, but is not conditional upon info to Jap Govt, whose vital interest it is impossible to deny.

6. I do not believe we can get more unless we are prepared use threats and pressures which, if backed up, would be disastrous US-Jap relations. If we have more specific arrangements in mind, above text leaves way open for consultation about them; in any event our earlier text did not provide any agreement now as to more specific arrangements.

7. Alternatives before us are, broadly,

(a) Accept text given above;

(b) Delete Art 22 and discuss entire matter later;

(c) Use only short general sentence, then consult later;

(d) Prolong negotiations here to try obtain difference between above text and our second draft.

8. Among alternatives, any of first three can be accomplished. First alternative will produce considerable amount acrimonious debate and will increase pressures to obtain restrictions on broad rights under Security Treaty. Second alternative might have been wise originally, as leaving us maximum freedom of action, but it is now known subject has been at issue in negotiations and complete silence might now excite suspicions. Third alternative would be to use some such sentence as “in the event of hostilities, or imminently threatened hostilities, in the Japan area, the Governments of the United States and Japan shall immediately consult together with a view to taking necessary joint measures for the defense of that area and to carry out the purposes of Art 1 of the Security Treaty”.

This alternative would not cloud our rights under Security Treaty, would involve minimum domestic debate Japan and would not raise constitutional issues. Fourth alternative is no choice at all, because it would be fruitless and would produce highly dangerous build-up of anti-American feeling here, even among groups ordinarily friendly to US.

9. My recommendation is that we promptly accept first alternative if our policy is to get as much of our draft as we can. In this case, no significant changes of language should be attempted. My own personal judgment is that our interests are best served by third alternative. I strongly recommend against fourth alternative. Info copy furnished Ridgway, please reply niact.⁴

Sebald

1. In his memorandum of the conversation held on Feb. 19, Bond stated:

   “Minister Okazaki distributed copies of a Japanese redraft of Article XXII, which was then considered. (With reference to the inclusion in that redraft of the term “combined command”, which he had previously indicated would not be acceptable to the Prime Minister, Minister Okazaki explained that it had been only with the greatest difficulty that he managed to persuade the Prime Minister to agree to that phrase.) After considerable discussion, Ambassador Rusk handed to Minister Okazaki a suggested revision of the Japanese redraft, incorporating certain points which Ambassador Rusk had explained were of importance to the U.S. Government on this subject. Minister Okazaki expressed the personal opinion that the revised text would be acceptable to his Government, but undertook to confirm that fact and to inform Ambassador Rusk at the earliest possible time.” (611.94/2–2352)

   A text of this redraft as originally distributed by Okazaki has not been found in Department of State files.

2. Telegram 1649 from Tokyo, Document 500.
3. Telegram 1735 from Tokyo, Feb. 19, not printed. (611.94/2–1952) It contains a summary of the talk described in Bond’s memorandum of conversation, Document 520.

4. In telegram C 63919 from SCAP, Tokyo, to the Department of the Army, also dated Feb. 19, marked “From Earl Johnson” and “For JCS, SecDef Wash DC for Frank Nash”, Johnson referred to the text quoted at the beginning of telegram 1736 as a “watered down version”, and the short form quoted in paragraph 8 of the “Comments” as a “generalized version” of Article XXII, and commented: “Watered down version would be more restrictive on US commander than generalized version.” After further analysis of alternatives he concluded:

   “Believe long-range relations US–Japs would be improved if draft as submitted were replaced by generalized version. If generalized version not acceptable to Dept, suggest in interest of strengthening bargaining position with Japan following coming into force of treaty and adm agreement that any reference to ‘combined command’ be deleted.

   “This message discussed with General Ridgway, as have been Rusk’s numbers 28 and 29. Ridgway concurs this message and recommends generalized version which he considers adequate from military viewpoint.” (Department of Defense files)