Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–2352

No. 520
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Mission in Japan (Bond)

secret

Tokyo, February 18, 1952.

Participants:

• Ambassador Rusk
• Assistant Secretary Johnson
• Mr. Bond
• Minister Okazaki
• Mr. Nishimura

Subject:

• Informal Discussion with Japanese Delegation Concerning Administrative Agreement Negotiations.

The above listed members of the U.S. and Japanese Delegations met again today at 3:30 p.m. to continue their informal discussions on the Administrative Agreement negotiations.

With respect to Article II, Ambassador Rusk stated that he had sent the new U.S. Delegation counter-proposal to Washington for consideration.¹ Minister Okazaki expressed the opinion that, if the U.S. Government accepts that proposal, Article II would be disposed of.

Turning to Article XXII, Minister Okazaki stated that the Japanese Government had considered the statement of U.S. views and the proposed redraft of Article XXII handed to them on February 16 by Ambassador Rusk, and that he had certain informal comments to make orally and informally on behalf of his Government with respect to that subject. He then distributed the text of such comments (a copy of which is attached)² which he proceeded to read orally. Following the conclusion of the reading of these comments, Minister Okazaki stated that he was not entirely satisfied with the language in which they were couched, and that he would therefore be appreciative if the U.S. Delegation would accept those comments as tentative and entirely informal. He went on to say that the Japanese Government is now giving consideration to a formula for Article XXII which might be satisfactory to both parties, which he hoped would be ready on the following day. He reiterated that, although there would appear to be no alternative to a combined command in time of emergency, a public commitment to that effect in the Administrative Agreement would sound the “death knell” of the Liberal Party. He added that it would also tend to be destructive of the will of the National Police Reserve to fight in defense of their country.

Ambassador Rusk thanked Minister Okazaki for his presentation, and stated that he desired clarification on one or two points raised by those comments. With reference to the statement contained in the attached presentation to the effect that Japan’s security forces “are not supposed to engage in any belligerent action for protecting the state against threat from outside”, he inquired whether this meant that Japan could not defend itself in the event of unprovoked attack. He also asked how that language could be reconciled with the reference in the Security Treaty to the “inherent right of individual and collective self-defense”, and whether the latter phraseology would not constitute a legal basis for Japanese participation in joint defense measures in the event of such an attack. Minister Okazaki replied that it was mainly by reason of the sentence to which Ambassador Rusk referred that he had expressed a reservation as to the language of his Government’s presentation. He stated that Article V of the Peace Treaty is interpreted by his Government to mean that Japan as a sovereign state possesses the right of self-defense, but that a question arises as to how and to what extent the Japanese people desire to implement that right; i.e. through amendment of the Constitution, new legislation, etc. He added that, apart from the sentence quoted by Ambassador Rusk, he saw no contradiction between the text of the Japanese comments and the principles set forth in the Security Treaty and in Article V of the Peace Treaty. He reiterated that the text of the comments which he had presented should be considered as provisional, inasmuch as they would require revision on certain points. Referring to the constitutional bar against the establishment of Japanese armed forces, Minister Okazaki stated that some legal theorists in Japan hold that Article IX of the Constitution does not preclude the maintenance of armed forces for self-defense, but that other theorists hold the contrary view.

Ambassador Rusk stated that the legal advisers on his Delegation had suggested the possible deletion of the Article titles in the final text of the Administrative Agreement, and inquired whether this might not be helpful in the case of Article XXII. Minister Okazaki indicated that it might be. In response to a further question from Ambassador Rusk, Minister Okazaki stated that he expected to have the views of his Government on Article XXII ready for presentation to the U.S. Delegation by the afternoon of the following day. At this juncture Minister Okazaki said that he would like to put forward on his own responsibility, informally and not for the record, a suggested formula for covering the subject of joint defense measures; he then showed to the members of the U.S. Delegation a redraft of that Article utilizing the formula that “nothing in this Agreement shall preclude” the taking of the necessary measures by the two Governments.

Ambassador Rusk then inquired whether the principal difficulty for the Japanese Government with respect to Article XXII lies in the mere mention of a “combined command”, or In the retention of language indicating that the U.S. shall be the one to establish such a command. Minister Okazaki replied that the reservations entertained by the Japanese Government on this Article arise primarily out of concern as to the reaction of the Diet, mainly on the constitutional issue. He emphasized that the Japanese people would willingly accept a U.S. Commander-in-Chief under pressure of an actual emergency situation, but that it is not politically feasible for the Japanese Government to commit itself to such action in advance of such a contingency. He went on to say that the Japanese people like to think of the eventual possibility of a Japanese Commander-in-Chief heading all security forces in Japan at some later date, and that, although this is recognized as unrealistic in so far as the immediate future is concerned, the door must at least ostensibly be left open to such a possibility. He stated that Article XXII involves a serious political issue which affects the very existence of the Liberal Party and the present Government; he added that the Liberal Party is easily the most reliable political party in Japan and that it would be unwise to weaken it over this issue. He then expressed the view that acceptance of a provision along the lines of the U.S. draft of Article XXII would “certainly” bring about the defeat of the Government party in the next general elections. Ambassador Rusk then inquired what the attitude of the Democratic Party would be on this point. Minister Okazaki replied that both the Democratic Party and the Green Breeze Society, as well as all other Japanese political parties, would oppose such a provision, even though most of them would recognize the inevitability in practice of acting in accordance therewith in the event of an emergency. He added that the Administrative Agreement cannot be made to work without mutual confidence of the two nations, and that on the Japanese side such confidence could not survive the acceptance of Article XXII in its present form. He reiterated that the present Japanese Government, including the Prime Minister, admits the necessity at this stage of a U.S. Commander-in-Chief in the event of emergency, but that it cannot make a public commitment to that effect.

Assistant Secretary Johnson inquired of Minister Okazaki as to whether the Japanese Government would object to the inclusion in Article XXII of a reference to Article IV of the Security Treaty. Minister Okazaki replied that he would have to see the language in which such reference might be couched, but that they had already agreed to a reference to Article I of the Security Treaty and that in principle he saw no reason why mention could not also be made of Article IV.

Minister Okazaki then reiterated with considerable emphasis that, whatever may be the substance of Article XXII, it will be virtually impossible for the Japanese Government to agree to any mention therein of a “combined command” or “combined commander”. He stated that the Diet is already attacking the expansion of the National Police Reserve, at least in part because of a suspicion that Japanese land forces are being built up for the purpose of being sacrificed as cannon-fodder under a U.S. Commander-in-Chief and in the service of U.S. objectives. He said that, under such circumstances, the very mention of a U.S. Commander-in-Chief is politically bad. Minister Okazaki then asked Assistant Secretary Johnson if the Defense Department is very insistent on the maintenance of its position on Article XXII. Mr. Johnson replied that he was confident that such is in fact the case, and that he would not undertake to say that they could be dissuaded from that position.

In reply to a question from Mr. Johnson, Minister Okazaki stated that, although he would not like to be so quoted, the Japanese Government is thinking in terms of the eventual amendment of Article IX of the Constitution, but only after the Government has won the forthcoming general elections and has had an opportunity to prepare the way with Japanese public opinion.

Ambassador Rusk then asked whether, in the revision of the Japanese Government’s position on this subject, mention of a joint command could be included among the measures of Japanese cooperation in the field of defense. He pointed out that demonstration of free world solidarity in the face of threatened aggression is an important deterrent and one which should be reflected in the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, just as it is in the relationships between the U.S. and the countries of Western Europe.

Minister Okazaki stated that his Government would try to meet the point of view expressed by Mr. Rusk to the maximum extent, as it is also anxious to conclude the Administrative Agreement at the earliest possible time. Ambassador Rusk stated that, in view of their tentative nature, he would not report to Washington the views of the Japanese Government on this subject as set forth in Minister Okazaki’s presentation, pending the receipt of their further comments as promised by Minister Okazaki. Minister Okazaki agreed that what he had said should be off-the-record for the time being, adding that, in view of the vital importance of this subject, extensive consultation would be necessary within the Japanese Government in the formulation of a position.

Niles W. Bond

1. See telegram 1690 from Tokyo, Document 514.
2. Not printed.