Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–852: Telegram

No. 500
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Tokyo, February 8, 1952.

1649. Repeated info Secretary Defense. CX 63132. This is Sebald’s 1649. No. 14 from Rusk. This tel further to my number 12.¹ Re: Article 22, our discussions have disclosed wide gap between US and Japanese on what should be said in administrative agreement this subject. In number informal talks, Okazaki tell us Japanese Govt recognizes necessity US forces act in own security in case of emergency, that in such case forces should not be limited to facilities and areas provided under administrative agreement, administrative agreement, that Japanese security forces should operate under such command.

Possible that Japanese would prefer administrative agreement be silent on such matters, but they have suggested fol text Article 22:

“In the event of hostilities, or imminently threatened hostilities, in the Japan area, the Govts of Japan and the US shall immediately consult together with a view to taking necessary measures to carry out the purpose of Article 1 of the Security treaty.”

Fol points have been put forward by Okazaki as basis objection inclusion our draft article:

(1) Our paragraph one does not grant us any powers which it would not otherwise enjoy, but it might give Japanese public impression, by indicating US would not be bound by administrative agreement, that latter is mere scrap of paper.

(2) Action taken by us in Japan in event emergency must be preceded or accompanied by such consultation as circumstances permit. There would always be some Minister of State available for consultation. In fact, commander would act at once and consultation would be formality.

(3) US commander’s action would be limited in any event to measures securing our forces until US Govt had acted “since Congress declares war”. Necessity consult own govt affords commander opportunity contact Japanese Govt.

(4) Our Article 22 goes considerably beyond reasonable interpretation Article 3 of security treaty, since latter refers to “disposition of US forces in and about Japan”.

(5) Diet itself would consider commitments our Article 22 go beyond Article 3 security treaty and might insist upon legislative review entire agreement, in which Article 22 would run into great trouble.

(6) Subject raises many other related questions of highest political and security importance which cannot be dealt with in administrative agreement.

(7) Japanese Govt is having hard enough time selling increases Japanese security forces and other difficult policy questions without undertaking heavy burden involved our Article 22.

Relevant to above is recent conversation Rusk with Miki,² leader of Democratic Party which is strongly supporting rearmament and close ties with US. Miki stated Japanese interest is now ranging far beyond administrative agreement and that Japanese wish to know whether we intend to consult Japan about security matters, what arrangements we have in mind for command, and what steps we have in mind for moving toward general security pact in Pacific.

Press interest here is turning toward broad security questions which are not answered by our Article 22 but which would be further stimulated thereby. Examples such questions are: Do we intend to claim right to use atom bombs from Japanese bases without consulting Japan? Will security measures be such as to make Japan independent only in name but in fact a colony of the US? What will be the relation of Japan’s police reserve to US forces? What role will US play in training police reserve? Who will command? Will US forces put Japan through air raid drills in time of peace? Will active use US forces be decided by US alone or by mutual consultation and agreement? Who will decide what “contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” means in the security treaty? Recurring question is that of previous consultation and agreement with Japan.

We have made fol points among others to Okazaki in support our Article 22:

(1) Inescapable consequence of very existence of armed force, regardless where stationed, is that it must act in own security in event emergency and we cannot accept limitation this basic necessity, particularly in view our heavy world-wide responsibilities.

(2) Facilities and areas agreed under administrative agreement must not limit action which has to be taken as matter military necessity in case of emergency.

(3) Our draft entirely appropriate in administrative agreement as involving “conditions which shall govern the disposition, etc.” specified in Article 3 security treaty.

(4) Under present conditions, where sudden and damaging attack can be delivered by lawless nations, action of forces to provide own security cannot be subject to limitations of communication and consultation. Examples such sudden attacks past 20 years used, including Korea, Pearl Harbor and Philippines.

(5) Our Article 22 merely represents actual realities situation and Japanese public should begin to face up to them if they are now under illusions.

(6) Although administrative agreement cannot enlarge upon rights in security treaty, it is equally true that it cannot diminish them.

(7) In period in which Japan is virtually disarmed and incapable of exercising strategic command, such command could only be exercised by US; in such situation all forces capable contributing to defense of Japan should be under such command. All such arrangements, however, should be on basis consultation and agreement Japanese Govt as provided our draft.

On basis previous inter-departmental discussions and our analysis situation, Johnson and I consider that fol are essential elements our position on Article 22:

(a) We should have a clear understanding that the limitations of the administrative agreement do not apply to security measures which have to be taken in the event of hostilities or imminent threat thereof.

(b) We should have a clear understanding that US forces must, in the event of hostilities or imminent threat thereof, act to carry out purposes of Article 1 of security treaty and to provide for own security on basis of tactical and strategic necessity. Any limitation on this would be limitation on security treaty itself.

(c) We should accept principle of consultation, in event hostilities or imminent threat thereof, on joint measures which US and Japan might agree to take in such emergency.

If above is correct as to what we really want, it might be possible to get Japanese agreement on Article 22 which contains our first paragraph and something like their proposal (above) as second paragraph, amended by inserting “appropriate joint measures” after “with view to taking”. Even so it might be necessary to make some reference to consultation accompanying action taken under our paragraph one, consultation which would be inevitable even though we could not subject necessary action under our paragraph one to its results. Action Dept: What does US Govt think of this suggestion?

We have not yet moved into techniques of heavy pressures re Article 22. However, before we do so US Govt should carefully consider whether US interests are best protected by heavy pressure to obtain our Article 22 from reluctant Japan or by silence this matter in agreement itself. The more we talk now and publicly about such questions, the more embarrassing questions will become, the more Yoshida will feel compelled to water down meaning of agreement in statements to Diet and the more we shall undoubtedly have to move toward statement restricting wide open rights we now enjoy under security treaty, such as commitments to consult of the sort recently given Churchill. Best response Yoshida might now make to many questions this field is that such matters not appropriately covered by administrative agreement and should be left for further consideration two govts.

Sebald

1. Telegram 1631 from Tokyo, Document 498.
2. A memorandum of this conversation (held on Feb. 4) by Charles N. Spinks, First Secretary of Mission, is in Tokyo Post files, 320.1 Security Treaty.