611.94/2–752
No. 499
The Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash)
top secret
[Washington,] February 7, 1952.
Dear Mr. Nash: We have been discussing an Interim Policy
Guidance and an Interim Directive to the Commander in Chief, Far East
setting forth preliminary United States policies with respect to Japan
in the post-Treaty period. In the course of these discussions we have
agreed that it will be desirable to push ahead with the preparation of a
National Security Council paper on Japan.
I have asked the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to prepare a draft of
such an NSC paper which can then be
started through the normal NSC
processes. However in commencing their consideration of such a paper,
they have discovered the desirability of a military estimate of certain
factors regarding the security of Japan, in order to make possible a
more intelligent approach to some of the major problems of policy.
Enclosed are four copies of a list of questions, the answers to which
would lay a firm groundwork for the NSC
paper.
I realize that some of these questions have already been the subject of
considerable study, and that some of the answers have been communicated
to the Department in Mr. Lovett’s
letter of January 10.1 The
questions are included at this time, however, partly for the sake of
completeness and partly to be sure that we have the benefit of your
latest thinking. Other questions listed in the enclosure it may not be
possible to answer, but to the extent that even tentative answers are
possible we will all have a better basis for considering what our
policies toward Japan should be.
In case you believe discussion of some of these points between Defense
and State representatives will be fruitful, Mr. McClurkin of the Office of Northeast
Asian Affairs will be glad to consult with anyone whom you may
designate.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 1139]
[Enclosure]
Problems To Be Clarified Prior to Preparation
of NSC Paper
I. The effective potential over the next few years
of United States and Japanese military forces in Japan in
resisting attack.
- A.
- To what extent is it possible and desirable from a military
point of view to defend Japan against attack?
- 1.
- How much of Japan can be held against attack?
- 2.
- To what extent can Japanese production facilities
remain in operation in the event of hostilities in the
Japan area?
- 3.
- Is it expected that adequate shipping will be
available to supply United States and Japanese military
forces in Japan and Japanese industrial and civilian
requirements? Can this shipping be adequately protected
against attack?
- B.
- Consistent with the answers to the foregoing, what is the
estimated strength of United States air, naval and ground forces
required to defend Japan effectively?
- 1.
- Consistent with Japanese resources, to what extent is
it proposed to create Japanese ground forces, i.e.,
magnitude, character and timing, as a means of
strengthening the defense of the area and of eventually
releasing United States forces for duty
elsewhere?
- 2.
-
Is it contemplated that approval would be given to
the creation of Japanese—
- a.
- naval forces,
- b.
- tactical air force,
- c.
- strategic bombing force,
and if so, to what
extent?
- C.
- Consistent with the estimates made in response to B above,
what will be the approximate costs of maintaining United States
and Japanese forces in Japan for each of the next three years,
broken down as follows:
- 1.
- Total costs of maintaining United States forces in
Japan.
- a.
- Costs to be borne by the United States.
(1) Approximately what portion of this will be
expended in Japan?
- b.
- Costs to be borne by the Japanese
Government.
- 2.
- Total costs of maintaining Japanese forces.
- a.
- Dollar expenditures of the United States for
military equipment, etc.
(1)What portion of this, if any, will be
expended in Japan?
- b.
- Costs to be borne by the Japanese Government.
(1) To what extent would this involve
expenditure of foreign exchange by
Japan?
- c.
- What proportion of the total costs for
maintaining Japanese forces would be required for—
- (1)
- Light military equipment,
- (2)
- Heavy military equipment.
II. Development and use of
Japanese industrial capacity for the production of military
supplies and implements of war.
- A.
- To what extent will scarcities and delays in United States
industrial production have an effect on the ability of the
United States to supply U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan?
- 1.
- To what extent will such shortages be a limiting
factor upon the desired development of Japanese forces
until alternative supplies of such resources can be made
available?
- 2.
- Is there a critical year involved?
- B.
- Mindful of the current scarcities of certain vital materials,
the present and potential capabilities of Japanese industries,
the alternate uses of those industrial resources, the present
and future impact on the Japanese economy, the possibility of a
loss of Japan in the event of a general war, and the shipping
requirements to supply necessary imports for Japanese industry
during a war, what are the views of Defense with respect to the
development and use of industrial capacity in Japan for the
production of military supplies and equipment for—
- 1.
- United States forces in Japan.
- 2.
- United States forces stationed elsewhere.
- 3.
- Japanese security forces, and
- 4.
- Other friendly forces in Asia.
- C.
- Specifically, what are the views of Defense with reference to
the types of military supplies and equipment which Japan should
produce?
1. Should a distinction be made between encouragement of
Japanese heavy and light armament
industries?
