Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794C.0221/1–2552

No. 488
Memorandum by Myron M. Cowen, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] January 25, 1952.

Subject:

• Disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands

On October 17, 1951 General Ridgway submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with his endorsement a Staff Study prepared by General Headquarters, Far East Command, concerning United States Long Term Objectives with Respect to the Ryukyu Islands. A copy of this Staff Study, which was obtained by USPolAd and forwarded to the Department informally and confidentially, is attached hereto (Attachment I).² However, in as much as the JCS have not as yet transmitted the study to the Department, the fact that we are aware of its contents should not be discussed outside of the Department at this time.

The conclusions of the study (which General Ridgway observes are also applicable to Nampo Shoto, Parece Vela, and Marcus Island) are that the security of the strategically vital United States position along the off-shore island chain in the Western Pacific is in no way dependent on the perpetuation of United States political control, by virtue of a United Nations trusteeship or other device, over the Ryukyu Islands, and that there is no reason to suppose that the United States and Japan could not reach satisfactory arrangements retaining under United States long-term control such facilities in the Ryukyu Islands as are deemed essential by the JCS. General Ridgway, therefore, recommends that the United States initiate action to return these islands to Japanese control. However, he believes that this action should be deferred until the Treaty has been ratified and must be absolutely conditional upon a firm agreement with Japan to retain under our exclusive control such military facilities in the islands as are deemed essential by the JCS.

The conclusions reached by the Far East Command coincide with the early views of the Department that the Ryukyus should be returned to Japanese political and administrative control. As early as June, 1946, the Department proposed in SWNCC 59/1³ that the islands should be retained by Japan and demilitarized; however, this view was strongly contested by the JCS, who maintained that the United States should obtain sole trusteeship over the area. Subsequently, after Mr. Kennan’s trip to Japan in early 1948, the Department modified its position to the extent of supporting the retention of United States military installations in the Ryukyus on a long-term basis, with appropriate international arrangements regarding the disposition of the islands to be made at a later date; and on January 12, 1950 you stated in your extemporaneous talk at the National Press Club, “We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands and these we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations.”⁴ However, the eventual treaty provision on the subject (Article 3) was worded in such a manner as not to bind the United States to any specific course of action. Under this Article the views of the JCS were accommodated to the point of giving the United States an option of seeking a trusteeship over Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude, Nampo Shoto south of Sofu Gan and Parece Vela and Marcus Island (hereafter referred to simply as the Ryukyus and Bonins); and pending the making of a trusteeship proposal and affirmative action thereon, the right to exercise any and all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the islands and their inhabitants. The Article does not deprive Japan of sovereignty over the islands, nor does it require the United States to seek a trusteeship.

While Article 3 of the Treaty takes care of our immediate strategic interests in the area, it has become increasingly apparent during the past year that the assumption by the United States of a trusteeship over the Ryukyus and Bonins would raise a number of problems which in the long run might seriously affect the position of the United States in the Pacific. In the first place, the nearly 1,000,000 inhabitants of the islands are closely bound to Japan by ties of history, race, language, family, and trade which date back several centuries, and there has been increasing evidence that an overwhelming majority of the population actively advocates the return of the islands to Japanese control. It has been estimated that during the summer of 1951, 99% of the adult population of Amami Gunto (the northern Ryukyus) signed petitions requesting that the area be returned to Japan. Similar petitions circulated in Okinawa and the Southern Ryukyus are reported to have been signed by 74% and 80% of the adult population respectively.

Article 3 of the Treaty has also given rise to dissatisfaction among the Japanese, who regard the Ryukyus and Bonins as historically Japanese and an integral part of the Japanese homeland. This dissatisfaction has not been confined to leftist and rightist elements in Japan which are unfriendly to the United States; it has also been voiced by liberal groups who feel that the provision is contrary to the spirit of reconciliation and mutual trust inherent in the rest of the Treaty. Consequently, despite the fact that Japan has accepted the Treaty, it is probable that irredentist sentiment with regard to the Ryukyus and Bonins will persist.

A further consideration arises in the responsibilities which the United States would be required to assume as the administering authority for a trust territory of the islands. In general, both as a result of traditional United States policies in the administration of dependent areas and of the obligations set forth in the United Nations Charter, the United States would be expected to bring about the progressive improvement of political, economic, social and educational conditions in the area.

In this connection, as noted in Attachment 4,⁵ the Trusteeship Council would probably show special concern with regard to the development of self-government and the allocation of governmental posts to local inhabitants; the establishment of sound economic programs with particular reference to conservation, protection of the inhabitants against exploitation, customs duties, and land alienation; measures for social and educational advancement; the encouragement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including investigation of evidence of discrimination; and equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all United Nations members. The United States would also be obligated to submit annual reports to the Trusteeship Council, to send a special representative to Council hearings to reply to questions raised, to admit visiting United Nations missions to the area, and to permit the local inhabitants to petition the Council.

Aside from the problem of close United Nations supervision over the territory which might at some time result in criticism of United States policies in that forum, particularly in regard to the possible alienation of land for military purposes, trusteeship may raise political difficulties with the inhabitants, the great majority of whom desire that the islands be returned to Japan. Furthermore, the possibility that the area, which is seriously deficient in food, basic raw materials, and industry could ever become self-sufficient, is remote, and the islands will be an economic liability to any administering power.

A number of other countries, notably India, have been sensitive to the provisions of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, choosing to regard it as a device to perpetuate Western imperialism. While there is no reason to believe that the United States would be unable to conclude a trusteeship agreement with the United Nations, it is possible that the anti-colonial bloc in the United Nations would seek to assure that any trusteeship proposal submitted by the United States not subordinate the welfare of the native population to security considerations. It is also possible that the question of a time limit for trusteeship status might be raised. On the other hand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand would probably prefer that the United States assume trusteeship over the Ryukyus and Bonins in order to check any possible future moves on the part of Japan to expand southward. However, the present security agreements between the United States and those three countries offer them satisfactory protection, and they would probably raise no strong objection to the return of the islands to Japanese political control provided United States forces remain in the area on a long-term basis.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I believe that it would be unwise for the United States to proceed to exercise its option under Article 3 of the Treaty of seeking a trusteeship over the Ryukyus and Bonins. The pronounced feeling on the part of the inhabitants favoring a return to Japanese control, irredentist sentiment in Japan, the depressed economic status of the islands, and the problems which might be raised by continuing full United States responsibility for the administration of the area are liabilities which the United States should seek to avoid if it is possible in any other way to safeguard United States strategic interests in the Ryukyus and Bonins. This view is now held by General Ridgway and his command; and while the JCS have not indicated to the Department any change in their previous view that we should seek a trusteeship over the islands nor informed us of General Ridgway’s position, I believe that we should again raise the matter with Defense in an effort to find some means of ensuring our strategic interests in the islands without exercising political control over them.

It is accordingly recommended that:

1. The Department take the position that the United States should not exercise its option of seeking a trusteeship over the Ryukyus and Bonins, but should make bilateral arrangements with Japan for the return of the islands to Japanese control provided the United States may retain control over such military facilities in the islands as are deemed essential by the JCS.

2. I be authorized to discuss with the Department of Defense the problem of the disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonins with a view to obtaining their concurrence with the foregoing position, at the same time considering the means whereby it may be achieved.

Approved: Dean Acheson⁶

1. This memorandum was drafted by Douglas W. Overton of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and routed through Allison, who initialed it.
2. This memorandum, dated Oct. 16, 1951, is not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. For text of Acheson’s remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1950, p. 111.
5. This attachment was a memorandum, not printed, entitled “Implications of Trusteeship Under U.S. Administration for the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands”, dated Dec. 11, 1951, and prepared in the Office of Dependent Area Affairs. Attachments 2 and 3, neither printed, are “Excerpts from Basic Documents”, Jan. 28(?), 1952, drafted by Overton, and “U.S. Rights under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan”, Jan. 15, 1952, prepared in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs.

6. Acheson attached a brief handwritten note to this memorandum: “Mr. Allison: What happened to Mr. Dulles’ idea of a Presidential Commission on this subject? D.A.”.

   No reply from Allison has been found in Department of State files.