Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/1–2652

No. 489
Memorandum by the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to Dean Rusk, Special Representative of the President¹

secret

Tokyo, January 26, 1952.

Subject:

• Mission Views Regarding Political Effect of Administrative Agreement

1. The Mission is concerned that the situation contemplated by the draft Administrative Agreement is so similar to the present Occupation that the Yoshida Government will press for a number of changes in the draft, that there may be a significantly adverse public reaction to any Agreement substantially in the form of the present draft, and that future US-Japan relations might thereby be seriously prejudiced.

2. The property and jurisdiction aspects of the draft Agreement appear to provide no immediate important change in the status of the US forces upon the coming into force of Peace Treaty, although US authorities will no longer have extensive criminal diction over Japanese and there is the prospect of some change in the indefinite future the Joint Committee in respect to property and the coming into force of the NATO Agreement regarding legal status of forces. The financial burden to be borne under the proposed Agreement, though not precisely comparable to the present cost of Occupation, is undeniably a very considerable one which will probably arouse grave misgivings in Japan.

3. We consider there is a real possibility that should the Agreement be signed in substantially its present form, Japanese of all political persuasion will be seriously concerned that the Occupation is being continued under another name, while leftists and intellectual groups, already hostile to or suspicious of the United States, may take a position of strong opposition to the Administrative Agreement as well as to the Security Treaty and Peace Treaty and may be joined in this opposition by reemerging rightist elements averse to the present Japanese Government and eager to reassert their political strength.

4. We believe it probable that as a minimum the Japanese negotiators will want to study the draft Agreement at some length and will propose extensive revisions in wording and arrangement.² We do not discount the possibility that the Yoshida Government may hesitate to associate itself with the Agreement if the substance of the present draft is retained in all major respects.

5. We appreciate that the Agreement in its present form represents the considered view of the US Government and we do not propose at this point to raise matters of substance. We do, however, feel it important for political reasons in Japan that the Japanese should be given full opportunity to study and discuss the draft Agreement. Press reports from Washington indicate that the JCS desire conclusion of the Administrative Agreement as a condition precedent to US ratification of the Peace Treaty, and that the Senate may be prepared to act favorably within two or three weeks. We feel that any pressure brought to bear on the Japanese to sign the Agreement within two or three weeks would have particularly unfortunate results. As Mr. Dulles was reported to have observed before the Senate, the necessary number of ratifications of the Treaty are not likely to be deposited for several months even if the United States should ratify in the next few weeks, and this period of several months should provide more reasonable opportunity for the Japanese to consider the proposed Agreement.

WS

1. Rusk received this appointment, with the personal rank of Ambassador, on Jan. 23. He arrived in Tokyo on Jan. 25, for the purpose of negotiating the Administrative Agreement, at the head of a delegation which included Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army, and several technical experts.
2. On Jan. 29 the Japanese Government submitted to U.S. negotiators a document entitled “Observations and Requests in Regard to the Draft Administrative Agreement of December 21, 1951”. (Tokyo Post files, 320.1 BST) This paper is not printed because of its length and because in the opinion of the editors the principal concerns of the Japanese Government regarding the Administrative Agreement are illustrated in the documentation of the actual negotiations.