611.94/1–2452

No. 487
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

top secret

Dear John: I beg to refer to the personal and confidential memorandum from Prime Minister Yoshida addressed to John Foster Dulles dated 27 December 1951,1 received through General Ridgway. Following our conversations,2 paragraph 3 of this memorandum was summarized in a cable to our Senior Representative in Tokyo with the suggestion that General Ridgway might find an appropriate occasion to advise Prime Minister Yoshida that the appropriate authorities here are interested in his suggestion and are giving it most careful study with a view to a more detailed discussion of the matter with him at an early date. In this cable we further [Page 1116] suggested that General Ridgway might wish to add that the appropriate authorities here trust that the Prime Minister would be able to develop a program which would include his ideas as to the role which would be played respectively by his people and by our people so that the next conference might lead toward agreement on a course of action. The general substance of our outgoing cable was discussed with you.

Under date of 12 January 1952, we received a reply from our Senior Representative in Tokyo stating that he was authorized by General Ridgway to advise us that he is thoroughly in accord with the procedure outlined and that he will take it up with the Prime Minister at an early date and will then advise us further.

Meanwhile, in view of the fact that Brigadier General Ennis has been brought into the matter by General Ridgway, we have given General Bolling an outline of our cables to and from Tokyo on this matter.3

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles
  1. See the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1471.
  2. No record of conversations between Dulles and Allison on this topic has been found in Department of State files.
  3. In a letter to Allison dated Jan. 18, Allen Dulles wrote that the CIA had by then been informed that General Ridgway had delivered to the Prime Minister the message outlined above. “The Prime Minister replied that he did not have a plan but would develop one. Apparently his idea of assistance is based largely on the use of business agents for the sale of cheap merchandise, such as cotton goods. Such agents would move via Formosa and Southeast Asia, not through Korea.

    “As soon as we receive the Prime Minister’s plan, we will get in touch with you with a view to obtaining such policy guidance as you may consider appropriate to give.” (611.94/1–2852)