Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

79. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, December 8, 1981, 10:15–11:30 a.m.; 2:20–3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Global Negotiations and FY83 Foreign Assistance Budget

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• State:

  • Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
  • Dep. Sec. William P. Clark
  • Under Sec. James L. Buckley
  • Under Sec. Richard T. Kennedy

• Treasury:

  • Secretary Donald T. Regan

• OSD:

  • Dep. Sec. Frank C. Carlucci

• Justice:

  • Attorney Gen. William French Smith

• OMB:

  • Dir. David Stockman
  • Mr. Edward Harper
  • Mr. William Schneider

• CIA:

  • Dir. William J. Casey

• USUN:

  • Amb. Jeane Kirkpatrick

• JCS:

  • Acting Chairman Thomas B. Hayward
  • Lt. Gen. Paul F. Gorman

• AID:

  • Admin. Peter McPherson

• White House:

  • Mr. Edwin Meese III
  • Mr. James A. Baker III
  • Mr. Michael K. Deaver
  • Admiral James W. Nance
  • Admiral Daniel Murphy
  • Mr. Richard Darman
  • Mr. Craig Fuller
  • Mr. Edward Hickey

• NSC:

  • R. Adm. John Poindexter
  • Major Robert Kimmitt
  • Mr. Henry R. Nau

• OPD:

  • Dir. Martin Anderson

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

A.M. Session

KIRKPATRICK began the discussion by arguing that the U.S. should go along with the emerging consensus in New York to launch the Global Negotiations. All countries, she pointed out, were ready to accept the resolution at Tab A of the documents distributed for this NSC meeting.² She had made clear in New York, however, that the U.S. could not accept this resolution as is, and she was asking the NSC to approve the amendments to this resolution suggested in Tab B and on that basis to indicate U.S. acceptance of the resolution.³ She has concluded that the political costs of not going along with the resolution with these amendments were higher than any political or economic costs which might result from the Global Negotiations themselves. Like it or not the Global Negotiations had become the litmus test of a country’s good will and support for the developing countries. It was time for the U.S., which has thrown a lot of money at development, to start throwing some politics at development. We would get more credit for our real assistance if we would play along in the game of “rhetorical assistance” in such organizations as the United Nations.

HAIG supported Kirkpatrick’s recommendation and itemized the changes in the UN text (November 30) that we would require. First, the preamble should note and not reaffirm UN Resolution 34/138.

MEESE asked if we had to note it. Couldn’t we just leave it out?

HAIG responded that we would have to note it and that moreover some parts of 34/138 were good, while other parts which Jim Baker read to us in the meeting before Cancun were unacceptable.

BAKER said that he thought we had decided before Cancun not to agree to return to preparatory talks in the UN if they were based on 34/138.

HAIG restated his view that we must note it. He went on to review the rest of the resolution. Paragraph 1, he pointed out, convenes the conference for Global Negotiations but paragraph 2 indicated that the conference must first establish an agenda, procedures, and time frame for the negotiations. In effect, therefore, the conference convened by paragraph 1 was a preliminary conference. Paragraph 3 provided a firm rule of consensus which protected the U.S. from being isolated on any issue taken up by the conference. He felt that this paragraph enabled the U.S., if pressed, to break up the Global Negotiations on substance and argued that this would be a much better way to terminate Global Negotiations if they did not conform to our basic interests than to block the launching of the negotiations. Paragraph 4, as revised, fully protected the specialized agencies.

MEESE asked whether the term specialized fora in paragraph 4 included GATT.

KIRKPATRICK replied yes, she had three legal opinions to that effect.

REGAN stated that he was opposed to the resolution as amended in Tab B.⁴ He felt that we were rushing into something that we still had not defined. The resolution launched Global Negotiations, not a preparatory process to define agenda and procedures. We have not yet defined all of the points with respect to agenda and procedures. Ambassador Kirkpatrick is doing a good job in developing these points and should continue to do it for a while longer. Consensus doesn’t mean necessarily that we are protected. The chair sometimes rules consensus even when there are two or three objections. Those objecting are then encouraged to insert reservations. We must have some idea of what we are getting into, otherwise we should do nothing. The understandings which the President laid out at Cancun are not all incorporated in this resolution. We are not ready to go to Global Negotiations themselves. We should insert the word preliminary before the word conference in each paragraph of the resolution at Tab B.

HAIG pointed out that Kirkpatrick had done an outstanding job in New York. She has not allowed herself to be pinned down. She has led the Europeans to believe that we will accept more than we actually can accept. This has caused the Europeans some concern and put them in a mood to support our changes.

REGAN pointed out that for two years the U.S. government has said that agreement on agenda and procedure must precede the launching of Global Negotiations.

HAIG responded that he would be happy with preliminary in or out of the resolution.

THE PRESIDENT noted that he would feel better with it in.

DARMAN noted that we should be sure and nail down our understanding of the consensus rule early in the negotiations of the procedures of the conference.

MEESE expressed concern that the resolution misleads other countries into thinking that the U.S. is prepared to go in one direction when in fact we are not.

HAIG pointed out that we could insist on our conditions in the preliminary talks.

MEESE wondered if we are not falling into the same trap by recognizing UN resolution 34/138.

HAIG responded that we were only noting it.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that he did not say no at Cancun. He said that he wanted to help with private investment, agricultural task forces, and so forth. This is where the U.S. wants to make a contribution. We want to be positive but in these substantive areas.

ANDERSON pointed out that the impression would exist domestically that we have changed our position. He thought that our intention before Cancun was to say no to 34/138 and to Global Negotiations. Now he is not so sure.

THE PRESIDENT said that he agreed to preliminary negotiations and to provide help in substantive areas.

MEESE worried about selling our position here at home. Kirkpatrick’s assessment of the views of other nations was correct, but we also had to be concerned about the views of the American people. At Philadelphia and Cancun, the President had set out an economic program and point-of-view which had gained wide respect not only at home but in many countries abroad. We must not give the impression that we are sliding back from this point-of-view.

THE VICE PRESIDENT agreed with Kirkpatrick and Haig. He pointed out that it is unlikely that the UN will accept the resolution even without the word preliminary in it. And if the UN does accept it, the results will not harm us.

REGAN repeated his view that it was dangerous when you don’t know what you are getting into.

HAIG agreed with the Vice President that the chances of passing the resolution without changes were slim. He noted that the President had threaded the needle at Cancun and that we had to preserve this delicate balance. He believed that we should lawyer this thing a little more.

REGAN pointed out that we don’t have agreement on our understandings.

HAIG replied that we are talking about foreign policy—breaking the Third World away from the Soviets. This was what it was all about.

P.M. Session

HAIG urged that the participants look at the resolution.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his concern that we were proceeding down the line step by step and wondered when we would reach the point of no return. He queried whether we could stick in the word preliminary.

KIRKPATRICK pointed out that the consensus in the UN is strong against us. It probably will not make much difference. We could accept preliminary and still be able to argue that we were acting in good faith.

THE VICE PRESIDENT pointed out that our allies should stick with us on this one. Some participants in this dialogue seek a restructuring of the international economic system. Others seek to remove obstacles. These issues must be discussed somewhere.

KIRKPATRICK noted that the odds were 9 to 2 that the resolution would not be accepted.

REGAN asked what we would do if the UN proposed the resolution at Tab A (without the U.S. recommended changes)?

KIRKPATRICK said she had been begging countries to go ahead without us.

HAIG said they would not go ahead without us however.

MEESE asked then whether we had agreement on inserting the word preliminary. He then raised the problem of new institutions which is implied in paragraph 4 where the conference is given the right to create new fora.

HAIG replied that this referred only to committees in the UN, not to separate organizations.

THE PRESIDENT noted that he had talked about task forces at Cancun and that is what we are talking about in paragraph 4. There might be committees that would look into the availability of resources in developing countries or that would seek to provide advice or assistance in developing countries in certain sectors, such as the U.S. task forces would do in the agricultural sector.

KIRKPATRICK summarized the agreement by noting that we would insist on the insertion of the word preliminary before the word conference in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution at Tab B. In addition we would eliminate the word first from paragraph 2 of the resolution at Tab B.

MEESE ended the discussion by noting that we now had a position that was fully consistent with the President’s policy at Cancun.

[Omitted here is discussion of the FY 1983 Foreign Assistance Budget.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting File, NSC 00029 12/08/1981 [Global Negotiations, Libya, Foreign Assistance, Budget, Terrorism]; NLR–750–3–1–11–2. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The portion of the meeting dealing with the FY 1983 foreign assistance budget is printed as Document 270 and is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 73.
2. Not attached. A copy of Tab A, an undated “UN Draft of the Proposed Resolution,” is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting File, NSC 00029 12/08/1981 [Global Negotiations, Libya, Foreign Assistance, Budget, Terrorism].
3. A copy of Tab B, an undated “Proposed Resolution with US Amendments,” is ibid. A copy of an “NSC Discussion Paper” on Global Negotiations outlining Kirkpatrick’s analysis of the proposed resolution presented in Tab B, including her judgment that submitting the Tab B version would certify the United States’ “good faith,” is ibid.
4. In a December 8 memorandum to Regan, Leland wrote that Kirkpatrick’s Global Negotiations paper was a “disaster” and “written for third graders with only analysis of the pros and not the cons.” Leland presented points for Regan to stress at the NSC meeting, concluding that Kirkpatrick’s proposed resolution “does not meet U.S. objectives.” (National Archives, RG 56, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, Official Files, 1981, UD–10D27, 56–83–71, Box 35, Memo to the Secretary Classified December 81)