Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

66. Memorandum From the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Chew) to the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs (Fuller)¹

Washington, October 17, 1981

SUBJECT

• Comments on State draft Cancun opening remarks for the President

Put bluntly, State’s draft opening remarks are an astonishing departure from the philosophy, themes, and substance already embraced by the President for his participation in the Cancun Summit.² His Philadelphia speech, only two days ago, outlined these at length and cast them explicitly as his platform for Cancun.³ The State draft has little in common and much in conflict [with] the Philadelphia speech. It is so inconsistent with the approved internal guidance circulated on October 13 by you and Dick Darman that it cannot even serve as a basis for further drafts.⁴

Moreover, on at least one major policy issue—the U.S. stand on U.N. Global Negotiations (GN)—State’s draft announces a course of action explicitly rejected by the President and other participants in the recent Cabinet-level discussions, as recorded in your October 13 memorandum. (The approach is even at odds with State’s own unilateral rewrite of that decision in Secretary Haig’s memorandum of October 14 to the President.)⁵

The Administration’s position since early spring has consistently been that we would defer a GN decision until after Cancun. The State draft rejects this and:

— volunteers, at the outset of Cancun, a U.S. return to the New York GN preparatory process;

— restates and softens each of the four conditions for talks in paragraph (4) of your October 13 memo (also found in paragraph (2) of the State rewrite);

— reduces the conditions to mere “considerations” which need only be accepted as “reasonable” by Cancun participants; and

— omits the crucial point of the unacceptability of further GN preparations on the basis of UNGA Resolution 34/138—which, if not conveyed, would lead to total misunderstanding of the U.S. position.

As the to the rest of the State draft, its compatibility with the President’s Philadelphia address is remote at best. For example:

— the President’s “three solid pillars” for a “cooperative strategy for global growth to benefit both developed and developing nations” are nowhere referred to in the State draft, nor are the “five strategic principles” which comprise the framework for his action program;

— his basic philosophy of market-oriented policies and a better private/public sector balance goes unstated, in favor of vague references to “a new era of growth”, interdependence, and the importance of public sector aid programs (the first mention of the private sector occurs in an apologetic explanation that “there are certain types of projects which the private sector cannot finance . . .”);

— rather than stressing, as the President did, that assistance should purposefully develop “self-sustaining productive capacities, particularly in food and energy”, with emphasis on domestic policy improvements, the draft highlights the volumes of assistance we are prepared to commit (“one-half of an bilateral development assistance to agriculture; . . . a considerable amount of resources” to following up the UN Energy Conference);

— where the President’s speech praised the GATT, IMF, and World Bank for helping “to maintain maximum flexibility and opportunity for individual enterprise and an open international trading and financial system,” the State draft focuses on resource transfer and assistance programs of the international institutions—even going so far as to compliment the “commendable role” played by the UNCTAD!

Many other examples could be cited. Taken together, they most closely resemble the essential themes and approaches of the previous Administration.

It would be far more appropriate, and entirely logical, for the President’s opening Cancun statement to flow from and build on his Philadelphia speech. Not only does that address present a clear-cut philosophical and policy framework—which is entirely absent from the State draft—but it also includes a reasonably elaborate action program which is a key element in showing that there are practical alternatives to Global Negotiations. There is nothing to be gained by shortchanging either the President’s philosophy or his action program, when other Heads of State are listening.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Trip File, North-South Economic Summit Cancun Mexico 10/22/1981–10/23/1981; NLR–755–3–16–3–0. Confidential.
2. See footnote 2, Document 65.
3. See footnote 2, Document 38.
4. See Document 63.
5. See Document 64.