Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

61. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Bilateral Meetings and Your Objectives at Cancun, October 21–24, 1981

The bilateral meetings you will hold at Cancun will probably be more important to the outcome of this meeting than your bilaterals were to the outcome of the Ottawa Summit.

Al’s memorandum identifies a number of common themes for all the bilaterals as they relate to our objectives at the Summit.² Let me elaborate a few points.

The meetings the first day with Lopez Portillo (Mexico), Zhao (China), Gandhi (India), Shagari (Nigeria), and Herrera Campins (Venezuela), and Thursday morning³ with Kraigher (Yugoslavia) are particularly critical. We have scheduled these meetings to take place before the plenary sessions begin in order to give you an early opportunity to influence these leaders. Their support is essential to a successful outcome at the Summit. As Al’s memorandum suggests, such an outcome from our perspective implies no forced decisions and priority emphasis on personal rapport among the leaders and a broad exchange of views on serious issues (where differences are actually smaller than on the symbolic issues, such as Global Negotiations).

With Lopez Portillo, you should capitalize on the excellent personal relationship you have established to indicate that you are looking to his leadership to produce a cooperative and constructive outcome. Now that Kreisky (Austria), the other co-chairman, is not coming, Lopez Portillo is likely to be very cautious. You might suggest to him that, at a first meeting of this type among world leaders from both industrial and developing countries, the spirit of the meeting is far more important than specific results, particularly since Cancun is not empowered to take decisions and no consensus exists on specific points. Perhaps the leaders could agree on some form of continuing contact. That would demonstrate concrete resolve to back up a “new spirit of Cancun.”

With Zhao (China), you should stress the importance of moderation and success at Cancun as the best way to dramatize the exclusion of the Soviets and the world’s repudiation of Soviet actions in the Third World, particularly in Afghanistan and Indo-China. Point out to him that we need a success out of this meeting in order to keep the pressure on the Soviets in the Third World. Thus we hope China can help to tone down any possible conflict at Cancun over symbolic issues (e.g. Global Negotiations).

With Gandhi (India), you should appeal to the tradition of Indian influence in the developing world and suggest that her help is needed to assure other countries that the United States has a positive and sensitive program for world economic revival and development. Inform her that U.S. concerns about the dialogue between industrial and developing countries derive from fear that this dialogue, as presently structured, can only lead to further polarization. We seek a course that promises something more hopeful. According to a recent press report, Gandhi is said to be willing to accept a different type of forum than Global Negotiations as long as the aim remains the same.

Nigeria and Venezuela played helpful moderating roles at the Foreign Ministers Preparatory Meeting in August. You might refer to this when you meet Shagari (Nigeria) and Herrera Campins (Venezuela) and express your hope that the present meeting will build upon and advance this spirit. Venezuela, although frequently a leader of OPEC and the developing country caucus (known as the Group–77), is working closely with us in bilateral and regional affairs, particularly in the Caribbean. You might mention to Herrera Campins that we appreciate the fact that Venezuela is acting (i.e., committing its own resources) and not just talking about the development process.

Yugoslavia is eager to play a bridging role between the U.S. and more radical developing countries. You might indicate to Kraigher that you are deeply concerned that developing countries appreciate the positive approach the United States is taking. It is precisely because we are serious about the real problems of development that we do not believe that any dialogue, however constructed, can serve this purpose. Yugoslavia could play a pivotal role in obtaining an agreement on a Cancun follow-up.

The other bilaterals are also important to the outcome of the meeting, but more by way of limiting damage. The meetings on Friday with Algeria, Tanzania and Guyana may create some anticipation that will favorably influence the positions these countries take in the plenary sessions. Bangladesh is likely to play a moderate role, and the bilateral meeting will reinforce this. The Philippines and Saudi Arabia are key U.S. partners in the quest for peace. While they may not be unusually helpful to us in the plenary meetings, they are also unlikely to take the lead against our interests.

We have not scheduled separate bilaterals with industrial countries both to emphasize the developing country focus of the meeting and to avoid any appearance of needing a go-between with developing countries or of ganging up on the developing countries. If appropriate, we have left open breakfast on Saturday morning for a possible, common meeting with the industrial country leaders.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Trip File, President Reagan’s Participation in the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development Cancun, Mexico 10/21/1981–10/23/1981 Bilateral Meetings (Binder); NLR–755–2–28–3–8. Secret.
2. A copy of an undated memorandum from Haig to Reagan on Reagan’s bilateral meetings at the Cancun Summit is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Trip File, [Photos—Cancun 10/20/1981–10/23/1981].
3. Thursday, October 22.