Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

54. Memorandum From the U.S. Representative to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick) to the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs¹

Washington, October 1, 1981

SUBJECT

• Cancun and Global Negotiations

1. Whether or not the United States will agree to participate in global negotiations in the United Nations has unfortunately become the central issue surrounding the Cancun Summit Meeting. It will prove impossible for us to sidestep or finesse this issue. All OECD countries and indeed all developed countries urge the United States to participate in global negotiations as a political gesture to poorer countries. The less developed countries attending Cancun feel themselves under great pressure from non-Cancun participants to “deliver” on an agreement to launch global negotiations. This has thus become the touchstone of the meetings “success” and the United States attitude toward the less developed nations.

2. We should expect no progress in concrete economic patterns to emerge from a global negotiation process in the United Nations. Such progress can only take place in smaller specialist groups.

3. The Europeans and other developed nations, e.g. Australia, Canada, Japan are convinced that unreasonable economic proposals can be deflected or watered down as many such proposals made at UN conferences have in the past.

4. The global negotiation framework presents developing countries an opportunity they badly want to argue their case. We have many indications that the LDCs (i.e., India, Brazil) will be flexible on matters of both a global negotiation agenda and procedures at Cancun. They do not expect much from us. This gives us an opportunity to be positive on the principle [of] global negotiations but very demanding about procedures, locations, and agendas.

5. UN experience teaches:

a) that the other developed countries are quite willing to bear the brunt of the defense of the developed countries economic and political interests. We should not let them do this.

b) that there are many deep divisions of interest and points of view among the LDCs which will emerge in the course of actual negotiations.

c) that New York is a singularly poor place for prudent, non-political consideration of international issues. Paris, with its OECD structure, would surely prove more amenable to concerted action of the developed countries.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Investment Policy Files, 1981–1984, Lot 85D193: Cancun Summit—Global Negotiations. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Sent under an October 2 covering memorandum from Lollis to multiple recipients, in which Lollis explained that this memorandum was handed out at the October 1 meeting of the CCEA.