Office of the Historian

49. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to Henry Nau of the National Security Council Staff1

Washington, September 21, 1981

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Policy and Tactics at Cancun Summit

I have read with interest and even admiration the initial Cancun gameplan set out in the materials you sent us earlier this month. A few quick observations follow:

—
The case for a relatively high-profile Presidential performance seems to me imperative, for reasons that are both implicit and explicit in the framework papers and which can be summed up in this way: because the industrial countries will inevitably be cast in the role of heavies who have too long shirked their responsibilities vis-à-vis the LDCs, the best defense will be a strong offense;
—
That offense should make maximum use of the President’s communications and interpersonal talents, including the major keynote speech recommended in the papers2 (where does this idea stand, by the way?);
—
As both a fail-safe ploy for circumventing Mexico/Canada-type efforts to control the plenary discussions and an integral part of our offensive strategy, the President should have the fullest possible schedule of bilaterals, concentrating on LDC leaders, talking turkey to them as only he can (especially to turkeys like Nyerere). In fact, it would be psychologically beneficial for the U.S. image if the President dealt exclusively with the LDCs, rather than scheduling any Western bilaterals, a move which would preclude charges of Western “collusion” and, more positively, demonstrate our pragmatic interest in and priority for LDC views.3

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Douglas McMinn Files, Economic Summit Files, Mexico—Tactics. Confidential. Copies were sent to Allen and Blair.↩
  2. Reagan delivered the opening statement at the Cancun Summit on October 22. For the text of his statement, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, Book II, pp. 980–982.↩
  3. Nau highlighted this sentence and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.↩