Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

310. Memorandum From Richard Levine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 12, 1984

SUBJECT

• Food Aid

In response to your request that we explore food and developmental aid options to feed the world’s hungry, John Poindexter, Roger Robinson and I met. John asked that I develop terms of reference for an NSSD,² followed by an NSDD³ laying out how U.S. and Western aid programs could be improved to feed the world’s hungry. This, of course, is no small undertaking. Hunger has been with us throughout history, and there is no “silver bullet” to eliminate it and its consequences. Since WWII, a complex structure of U.S. and Western programs has been built to deal with the hunger problem. Despite dramatic growth in the world’s population, due in part—ironically—to better nutrition and health care, world food production has also risen dramatically due to the “green revolution” of new wonder grains.

The first step in conducting an NSC review of the developmental and food aid issue would be the codification of existing USG studies in this area. USDA, for instance, is now conducting a large study on the worldwide hunger issue. I would then set up a small, professional working-level group to establish the terms of reference for the study, leading to a formal NSSD with corresponding agency dedication to the review. Since I will be gone through the end of this month, I would begin this effort in early February with a view to issuing an NSSD 3 weeks thereafter. The completion time for the study would be 2 to 3 months.

The whole area of global hunger has actually been the subject of numerous studies, but perhaps with concerted interagency effort some fresh and relative approaches could be found. Potential strategies, however, may require increased funding.

Apart from the NSSD, there is the more immediate question of increasing food aid to those countries—principally in Africa—now experiencing a severe drought.⁴ An additional $100–200 million in P.L. 480 would be, unlike the $1 billion figure proposed earlier, of some real benefit to these people. However, we should realize that the current size of our food and developmental aid programs was shaped through the budget process where these issues were fought out. In most cases, the Administration selected the “high option” on these food aid funding issues. To now evince support for more food aid funding will send a very curious message to the bureaucracy and knowledgeable members of the Hill, and intensify requests from the international community. For instance, in a recent “off-the-record” conversation with USDA Under Secretary Amstutz, he expressed wonderment at the fact that we were even considering increasing food aid, given the fact that his budget requests for loan guarantees were recently trimmed by billions. I say all this not to be a spoiler; I just want to give you a full picture of the departure that a new food aid initiative would be from recent deliberations.

If the President desires to take immediate steps to combat the hunger problem, a $100–200 million P.L. 480 program, as an FY 84 supplemental program, should be considered. This supplemental would bring our FY 84 program up to our requested FY 85 program level of $1.7 billion. USDA might have some alternative food aid approach, such as credits, to do much the same thing. Certain OMB staffers have alternative approaches stressing greater private sector participation in concessional grain export financing. Thus, in order to speedily move ahead to address the present issue of the severe drought in Africa, I believe we should ask that the President approve our tasking the SIG–IEP to review such a P.L. 480 supplemental, or its equivalent, on a 2-week turnaround. The SIG–IEP’s report could then be considered at a BRB meeting you could convene. A complicating factor to increased P.L. 480 funding would be its impact on domestic program growth, or foreign assistance cuts when the Hill reviews it.

Messrs. Robinson and Wettering concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.⁵

1. Source: Reagan Library, David Wigg Files, Unfoldered, Unfoldered Subject File, Food Aid. Confidential. Sent for action.
2. For the text of National Security Study Directive 1–84, “U.S. Third World Hunger Relief,” February 27, 1984, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Document 218.
3. For the text of National Security Decision Directive 143, “U.S. Third World Hunger Relief: Emergency Assistance,” July 9, 1984, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Document 221.
4. For documentation on U.S. policy toward the African famine crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Documents 203–259.
5. McFarlane did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Attached but not printed at Tab I is the undated memorandum to the President. Attached but not printed at Tab A is an undated memorandum from McFarlane to Regan.