31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to the White House Deputy Chief of Staff (Deaver)1
SUBJECT
- Cancun Summit Preparatory Meeting
There are three issues on the agenda of the Cancun preparatory meeting this weekend:2
- 1.
- evaluation of recent developments in North-South relations, including a Canadian report on the results of the Ottawa Summit;3
- 2.
- identification of the issues to be discussed by the heads of state or government in October;
- 3.
- agreement on format and procedures for the October meeting.
The issues seem harmless enough, but there are some briars buried in the bushes.
The topic of Global Negotiations (GNs)4 will be raised under the first heading. Algeria, Guyana, and others seek a commitment to launch GNs. They may argue this weekend that Ottawa took one step in this direction and that this preparatory meeting should take the next step so that Cancun can focus on other matters. The European Community is committed to give impetus to GNs at both Ottawa and Cancun. Hence, it too will favor getting this issue out of the way. The U.S. has said it will make no decision until after Cancun. Some believe the U.S. can hold this position without GNs becoming an issue at Cancun. Others believe that we should begin now to explore internally and with allies and friends how GNs might be restructured. If Cancun is successful, as it must be, the U.S. will in all likelihood have to join these negotiations in New York. We can begin now to try to make them acceptable, wait until after Cancun to do so, or delay our decision indefinitely in the hope that GNs will die or a non-New York alternative will emerge.
The identification of issues for the October meeting involves a difference of view between those, led by the Mexicans, who seek a [Page 84] structured agenda and debate in October along North-South bloc lines (e.g., one North country speaking to an issue, followed by a South country speaking to the same issue) and others who favor sticking with the terms, set at the March preparatory meeting, that there will be no agenda and an open exchange of views. The Mexicans also favor a negotiated Chairman’s Summary or communique, although it was decided in March that there would be no communique. There is only mild support at this point for the Mexican positions, but if we had to oppose these positions strongly, it would cost us something in our broader relations with the hosts.
Format and procedures for October include the possibility of additional participants, whether heads of state will make formal presentations, and whether further preparations are necessary between now and October. No doubt the issue of Cuban participation will be raised. Few actually favor this, but practically all are unwilling openly to oppose it. The U.S. should simply argue that the present number of participants is balanced and manageable. We have indicated that the President would like to make a statement at Cancun, which could then be published perhaps along with other statements as proceedings of the meeting. Between now and October, we have much work to do to prepare this statement and to use this occasion to put the President’s imprint on the international development dialogue and on the direction of U.S. foreign assistance programs. We oppose any further international preparations for the October meeting.
One final note: if we portray this Summit as an occasion to establish personal lines of communications between the heads of state or government of many of these countries (and hence not as a decision-making or negotiating session), we will need to think hard about the President’s bilateral meetings. As we saw at Ottawa, these meetings are critical for the tone that emerges from such a Summit. And they exploit the President’s strong suit at personal communications. On the other hand, we cannot overload him, as we did to some extent at Ottawa, and time is very limited. We may want to consider having him arrive a day earlier or stay a day after the meetings.