Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

29. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 16, 1981, 11:30 a.m.–4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mexico:

  • Jorge Eduardo Navarrete, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
  • Andres Rozental, Director General, North American Affairs
  • Carmen Moreno, Director General for Multilateral Economic Affairs
  • Florencio Acosta, Minister, Mexican Embassy

• Austria:

  • George Lennkh, Foreign Policy Assistant to Chancellor Kreisky
  • Nicholas Sherk, Minister Counselor, Austrian Embassy

• United States:

  • The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
  • Henry Nau, NSC
  • Ambassador Charles Meissner, EB/SEN
  • Gordon Brown, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO
  • Robert Bruce McMullen, EB/IFD/ODF (notetaker)

SUBJECT

• Preparations for Cancun Summit/Global Negotiations

Under Secretary Rashish began the conversation by stating that while the United States had more modest ambitions for Cancun than some other countries it was better to begin slowly but surely. He emphasized the benefit of allowing time for bilateral meetings during the summit and asked what plans there were for the August 1–2 foreign ministers meeting in Cancun.

Mr. Navarrete, who was the chief spokesman for the visitors, responded by listing three purposes of the August 1–2 meeting. These were: 1) evaluation of recent North/South developments in north-south topics; 2) clarification of issues to be discussed at Cancun in October; 3) finalization of preparations for the Cancun summit.

Regarding the first item, the status of Global Negotiations in the United States and the results of the Ottawa Summit on north-south issues will dominate. Mr. Navarrete urged that now is the time for an international reaffirmation of the major elements of a global, simultaneous approach to north-south issues (i.e. global negotiations). If this can be accomplished before October, perhaps at Ottawa or early in the thirty-sixth UNGA, it would substantially improve the atmosphere for Cancun. For the next hour discussion focussed entirely on global negotiations and to a lesser degree the Ottawa summit.

Mr. Navarrete stated that in his view the South will expect some “facilitation” of global negotiations at Cancun. If this is not the case there could be difficulties at Cancun. Cancun should also result in a clear reaffirmation of the global negotiation process as well as a thorough discussion and understanding of the substantive issues which are behind the procedural problems in global negotiations. However, if substance is to be discussed, doubt regarding continued interest in global negotiations must first be eliminated. It would be harmful if the Ottawa summit does not produce a clear and positive statement on north-south relations.

At one point Mr. Lennkh interjected to add that many countries consider Cancun to be the touchstone regarding global negotiations and that a symbolic gesture of movement on this issue is required to defuse mounting frustration.

Under Secretary Rashish stated that Canadian Foreign Minister Mark MacGuigan possibly could give a report at the Cancun preparatory meeting on what took place at Ottawa. He cautioned that he doesn’t expect Ottawa to result in a quick agreement to resume global negotiations but added that he didn’t think Mr. Navarrete would be disappointed with the results of the Ottawa Summit. The Under Secretary insisted that raising global negotiations as a first item at either the August or October Cancun meetings would be premature and take up time in discussion which could be better devoted to more substantive issues (e.g. food, energy). The United States is prepared to discuss the underlying differences which are behind the stalemate in global negotiations but is not prepared to reach an agreement on Global Negotiations at Cancun since that would be counter to the spirit of the March Vienna preparatory meeting.² One of the reasons the President agreed to go to Cancun was because the United States wants to change the political dynamics of our economic relations with the developing world and view issues in a more useful way.

At a couple of points Messrs. Nau and Meissner intervened. Ambassador Meissner stressed that at Cancun procedural objectives should not be placed over substantive ones in order to gain consensus and that we view a major benefit of Cancun as simply being the opportunity for our President to meet informally with a large number of heads of states from the developing world.

Mr. Nau stressed that there should be no doubt that the United States recognizes the importance of relations with the South. The United States however does not want to make empty gestures or go back to old ways in dealing with North-South issues. The United States sees Cancun as a way to clear the air.

Mr. Navarrete agreed that a briefing at the Cancun preparatory meeting on the results of Ottawa, as Under Secretary Rashish had suggested, would be useful.

[Omitted here is discussion of logistics and planning.]

Discussion then shifted to handling of topics and which ones should be discussed at the October meeting. Mr. Navarrete suggested that discussion of each topic commence with two brief presentations, one by a developing country and the other by a developed country. The US side reacted negatively to this. Ambassador Meissner suggested that the August 1–2 meeting address the issue of topics. Perhaps an informal, non-definitive list could be agreed to. It was agreed this should be examined in the afternoon discussions.

In answer to a question from Ambassador Meissner, Mr. Navarrete listed what benefits he thought other developing countries envisioned coming from the Cancun Summit. These were: attracting a high level of political attention to north-south issues; the opportunity to obtain views and a broad political consensus that can assist in other discussions and the opportunity to make some concrete movement on some issues which are stalled. He cautioned that no one expects concrete agreements but that all these countries expect a recognition of where things are to result. Mr. Navarrete said he hoped the following could be achieved in October: 1) a general recognition of the necessity of economic growth, of interdependence and of moving ahead on north-south issues; 2) some specific understandings, e.g. more specific guidelines on food or energy and 3) perhaps some understanding on follow-up to Cancun.

The Under Secretary asked whether ministers would be expected to speak at Cancun in October and was told no since this would mean 66 spaces (two ministers plus head of state for each country) rather than 22 spaces would have to be provided at the conference table. It was agreed that this question should be raised at the August meeting.

Everyone agreed that the issue of adding additional countries to participate or observe in Cancun was closed.

Mr. Rozental asked for a list of people who would be accompanying the Secretary to the August 1–2 meeting. He was told a list would be provided.

The Under Secretary excused himself at 2:20 and the rest of the group returned to the Under Secretary’s office for further discussion. Ambassador Meissner acted as host.

Mr. Navarrete began by stating that a formal agenda is not needed for an informal meeting, but something is required to ensure issues are focused in Cancun. The October meeting must provide the opportunity for specific discussion. He then referred to the short paper on “framework for discussion” which the Mexican government has prepared to stimulate discussion.³ With the exception of commodities and domestic oriented industrial development all the issues which should be addressed are covered within the four topics: energy, food/agriculture, finance and trade/industrial development.

At this point, Mr. Lennkh added that Chancellor Kreisky believes the number of items for discussion in October should be even more restricted. The question is how to decide on two or three topics.

Ambassador Meissner then described the United States reaction to the Mexican paper. The four topics are satisfactory with the exception of portions of the finance section dealing with monetary issues. However, the United States does not agree with the relative emphasis given the four areas. For example, too much attention is paid to financial issues and too little to food and agriculture. The paper places too much attention on international measures. Thirty-three suggestions are provided on what can be done by developed countries; only two on what the developing countries can do domestically. Resource problems with international ramifications are not discussed, e.g. population, air and water pollution, deforestation, etc. The paper does not distinguish between short (e.g. finance) medium (e.g. energy) and longterm (e.g. natural resources) problems. While of value, Ambassador Meissner felt the paper would cause more problems than it would resolve if it was tabled in Cancun for discussion. He added that the United States viewed Cancun as a “sensitivity session”, as an opportunity to exchange views and concepts, that the United States wants to provide a philosophical approach for its economic relations with the developing world and that a Presidential statement on economic relations with developing countries was being considered, using Cancun as a vehicle.

Mr. Navarrete responded that he expects there will be differences of opinion at the summit regarding the relative balance between internal and external policies. There must be a compatibility between international cooperative measures and domestic policies aimed at adjustment. A healthy US economy will help the world economy but the developing countries don’t want to wait until this is achieved. He added that it might be useful to develop even more specific topics for discussion and that he now was looking at items which could be drawn from each of the four areas earlier referred to (e.g. on energy address development of indigenous resources).

Mr. Lennkh asked what the United States expected from the Cancun summit. Ambassador [Meissner] responded that the United States hopes Cancun will result in a greater sense of interdependence—an understanding that decisions made in one area often have an impact in others—and the development of personal relationships between the President and other heads of state.

At the end of the meeting a message was passed on that the Secretary would be able to attend the proposed July 31 dinner but that he would have to depart Cancun August 2 at 5:00 p.m. A tentative list of who would be heading the US delegation to the August 1–2 meeting also was provided (the Secretary, Under Secretary Rashish, Assistant Secretary Hormats, Ambassador Meissner and Henry Nau of the NSC).

The meeting ended at 4:00 p.m.

(Following the meeting Mr. Lennkh told Ambassador Meissner that the Austrian government favored a summit meeting which was less formal and structured than what the Mexicans preferred.)

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Investment Policy Files, 1981–1984, Lot 85D193: Cancun Summit—Miscellaneous II. Limited Official Use. The meeting took place at Rashish’s office and the Watergate Terrace Restaurant. Drafted by Robert McMullen (EB/IFD/ODF); cleared by Meissner and Gordon Brown (IO). Nau’s handwritten notes of portions of the meeting are in the Reagan Library, Douglas McMinn Files, Economic Summit Files, Mexico—General.
2. See Document 7.
3. Not found.