Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

269. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (Buckley) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Clark)¹

Washington, October 21, 1981

SUBJECT

• IDCA

You asked for my views on the issue of IDCA, and Peter McPherson’s proposal to maintain it as a shell without personnel but with statutory authority intact.² Frankly, I continue to view IDCA as an anachronism. It had little policy relevance even during the Carter Administration when development for its own sake was a policy priority. IDCA’s role is less vital in this Administration, where development policy and economic and development assistance are viewed within the overall context of our foreign assistance resources and our foreign policy objectives.

I see programmatic advantage in giving the Administrator of AID first among equal status within the Administration in terms of developing a specific development strategy to implement our broad policy goals. He also has a very important role in terms of his providing input to the Secretary of Treasury on development policy for the multilateral banks.

The real issue is where decisions will be made on resource allocation questions. Here, Peter McPherson and I have different views. I believe he considers my “coordinating” role as narrowly defined, more or less collating annual budget proposals from AID and PM. It would be the Director of IDCA who formulated actual economic assistance proposals based on State’s broad foreign policy guidance. Also, he would make programmatic decisions throughout the year.

IDCA’s focus specifically on development as its own objective complicates life for us. A process which attempts to justify economic assistance and security assistance separately must be a process which is inherently unmanageable. It will lack policy focus, and it must promote, rather than diminish, the impression that there is no common theme running throughout.

Experience shows we need to have one central point that exercises leadership and provides the policy discipline required to develop consistent, comprehensive foreign assistance proposals for the Secretary. Since there are trade-offs, our approach is to use any or all of the individual assistance programs (economic or security) to meet our specific foreign policy objectives. This is important during preparation of annual budgets and important throughout the year, as the recent supplemental proposals by PM, NEA, AF and ARA would indicate.³ IDCA was unable to exercise this discipline over State Department bureaus during the Carter Administration, and the bureaus will not accept it from IDCA now.

In the FY 1983 process, we played the role of honest broker. The State bureaus accepted our taking the lead, and AID worked closely with us on proposals that are broadly supported now in State and AID.

I question whether we must keep IDCA to get an Authorization Bill. We have had no bill for two years, and it is by no means certain we will get one this year—with or without IDCA. While I do not propose to ignore Clem Zablocki, who is one of IDCA’s champions, I do think our FY 82 consolidated budget, which includes a specific objective for “aid to poorer countries” and specific increases in development assistance for the poorest LDCs, is the best demonstration we can give that we mean to meet the Secretary’s pledge to continue generous assistance to the poorest countries. This is an approach we will follow because it is good foreign policy, and the right thing to do. We do not need IDCA to act as a development conscience in this regard.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Files of the Office of Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James L. Buckley, Lot 82D352: untitled folder. No classification marking. The memorandum was sent under an undated covering memorandum to Bremer from Wolf, which stated: “The attached memorandum to Judge Clark on IDCA was drafted with considerable personal JLB input. Since the memo was done in full candor, it should not receive any distribution except through S/S to D as your note requested.”
2. In a November 17 memorandum to Haig, Clark referenced this memorandum and wrote that he thought the Department of State should agree with McPherson’s proposal to “continue the IDCA as a shell, thus avoiding a struggle with Percy and Zablocki in the face of our foreign assistance legislative needs and enabling Peter to more easily and effectively influence the U.S. role in the banks.” Clark recommended that Haig authorize him to “inform McPherson that he should continue with his plan to hold IDCA as a shell while developing plans for its ultimate elimination, but that this decision is contingent upon an agreed modus vivendi re development assistance matters between AID, E, and T.” Haig did not indicate a decision on the memorandum. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630: Not For The System: Nov. 1982)
3. Not found.
4. Buckley wrote in the bottom margin of the memorandum: “A further thought: Democrats will vote for AID even in the absence of IDCA because they believe in it. Republicans, however, may be more likely to vote for AID if IDCA is removed.”