2. Memorandum of Conversation1

Personal Reps Dinner

Rashish left with the impression that the others were receptive and indeed agreed to the idea that this meeting of the Sherpas and the Summit should look at such questions as: What are the issues? What is relevant to the alliance? What is the integrating theme?

There was a general feeling that real (as contrasted to procedural) questions must be addressed and particularly, what is appropriate in the North/South context. In this regard, the response which the Heads of State had asked for at Venice2 did not seem to be forthcoming through the technique adopted by the Canadians, i.e., the 21 questions.3 There seems to be general acceptance of the US view on the North/South debate, i.e., that North/South is an unfortunate label. There are differences among the developing countries. The whole North/South debate has been divisive; it has not addressed the real issues. Mrs. Thatcher [Page 7] (who attended cocktails briefly before dinner) said that North/South is a dreadful way of looking at the world.

[Omitted here is discussion of arrangements at the Summit.]

Rashish suggested that the personal reps try to develop an integrating theme. The others found this idea interesting. Specifically, he said that the US sees the Summit as a principal instrument of alliance strategy and a way to coordinate on issues before various fora. On the North/South debate, he said that the North is continuously on the defensive and that it was time to get off this approach. He made a plea for political relevance in discussions with developing countries. He said that the current North/South discussions as they had been conducted in various fora may be far less relevant. Japan and France both indicated some hesitation about backing away, particularly away from the discussions on global negotiations.

As to the Mexico Summit, Armstrong repeated that this should definitely be held after Ottawa. Shulman said the FRG view is that these discussions could be educational for the South. They could be used to point out that the North has limited resources and that both OPEC and CEMA have a responsibility to the NOPEC countries. In addition, the Third World must recognize that it has a political role to play. Chancellor Schmidt’s view is that we talk tough and straight to make our positions clear to the other North/South Summit participants.

[Omitted here is discussion of preparations for future meetings.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Office of Economical and Agricultural Affairs Files, Official Economic Summit Files, 1975–1991, Lot 93D490: 1981 Ottawa Summit—1st Sherpa Meeting—London. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
  2. A reference to the Venice Economic Summit, held in June 1980. For documentation on the Venice Economic Summit, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 239, 240, 243, and 247; and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Documents 145 and 147.
  3. A copy of the Canadian responses to 21 questions on “Aid and Other Contributions to Developing Countries,” dated February 6, which participants in the Ottawa Summit were supposed to answer prior to the Summit is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Trip File, Ottawa Summit 1981—Positions of Others; NLR–755–10–36–3–0. An undated copy of the State Department’s responses to the 21 questions is in the Bureau of Economic Affairs, Office of Economical and Agricultural Affairs Files, Official Economic Summit Files, 1975–1991, Lot 93D490: 1981 Ottawa Summit North/South Can Paper.