Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

105. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Wallis) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 13, 1983

SUBJECT

• UNCTAD

Larry Eagleburger’s cable,² commenting on my UNCTAD memo,³ does a good job of setting out the details of how to do what I proposed to do. As I spell out in the attached notes, in the actual substance of what should be done, he and I agree on about eighty-five percent of the items.⁴ We do disagree in that he wants to give away something while we are there, proposing some unsound initiatives for unwise reasons, whereas I don’t see any reason to do so. But apart from three or four specifics of that kind, we agree on all the rest, until I get to the part about saying at Belgrade that after UNCTAD VI the US will have a fundamental review of its continued participation.

In my February meeting with my OECD counterparts⁵ they started out by assuring me that the G–77 attitudes are changing, and that they are now inclined to be more constructive. As the conversation went on, they noted how officials from G–77 countries talk very differently in private from the way they talk when they get together in public; in public, they feel they have to posture for each other. Finally, late in the evening, I asked them if they thought there was really any chance that the posturing would stop and serious work would get done at UNCTAD; after thinking it over, my counterparts all agreed, well, no, not at UNCTAD.

Although many people in this building are afraid of our being “isolated” at UNCTAD, it has little or no effect on the real interests of our OECD partners whether we give things away at UNCTAD or not. Nor does it affect our real interests if they all vote against us. We should bear that in mind when we later review whether we want to continue our participation. In the meanwhile, I welcome Larry’s very valuable suggestions about how to be diplomatic about doing the right thing at UNCTAD VI.

Of course Brock and I will want to speak softly and adopt a positive tone in presenting our position. Larry sets out much of the right way to do that. We would also draw on President Reagan’s Cancun declaration of “four understandings” necessary for entering into global negotiations,⁶ and would point out that those understandings are necessary for useful discussion in any forum, including UNCTAD.

Do I have your approval to go ahead as my memo proposes?⁷

Allen Wallis⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630: Not for the System April 1–15, 1983. Secret. Drafted by Martin Bailey on April 12. Copies were sent to Dam, Eagleburger, and McCormack. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “Not for the System.” Hill initialed the memorandum on April 13.
2. See Document 104.
3. See Document 102.
4. Notes are attached but not printed.
5. Wallis traveled in Europe February 6–15.
6. Reagan outlined “four understandings” that the United States deemed essential for future talks in his opening statement at the Cancun Summit on October 22. See footnote 2, Document 49 and Document 75.
7. See footnote 1, Document 107.
8. Allen initialed “AW” above his typed signature.