Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

100. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (McCormack) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 20, 1982

SUBJECT

• Status of Efforts to Launch Global Negotiations

Summary

The EC Ambassadors in New York, and the LDCs, are once again mounting pressure on us in the UN to accept a text on Global Negotiations (GNs) which deviates from that agreed to at Versailles and which violates our long-standing position on GNs. The Ambassadors suggest that some of our long-standing position on GNs. The Ambassadors suggest that some of our Versailles Summit partners, particularly France, may be prepared to renege on the Versailles agreement and seek a compromise with the G–77. They are pressing us to agree and will try to place the responsibility on us for failure to launch GNs. Contacts with capitals do not confirm the UN Ambassadors’ views and we believe from these contacts that the Versailles agreements are holding.

Background

At the Versailles Summit four amendments to the G–77 text on Global Negotiations (GNs) were agreed upon by the heads of state, including the EC presidency. Willingness to accept the G–77 text with these amendments represented a significant concession on the part of the United States, especially when coupled with forthcoming Versailles communique language indicating that GNs were important and had a high political priority. Specifically we agreed to launch GNs without an agenda and without an agreement on what issues would be assigned to the specialized agencies. In return we received an agreement from our summit partners that:

1. there would be no change in the summit position unless agreed to by all seven of the heads of state,²

2. there would be strong guarantees for protection of the specialized agencies (embodied in the Versailles amendment to paragraph 5 of G–77 text); and

3. the foundation of GNs would rest on a broader basis than UN Resolution 34/138, which calls for a restructuring of the international economy to achieve the new international economic order (embodied in the Versailles amendment to paragraph 1 of the G–77 text).

The Versailles amendments were accepted by the EC and eventually all the OECD countries. However, the G–77 in July offered counter language gutting the Versailles amendments to paragraphs 5 and 1. The result has been a standoff since July.

A majority of EC countries, and also OECD countries, can accept the new G–77 position and could probably have done so even before the Versailles amendments. They believe the US position of holding with the four Versailles amendments will torpedo GNs and they do not wish to share the political cost of that outcome. They have begun to maneuver to pin the blame for killing GNs on the US.

What is at stake

The common agreement at Versailles was intended to provide real movement on GNs while protecting us from future isolation by tying the seven together. Erosion of the agreement would further denigrate the concept of Summit cooperation and consultation. Apart from New York, we do not yet see serious cracks in the agreement.

Secondly, accepting the G–77 counter offer or the EC Ambassador’s tactical position compromises the US position on the integrity and independence of the specialized agencies and the UNGA role in economic negotiations. Resolution 34/138 envisions the UNGA as the supreme global economic negotiating body. In contrast, US efforts have focussed on decentralizing negotiations to the specialized agencies and preserving their competence, functions and powers.

Thirdly, no one has been able to specify in economic terms why GNs must be held or what the concrete results might be. The returns on launching are short-term and political but the cost may be long-term and economic.

What we are doing

In New York Ambassador Sorzano is holding a tough position and explaining the rationale base for the Versailles agreement. We are taking the same stand in Washington and in dealing with capitals.

Next week Under Secretary Wallis will be in Europe discussing the summit follow-up and plans for the next meeting.³ He will address the issue of holding to the Versailles consensus on GNs in London, Bonn and Paris. He will also attend the OECD/XCSS meeting and will reinforce solidarity among the OECD countries as best as this can be done. The Nordics are already breaking away from the OECD consensus along with a number of others.

As to the future, we are looking to UNCTAD VI in Belgrade in June 1983.⁴ With the exception of energy, it will cover the same topics as proposed for GNs in New York.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820158–1601. Secret. Drafted by Meissner and James Landberg (EB/SEN) on October 19; cleared in E, IO and EB/ODF. Sent through Wallis. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. The “Synoptic text of draft resolutions” was not attached. A copy of the “Synoptic Table of various texts proposed for UNGA resolution on Global Negotiations” is attached to a December 6 briefing paper on Global Negotiations in the Department of State, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Office of Economical and Agricultural Affairs Files, Official Economic Summit Files, 1975–1991, Lot 93D490: 1983 Williamsburg Summit Meeting of Personal Representatives December 11–13, 1982.
2. Shultz highlighted this point in the right-hand margin.
3. According to telegram 283588 to multiple diplomatic posts, October 8, Wallis was traveling in Europe from October 25 to 30 to attend the OECD Executive Committee in Special Session and to consult in Bonn, London, and Paris with his counterparts concerning the 1983 economic summit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820520–0027)
4. See footnote 4, Document 99.