Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

80. Telegram From the Department of State to IntSum Collective and the Embassy in Lebanon¹

238961.

Washington, August 3, 1987, 2238Z

The Maghreb: Handling the Islamic Challenge.

1. (S/NF/NC) Islamic fundamentalism draws from common sources but lacks political unity. Government heavy handedness has made Islam a serious problem in Tunisia; more skilled management has blunted the challenge in Algeria and Morocco. Nonetheless, success in Tunisia as Bourguiba leaves the scene could encourage Islamic radicals throughout the Maghreb.

Iron Fist in Tunisia

2. (S/NF/NC) Long opposed to President Bourguiba’s political secularism, Tunisian Islamists are exploiting national drift and fear of repression to expand their following. Tunis has responded with extensive, often heavy handed measures to contain Islamists,² closely watching the military for Islamic sympathies and naming efficient hard-liners to head the key Education and Interior Ministries. Rather than deterring fundamentalism, however, these actions have generated sympathy for the Islamic tendency movement among groups with differing philosophies.

Pragmatism Sidetracks Critics

3. (S/NF/NC) Algeria, a self-declared secular republic since independence, jailed Islamists in the 1960s but has since tried generally more moderate tactics to cope with fundamentalism. Algiers has taken steps to give the impression that Islam plays a major role in national life, recasting its national charter to acknowledge Islam’s role in Algerian culture, promoting moderate Islam to counter Iranian or Libyan doctrines, and spending large sums on mosque construction. Algiers has also ordered security services to infiltrate home-grown and foreign-inspired groups, including one linked to ousted former President Ben Bella. It has generally limited strong-arm tactics to rooting out one especially violent sect, leaving the mainstream alone. Some on the Algerian left fear the government is not sufficiently sensitive to the threat, however.

Flying Mohammed’s Flag

4. (S/NF/NC) Like Bourguiba, King Hassan originally used Islamists in the 1970s as a foil to the Moroccan left. Now, however, like Algiers, he recognizes the threat and has chosen a more considered approach. Hassan wields his role as ‘‘commander of the faithful” (and direct descendant of Mohammed) to defuse Islamic critics. He built a powerful Religious Affairs Ministry to oversee religious grants and train imams, uses his Interior Ministry to monitor religion, and tries to exert central political control over religious education and religious scholars.

5. (S/NF/NC) After a major crackdown in 1985, the Islamic movement either ebbed or went underground. More recently, there are signs of reemergence. This spring 90 Islamists were arrested in northern Morocco (frequently the scene of dissident activities) and two incidents of Islamist activity in the Navy troubled the military, thought free of Islamic influence. Rabat does not think Islamists will soon be strong enough to take on the government. It worries, however, that they could exploit social discontent to make new gains.

The Soft Sell Works–for Now

6. (S/NF/NC) Islamic fundamentalists in North Africa are not linked to one another, but the socio-economic strains and unemployment prevalent in the Maghreb provide potentially fertile soil for growth. And success by fundamentalists in Tunisia could provide a stimulus now lacking among Moroccan and Algerian Islamists.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870621–0110. Secret; Priority; Noforn; Nocontract. Sent for information Priority to the Treasury Department. Drafted by Charles Dunne (INR/NESA); cleared by Richard Whitaker (INR/NESA); approved by Gary Dietrich (INR/NESA). Sent for information to DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC, the Mission in Vienna, CINCUSNAVEUR, USCENTCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, COMSXTHFLT, USCINCEUR, USIA, the Delegation to the MBFR in Vienna, London, Paris, Rome, DOD/ISA, CINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR for INTAF.
2. Reference is to the government’s crackdown on Tunisian Islamic fundamentalists following the August 2 bombings of tourist hotels in Tunis. See Document 352.