Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

428. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

2078.

Rabat, March 5, 1985, 1830Z

From Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. Subject: March 4 Audience With King Hassan. Ref: State 59695.²

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: During a 90-minute one-on-one audience in Marrakech March 4, King Hassan questioned me closely and at length on politics of the UN and strategies for handling the Western Sahara issue. Hassan clearly attaches the highest priority to moving ahead with a referendum and is determined to make a major effort at the United Nations this year. Our conversation dealt almost entirely with UN matters, and the King was clearly attempting to learn from my experience in that forum. End summary.

3. Prior to seeing Hassan, I met at length on March 3 with newly-appointed Foreign Minister Abdellatif Filali³ who alerted me to the King’s interest in reviewing in detail with me Morocco’s strategy at the United Nations and plans to reorganize GOM multilateral diplomacy. I took the occasion to discuss at length with Filali the importance of regional blocs at the UN and the need for active Moroccan diplomacy in the African and non-aligned context.

4. The March 4 audience took place at the Marrakech Palace following the annual ceremony of allegiance. After I presented the President’s letter (reftel), with which Hassan was clearly pleased, the King turned the conversation to the United Nations. He made clear his real determination to settle the question of the Western Sahara by holding a referendum next year. He expressed complete confidence that Morocco would win in a fair referendum and, after expressing regret that I was leaving government service, sought my reaction to his strategy for handling the issue.

5. Hassan told me that Morocco will take the Western Sahara issue to the Security Council, seeking an arrangement under which the Council and Secretariat would organize a referendum in the Sahara. He reiterated that Morocco could no longer accept a referendum under auspices of the OAU, which has already pronounced itself on the issue and is now under factional control of Ethiopia and other radical states. The OAU, the King told me, is a closed subject and there is no possibility of Morocco re-joining the organization. Hassan predicted that other member states will also withdraw as radical domination of the OAU is further extended.

6. Turning to the Security Council, Hassan told me that he was confident of support in the Security Council for a UN-organized referendum in the Sahara. Noting a recent conversation with a high-level Soviet, possibly a special emissary or the local Ambassador, Hassan said that the Soviets have assured Morocco of support for self-determination. India too, he told me, has expressed support for a process of self-determination. Like Morocco a founding NAM state, India remains committed to decolonization and self-determination. Finally, Hassan reported that, during a conversation in the last few days, former French Culture Minister Maurice Druon had assured him that France would support Moroccan efforts in the Security Council.

7. Hassan outlined for me the new team which he is sending to New York to reactivate Moroccan diplomacy at the UN. The Permanent Representative, Mehdi Alaoui, was selected for broad expertise and contacts in the Third World, political savvy and a reputation as a “good Moroccan” (Rabat 2022).⁴ Two deputy PermReps, Dr. Mohammed Bennouna, an expert in international law, and Ambassador Khalil Haddaoui, now in Monrovia, will round out the GOM team. Implementing the effort in Rabat will be Foreign Minister Filali, a colleague during earlier UN service of Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, with whom he has good personal relations.

8. In response, I told Hassan that, frankly, I was less optimistic about the outcome in the Security Council because, Soviet and other commitments to self-determination notwithstanding, one should not underestimate levels of cynicism at the UN. I encouraged Hassan, however, to undertake this important initiative with maximum publicity, insuring that the world is aware of Moroccan efforts. He should draw on public relations and other resources, I urged, to make known Morocco’s commitment to a UN-supervised referendum. Morocco should, nonetheless, face the fact that efforts in the Security Council could be blocked or otherwise sidetracked. I also pointed out that, given Algerian influence at the UN, it would be difficult to get an SC resolution providing for a referendum on terms acceptable to Morocco.

9. The King also questioned me closely on the General Assembly, expressing interest in a UNGA resolution this year on the Sahara. The 1983 outcome and lack of majority support for Algeria in 1984, he suggested, left grounds for optimism this year. He was particularly encouraged that, among the EC–10, only Greece and Spain had supported the Algerian position. Referring to USUN consultations with Royal Counselor Reda Guedira last November, Hassan thanked me and the USUN team of Ambassadors and Counselors for our counsel and support.

10. I also urged that Morocco be represented at all caucuses and meetings of the non-aligned, even small strategy meetings which sometimes set subsequent policy. In sum, effective UN diplomacy required an active policy in both the NAM and OAU, combined with world-wide lobbying. I described Nicaragua’s success and efforts world-wide.

11. Hassan expressed hope that, at the working level, USUN staff could share thoughts with his new UN team on key countries and tactics to enforce disciplined behavior from certain UN states. I said that it was most important that, in conversation with other heads of state, he underline the importance Morocco attaches to the Western Sahara in the UN. While I was there, President Kountche called about plans for a future meeting and Hassan afterwards praised the Niger head of state. I told him that it was also important that the GOM Foreign Minister follow through in greater detail with his counterparts, mentioning, for example, GOM disappointment over the role of countries like Senegal during last year’s UNGA.

12. The King referred to the practice by certain countries of buying UN votes, and I urged that Morocco make this impossible by prior lobbying and firm commitments from foreign ministers or heads of state which would limit maneuvering room for PermReps in New York. Citing Nicaraguan behavior, I stressed the importance of the new GOM team visiting every delegation in New York except those which are certain to vote against Morocco. Even with such efforts, I cautioned, Morocco should be prepared to lose in the Security Council. A fall-back could be selection of a few countries to represent the international community as observers for a referendum. Professional groups, as during voting in El Salvador, could also help with ballot box technology.

13. Hassan had already anticipated such a fall-back and was prepared to seek observer delegations from the NAM, Arab League, ASEAN and the OAS. He told me that he had also “secured”, after consulting with President Mitterrand, the services of former French PermRep Jacques Leprette and international lawyer Maitre Dupuy, as formal consultants.

14. Comment: King Hassan was extremely well informed on UN voting patterns and is obviously giving top priority to organizing a Saharan referendum next year. He is briefed on details of past votes and committed to mounting as professional an operation as possible at the next UNGA. I was impressed by the seriousness with which he has informed himself and reflected on the problem. He is optimistic, but has included a realistic fall-back in his planning. The King clearly made maximum use of me as a resource during our 90-minute conversation.

Reed

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850149–0515. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to USUN. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Casablanca, Dakar, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Niamey, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, and Addis Ababa.
2. In telegram 59695 to Rabat, February 27, the Department transmitted the draft text of a letter from Reagan to King Hassan, in which Reagan wrote in part: “I am very pleased to designate Ambassador Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick as my personal representative to the celebrations on March 3 honoring your accession to the throne of Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850135–0288)
3. No record of the Kirkpatrick-Filali conversation has been found.
4. In telegram 2022 from Rabat, March 2, the Embassy reported that Alaoui, while “at first glance an unusual choice” for UN Ambassador, “appears to be in tune with the palace on key diplomatic questions facing the country, namely the Western Sahara and related Maghreb issues. A proponent of Maghreb unity, he is among the socialists taking the hardest line on the Western Sahara and relations with Algeria.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850143–0607)