Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

414. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

Washington, December 28, 1983

MOROCCO-ALGERIA-WESTERN SAHARA: The War Grinds On

The chances of a political resolution of the eight-year-old war in Western Sahara, which were increased somewhat by a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria earlier this year, have diminished in recent months. As the deadline for an OAU-sponsored referendum this month runs out, the disputants have stiffened their positions. King Hassan remains under pressure to find a solution to the conflict, however, and Algeria is anxious to keep alive prospects for a settlement. [handling restriction not declassified]

Hassan tacitly accepted an OAU resolution² last summer that named Morocco and the Polisario Front as the parties to the conflict, but he has steadfastly refused to hold public talks with the insurgents. [less than 4 lines not declassified]

In a recent letter to African heads of state, Hassan reaffirmed his willingness to hold a referendum in Western Sahara. He insisted, however, that the OAU first has to arrange a cease-fire.³ [handling restriction not declassified]

The Algerian Position

During the past year, Algeria has begun to direct its policy in North Africa away from confrontation with Morocco in an effort to promote stability in the region. [handling restriction not declassified] [less than 1 line not declassified] has included a decision to seek a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara conflict. (S)

[less than 1 line not declassified] that Algeria no longer favors an independent Saharan state because it could introduce a new element of instability in the area. Instead, [less than 1 line not declassified] that the solution to the Western Sahara problem could be found in some kind of confederation scheme with Morocco and Mauritania.⁴ [less than 1 line not declassified] Algeria is willing to assist in negotiations by “working on the Polisario.” [handling restriction not declassified]

Algerian President Bendjedid, however, is constrained by the Army and other less conciliatory elements in the government and by Algeria’s longstanding commitment to the principle of self-determination for the territory. As a result, Algiers will continue to support the Polisario’s position that Rabat deal directly with the insurgents rather than through Algeria, as Hassan would like. [handling restriction not declassified]

While the recent fifth party congress of the National Liberation Front strengthened Bendjedid’s authority, he is still unlikely to adopt policies that offend the Army—his main power base. [handling restriction not declassified]

In any event, Algiers is unlikely to take any new initiatives in the next several months. Among other things, the Algerians are increasingly preoccupied with the presidential election to be held next month. [handling restriction not declassified]

Other Pressures

African states are anxious to see progress in settling the conflict before the OAU summit scheduled for May in Conakry, Guinea. The interim Secretary General of the OAU says the Polisario leaders have agreed not to attend a ministerial conference in February to avoid further disrupting the organization. He expects, however, that the insurgents will insist on attending the summit and claiming a seat.⁵ [handling restriction not declassified]

Morocco’s moderate African supporters, who thus far have gone along with Rabat’s insistence that the Polisario not be seated at the OAU, are restive over Morocco’s position on implementing the OAU resolution. If the Polisario’s self-declared “republic”—recognized by 27 of the OAU’s 50 members—is admitted as a member state at the summit, only a few other members would be likely to follow Rabat in its probable walkout. [handling restriction not declassified]

Rabat’s serious financial difficulties, which are caused in part by the cost of the war, may eventually add to the pressures on Hassan to compromise. Although acquisition of Western Sahara remains a popular cause among Moroccans, the continuation of economic austerity measures could cause political problems for the King. [handling restriction not declassified]

Aid from Saudi Arabia, which earlier had helped offset military expenses, has dropped off over the past two years. In recent months, the Saudis reportedly have [less than 1 line not declassified] encouraged all parties to seek a solution to the conflict in the interest of regional unity. [handling restriction not declassified]

Military Outlook

Polisario insurgents are likely to continue the sporadic but well-organized military attacks they began in July in the hope of forcing Morocco into direct, public negotiations. Their tactics have included efforts to breach the Moroccan defensive barrier, but they do not have the ability to hold territory actively defended by Moroccan forces. [handling restriction not declassified]

The guerrillas also probably will increase harassing attacks with the intention of luring Moroccan forces outside the barrier. In addition, they may continue efforts to shoot down Moroccan aircraft, which frequently attack Polisario camps in Western Sahara. [handling restriction not declassified]

The recent start of Moroccan construction to extend the barrier to the Mauritanian border will further frustrate the Polisario and reinforce its determination to fight on. Without increased support, however, the Polisario is unlikely to be able to put enough military pressure on Morocco to force it to compromise any time soon.⁶ [handling restriction not declassified]

Algeria probably will not increase substantially the Polisario’s military capabilities or loosen the controls that inhibit the insurgents’ access to Moroccan territory. On the other hand, the Algerians are likely to have approved heightened guerrilla activity in the past six months. They may calculate that Rabat will not be ready for a compromise solution until after Moroccan resources have been strained further by the conflict. [handling restriction not declassified]

[Omitted here is a map of the Western Sahara.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Maghreb 1983 and 1984. Top Secret. [codeword not declassified]
2. See footnote 3, Document 408.
3. No record of Hassan’s letter has been found.
4. In telegram 5414 from Algiers, December 9, the Embassy reported: “There have been private indications Algeria is prepared to work for a compromise of less than independence for the Sahrawis within the context of the grand Maghreb ideal if Hassan will negotiate openly with the Polisario.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830726–0663)
5. In telegram 4674 from Addis Ababa, December 9, Korn reported: “Onu says that in any event he expects the Polisario to stick to its pledge not to attend the February 1984 OAU Ministerial Meeting. The Polisario will insist on attending the summit, and Sekou Touré may choose to postpone the summit—otherwise scheduled for May—rather than have to face a decision on this issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830726–0904)
6. In telegram 10491 from Rabat, December 22, the Embassy stated “some 2,000 Moroccan military drawn from two brigades moved into the Amgala area on December 21 assembling over the past weeks at Bou Craa. Their mission is to secure the area in order to extend the berm and enclose the Amgala region.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830755–0432)