Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

324. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to Secretary of State Weinberger¹

Washington, March 8, 1985

Dear Cap:

I very much appreciated your letter of November 28th in which you expressed your concern for the continued stability and security of Tunisia as the Bourguiba era draws to a close.² We are closely following events there and share your concern and sympathy for Tunisia’s difficult economic circumstances and complicated security environment. As you noted, Tunisia’s economic and security needs are inter-related, and we fully share your desire to contribute to Tunisian development while minimizing the negative impact of our security assistance on Tunisia’s increasingly burdensome foreign debt.

Fortunately, the foreign assistance proposals for Tunisia contained in the FY–86 budget submission to the Congress will contribute considerably to Tunisian economic development and security. The $22.5 million ESF proposal, for example, is an increase over the $20 million FY–85 earmark and represents a substantial jump from earlier years. At the same time, combined FMS and MAP proposals of $69 million are somewhat larger than the $65 million of the previous year, and, more importantly, concessionality has been improved.

In the area of economic development, we are keenly aware of Tunisia’s need to concentrate its resources on rural development. However, Minister of Defense Baly’s request³ during his visit here last November for our assistance in developing a series of settlements designed to enhance security in the Saharan region of southern Tunisia is an ambitious and costly proposal. While the value of extending government services to the nomadic people in the area is self-evident, it is far less certain that the proposed settlement scheme would work or could ever have a positive security value. Our experience with similar settlement schemes in this and in other areas of the world suggests extravagant per capita costs and a very high probability of failure. Without overwhelming evidence to the contrary, we would be reluctant to use economic assistance funds for these settlements.

In our meetings last November, while I assured Minister Baly that we would be willing to discuss the project again as it takes shape, I was not in a position to commit a U.S. contribution. Subsequent consideration by AID and the State Department has led us to conclude, based on what we have seen so far, that other projects to which we are already committed are more promising and cost-effective vehicles for USG economic development or security assistance funding than this settlements project would be.

In the meantime, you can be assured that we remain very much interested in assisting Tunisia through this difficult transition period by the most effective means available.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz⁴

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–87–0008, 1985 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Tunisia. Confidential. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “SEC DEF HAS SEEN MAR 11 1985.”
2. See Document 320.
3. Baly made the request to Shultz during a November 14, 1984 meeting. See Document 319.
4. Shultz signed “George” above this typed signature.