Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

2259.

Rabat, March 6, 1987, 1801Z

Dept pls pass Treasury for Secretary Baker, SecDef and other addresses as desired. Subject: Secretary of Treasury’s Meeting With King Hassan.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Secretary Baker delivered President’s invitation for Hassan to visit Washington July 20² and also told King the USG will be able to provide an additional $25 million in food aid this year. The King was appreciative on both counts. In response to Secretary Baker’s assurance that a purposeful, cohesive government continues in Washington, Hassan said he had no doubt whatever and that had he been in President Reagan’s shoes, he would also have tried opening to Iran.³ King talked in genial terms about his desire to see established a consortium of developed countries, oil rich LDC’s and LDC’s with meager resources to “moralize” trade and assist the less advantaged LDC’s to solve their debt problems. The Secretary explained how the Baker Plan was designed to assist debtor LDC’s and described some recent developments in the framework of that plan.⁴

3. While not mentioning specific arms, Hassan said he would like to get U.S. permission to buy certain types of U.S.-designed military equipment manufactured in Korea and Taiwan in order to save foreign exchange. He seemed confident that Morocco can stay the course in the Western Sahara and said Morocco urgently needs M–60 tanks. In low key, Hassan struck his familiar theme that in strategic cooperation Morocco is doing more for the U.S. than vice versa and said that while he did not want to make any specific demands, he hoped U.S. would be forthcoming on assistance. Secretary Baker assured the King that President Reagan and the USG place great value on U.S.-Moroccan relations, that the U.S. will continue to assist Morocco, and that he would convey the King’s views to the President.
End summary.

4. Secretary Baker, Ambassador Walters, DAS Ussery, Ambassador, DCM and interpreter had cordial 80 minute meeting with Hassan March 3. Hassan was grateful for the invitation to visit Washington. Noting that he had already accepted the idea of a visit to the U.S. “in principle,” he said he would have to examine further the proposed July 20 date and get back to us.

5. The King seemed mildly surprised but quite pleased when Mr. Baker informed him that despite severe U.S. budgetary constraints, the U.S. is prepared to provide an additional $25 million in food aid to Morocco in FY 87. Secretary Baker noted that he would be discussing details with GOM Ministers (septel).⁵

6. At the outset the King expressed the greatest respect and friendship for President Reagan. Speaking at length in a philosophical and often theoretical vein, Hassan said he was worried at what appeared to be a current tendency for the U.S. press and competing political institutions to denigrate the Presidency. Referring to the East-West divide, which Hassan believes will long endure, he emphasized how important it is to the West and countries friendly to the West for the U.S. to be strong and purposeful. Secretary Baker generally agreed with Hassan’s analysis. He suggested that Americans do need to learn some restraint lest the Presidency over time be eroded.

7. Mr. Baker continued that the President and the Presidency are currently in good shape and that the U.S. Government will continue to move with confidence in those areas where there is an important ongoing agenda. He said that the President had asked him to reassure the King there will no further sales of military equipment to Iran. Hassan cut in, saying that he wanted it to be clear he had not questioned U.S. policy toward Iran: “The U.S. is too good a friend of Morocco for me to cite Iran as a reference point in our relations.” Hassan continued that had he been in the President’s shoes, he would also have explored the possibility of an opening to Iran. He concluded this portion of the conversation by saying that given Iran’s strategic significance and the fragility and uncertainty in the region stretching from the Middle East to South Asia, it is important for the U.S. to continue its efforts in the area “if perhaps in some better way.”

8. Hassan then began to discuss the importance of developing countries helping the more disadvantaged countries with their trade, debt, and investment problems. He saw a need to “moralize” trade and resource flow patterns and suggested that a consortium be set up which would group some 15–18 countries—about a third would come from the fully developed countries, another third would be oil producing LDC’s, and the remaining third would be comprised of countries like Morocco without great resources but of some strategic and political interest to the West. Hassan described his idea as a “pilot project” which might, if successful, be expanded over time to embrace additional countries. Although, he was not precise on details, he argued in general that the developed countries would provide technology to other members of the consortium at a reasonable cost, the oil producing countries would provide energy at a reasonable cost, and the resource poor countries would agree to follow sound economic policies. All members of the consortium would enjoy reasonable growth.

9. Secretary Baker said he did not disagree with the need to ameliorate the debt and trade problems of resource poor LDC’s. He thought it would be extremely difficult to construct and implement the kind of plan the King was suggesting to even out profits on a nearly global basis, given the human tendency toward accumulation. On the other hand, he thought that the U.S. and some other countries had already taken some steps in the direction the King described. The U.S. has encouraged surplus countries to do more through multi-lateral lending institutions to help on LDC debt and resource problems. Before the decline in oil prices, we had pressed the Saudis to be more helpful. More recently, the U.S. has encouraged Japan to participate in IDA8,⁶ and we have given up some of our own bank shares to bring that about.

10. The King briefly returned to his consortium scheme, saying that if there were such an arrangement, the consortium could perhaps agree with the multilateral institutions on the rules for economic reform to be followed by the debtor countries in the consortium and the latter countries might then be more prepared than at present to accept IMF-type conditions. He registered a brief flash of annoyance with present IMF conditions relating to Morocco but then backed off by acknowledging that the IMF is currently trying to be helpful to Morocco.

11. Mr. Baker then referred to the “Strategy for Growth,” or “Baker Plan” which he and the U.S. put forward in Seoul. He said that the U.S. strongly believes that the only solution to the debt problem is growth. Ways have to be found to increase production. The Baker Plan simply provides a framework for attacking the growth/production problem. The IMF understands and appears to have accepted the general philosophy, and in its most recent agreements (e.g., Mexico) has been moving in the direction of growth by providing better terms and some new money.

12. The King said he wished to sound the USG informally on whether it might be possible for Morocco to buy from Korea and Taiwan certain types of military equipment made in those countries under U.S. license. He said that such arms are of good quality and are cheaper and easier to obtain than from the U.S., which often seems to provide materiel “drop-by-drop.” He thought that Morocco might be able to work out some kind of barter arrangement with Korea which would partially involve Korean arms in return for fishing rights in Moroccan waters. In any case, whether the purchases were from Korea or Taiwan, Hassan thought he would save valuable foreign exchange. He said it was his understanding that U.S. authorization is required for such purchases.

13. The Secretary replied that the U.S. would take a sympathetic look at Hassan’s request consistent with current U.S. laws and regulations. We might also have to determine what the attitude of Congress might be. In response to Mr. Baker’s question regarding the type of arms he had in mind, Hassan said he had wanted to try out the idea informally and would later “look at the catalogue” depending on our response. He referred vaguely to his desire to purchase unspecified types of missiles and rifles.

14. Referring to Feb 24–25 battles in the Western Sahara, Secretary Baker regretted Moroccan loss of life but said he was glad that the U.S. had been able to be helpful and responsive in a moment of need. The King expressed profound thanks on behalf of himself and his senior military officers. Saying that U.S. actions had demonstrated that America is a true friend.

15. Hassan noted that the section of the berm where the sharpest recent engagement took place is the most dangerous sector since it is close to Polisario bases in Algeria. He said that the Moroccan military has, and will continue, to make special logistical and other dispositions designed to deal with any further difficulties in that portion of the berm closest to Tindouf. He said that it was understandable that the Polisario would attack in that sector since the extension of the berm currently going forward farther south is too far away for the Polisario to move heavy equipment and attack in force in the area. Noting that “only armor can fight armor,” the King indicated that apart from the additional TOW’s and night-sight devices now on order, Morocco also needs more tanks. He noted the current Morocco-Algeria tank imbalance of 1:7, and said he would like to see it improved to a 4:7 ratio. (In a separate earlier conversation with Ambassador Walters,⁷ the King apparently said he would like to see the ratio move to 1:4.) Hassan claimed that the U.S. “has more M–60’s than it needs—you have huge stocks and are even providing them to your National Guard. Let me buy M–60’s or help me find them elsewhere.”

16. Hassan terminated the conversation with a somewhat oblique statement designed to illustrate the depth of his friendship and support for the U.S. He noted that he and the President had signed an access and transit agreement which may one day be of great importance to both countries. He said that except for operations directed against other Arab countries, the U.S. can use Morocco logistically as U.S. needs dictate. He asked Mr. Baker to tell the President that Morocco has already given the U.S. a great deal and is even prepared to offer further facilities including possibly bases, if need be. He said Morocco has recently agreed to provide the U.S. land for a military communications facility which Hassan considers to be “worth more than 100 tanks.” (Comment: The King is somewhat confused on this issue, since he has agreed to provide land to upgrade Embassy communications, not military communications. Embassy will clarify this matter for him at the first opportunity. End comment.)

17. Hassan asked Mr. Baker to remind the President of the ways in which Morocco has demonstrated its friendship. Hassan said that every other Arab leader he knows would have asked for hundreds of millions of dollars in return. “I am not like other Arabs. Friendship cannot be weighed or measured but must be expressed,” he concluded. Secretary Baker responded that he would convey the King’s thoughts to the President. He said there should be no doubt of the very high value that the U.S. places on its current relationship with Morocco and on the 200 year treaty relationship. The King labelled it a “privileged relationship,” and Mr. Baker agreed.

18. Comment. The King was very relaxed and friendly and seemed to be exerting special effort to make a favorable impression on Secretary Baker. Nonetheless, at the end of the conversation, Hassan, as he has with such other recent visitors as SecDef Weinberger and Codel Chappell,⁸ made it clear that he is now ready to start making specific requests rather than general characterizations of needs, and that while he is prepared to extend further strategic cooperation to the U.S., it will be at a cost. He stated that he has an immediate need for tanks, given the threat he sees from the Polisario and Algeria. He will doubtless expect to hear from us in the months ahead about what, if anything, we are prepared to do for him with respect to tanks, and perhaps aircraft.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Lot 95D26, 1987 Nodis Telegrams, Box 17, Rabat 1987 Nodis. Secret; Nodis.
2. No record of Reagan’s invitation was found.
3. Reference is to the Iran-Contra affair. See footnote 2, Document 163.
4. Documentation on the Baker Plan is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance.
5. A record of these discussions is in telegram 2164 from Rabat, March 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870425–0247, D870172–0856)
6. Reference is to the 8th replenishment of funding by donor nations, approved in February, for the International Development Agency of the World Bank.
7. No record of the Walters-Hassan conversation has been found.
8. Congressman William “Bill” Chappell Jr. (D-South Carolina), the Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, visited Morocco November 20–21, 1986.