Hassan also expressed interest in visiting Washington in the first half
of 1987.3 We have proposed to Don Regan that Hassan be
invited for an official working visit in June/July 1987 (you may recall
that Hassan postponed a visit last summer in order to meet with Prime
Minister Peres). It would be
useful to pin down a date as soon as possible.
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan5
SUBJECT
- My Private Meeting with King Hassan, 5 December 1986, for
about two hours, 9:30–11:30 p.m. (before dinner)
I met with King Hassan, at his request, with only an interpreter
present most of the time, and then again during a long dinner, we
continued our discussions at a table for two.
We covered many topics, but the principal impression I have is that
the King is very anxious to resume much closer relations with the
United States and the West
in general, that he needs economic and other assistance, some of
which he is already getting from other Arab nations; that he has the
highest possible respect for you; that he is a skilled and
experienced world politician; and that we have an excellent
opportunity now to improve our own strategic position and that of
our allies as a result of the King’s attitudes and needs. It is, of
course, true that if we ignore, spurn, or react with less than a
substantive set of responses, he would probably start to look
elsewhere, although I do not think he has too many places to go that
would be consistent with his principal aim, which is the
preservation and strengthening of the Monarchy and his Kingdom.
Under the heading of Regional Security, the King firmly and directly
suggested he would like to become a member of NATO, probably as “sort of an
associate member, perhaps like France.” He feels Morocco can
contribute substantially to regional security, and in any event he
would like to have some kind of closer triangular relationship with
Spain and Portugal. He spoke of the exceptionally good Air Force
facilities in Morocco (which is true), and responded quite favorably
and with considerable interest when I suggested in a general way
that because of the Spanish apparent insistence on our removing our
72 F–16s from Spain, (which I mentioned to you in my report of the
NATO meetings),6 these planes might be
transferred to, and based in, Morocco.
He said this would be quite logical, both from the point of view of
our needing to protect the Southern Flank of NATO (which would be
[Page 550]
made very difficult if Spain actually
went through with ordering our tactical air wing out of Spain), but
also because Morocco has the facilities, and because he has already
decided to buy F–16s himself.
This led us to the subject of this aircraft purchase. He said the
decision had been made and that the first payment of $14 million
will be made shortly, and thereafter a schedule of payments would be
drawn up. He hoped the manufacturers (General Dynamics) would be
able to offer good terms, and he was quite pleased when I told him
we had been able to drive down the price of F–16s and there was no
reason he should pay more than we did. He then wondered aloud if I
thought a barter transaction could be worked out such as his paying
for the planes with oil (presumably from UAE) rather than cash. I told him there were such
barter transactions, and there were companies that specialized in
them and that General Dynamics might agree to such a sale.
Concluding this topic, he said he believed that there will not just
be East-West divisions and issues in the future (that is, disputes
between the U.S. and USSR), but
that many of the problems of the future will be “North-South
problems;” and, therefore, it is important for us and for NATO to have strong support in a
country situated as Morocco is.
He also talked about the many economic problems they have and was
pleased at the suggestion that we might be able to reduce interest
payments on past debts, as we are trying to do with Egypt, although
he said frankly, he would much prefer to have the debt cancelled. He
mentioned the great disparity between the treatment of Egypt and
Israel and the rest of the world. He was pleased at the possibility
that we might be able to secure additional security assistance in a
Supplemental to be submitted in January. He also liked the
possibility I raised of our buying more supplies in Morocco for our
troops in Europe.
He inquired most sympathetically about the problems with Iran and
reminded me that in one of his recent trips to Washington, he had
spent considerable time warning us all about the risks involved from
a government such as Iran’s. He accepted my explanations of the arms
sale to Iran, and said he remained in the fullest possible support
of you and your policies, and he was most pleased when I handed your
personal letter to him. He said he hoped he may be able to accept
our pending invitation to visit Washington, perhaps sometime in the
spring.
In a private conversation with the Ambassador and me, he responded to
a request that had been submitted to him by the Ambassador for 20
acres of land for a new satellite installation to upgrade and
safeguard our communications. He said he did not want any rent or
compensation for this, but that being quite a visible installation,
it would be reasonable to help strengthen their military so as to
enable them to protect our installation against possible attack.
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He responded appreciatively to my compliments on the way they have
stabilized the Maghreb situation by extending defensive berms
further and further south in the Western Sahara. He is worried,
however, that the Algerians continue to support the Polisario in the
region, and while he did not seem very worried about Algerian
President Bendjedid’s visit
to Libya, some of our intelligence reporting indicates that he
should have been.7 He
said again that his only reason for entering into the now broken
agreement with Qadhafi had
been to prevent Libya and Algeria working together to support the
Polisario.
He expressed great worry about “the tragedy” that is unfolding in
Tunisia, referring to the increasing senility of President Bourguiba and the fact that there
are no successors left, since President Bourguiba has thrown all possible successors out of
the country. He feels that after Bourguiba dies, there is almost bound to be a
conflict between Algeria and Libya over Tunisia.
He feels that Egypt needs a great deal of support because they are
going through difficult economic times now, and while Morocco has no
official relationship with Egypt, it is important that Egypt be
helped.
The King did not speak of the Arab Summit coming up shortly, nor of a
reported advance “conference” he is supposed to call before the
Summit to solidify positions and presumably try to make the Summit
more successful than previous Arab Summits have been.
He was most complimentary about our military-to-military relationship
and of the Joint Military Commission, the meetings of which
concluded while I was there.
Returning to the NATO Southern
regional security, he said that he had a good friendship and a lot
of respect for the Spanish and a particularly close relationship to
Portugal, and that he considers Portugal, even though they do not
have a Mediterranean border, to be virtually a Mediterranean
nation.
The King has always been particularly friendly and supportive of the
United States and also very friendly and cordial in his personal
relationships with me, but he outdid himself this time, particularly
in his exceptionally strongly voiced support for you.
We are looking into the two points he seemed most interested in—that
is transferring the 72 F–16s to Morocco from Spain and the
possibility of a barter sale of other F–16s to Morocco—and we will
get back to him.
With warms regards,
