255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco1
SUBJECT
- President Reagan’s Response to King Hassan’s Letter of February 7 (8606811).
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. The following are texts of King Hassan’s February 7 letter to President Reagan regarding the Middle East peace process and President Reagan’s answer. Ambassador should deliver reply. Signed original will follow.
3. Begin text of King Hassan’s February 7 letter:
Dear Mr. President:
We have met more than once since the American people have brought you to the highest office to conduct their destiny which often happens to be linked with that of other people. In fact, nothing humanly relating to the peace and progress of our society today could remain alien to the man who, dutifully aware of his responsibilities and determined to fulfill, for the general good, the mission which, in rather historically rare moments, is vested in him. Indeed, we are now going through a historically rare moment full of hopes as well as numerous questionings and deep concerns. Together, we have tackled a number of problems related to hotbeds of confrontation and insecurity.
My triple capacity of current Chairman of the Arab Summit, Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Chairman of the Al-Quds Committee has, in our joint reflections and our exchange of views, naturally made us dwell more particularly on the Middle East [Page 530] conflict. It was then with special attention and interest that I tried to understand your position, seeking to grasp as much as possible of the depths of the motives behind it. This I did with the greatest effort and the maximum degree of “fair play”, in order to free myself from any eventual preconceived ideas which, I had thought, might have caused so many harmful prejudices, thereby obstructing the way of comprehension and agreement here and there.
Today, I am asking you, most amicably and sincerely, to make the same exorcizing effort so that we may, together, gradually perceive the true significance of that which is preliminary, that which is principal, that which is transient, that which is temporary, that which is essential and that which embodies peace for the Middle East as well as that which may bring about the success of such a peace or endanger it.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is today at a decisive turning point. Not long ago, differences were deep; now, they are so reduced that one may hope to achieve the goal of peace so longed for. The error of not taking advantage of the opportunity which presents itself would be so unforgivable and would entail far-reaching consequences, especially that, in addition to the open or disguised war Israel and the Arabs have been waging one against the other for forty years now, a new hotbed of instability and insecurity has emerged along the Red Sea—something which could put all of the nations of the region into a situation whose evolution no one would dare control.
In this exceptionally strategic region, America has so many peace-seeking friends whose progress and development are unfortunately obstructed by the prevailing situation. Your determination to help your friends is so known, as it obviously results from a fair appraisal of the supreme interests of the United States of America which you value in a global manner and, consequently, in relation to every link between your country and the rest of the world.
I feel confident that you realize, as I do, that the time of hesitation is over and that the hour of beneficially liberating decision has come.
The main goal is to make a contribution—however modest—to the design of peace so wholeheartedly called for by the entire world.
Being far from the region, we naturally feel free from any inhibition or, quite simply, from anything that might hinder healthy reflections.
At this stage, the teachings deriving from the frequent contacts maintained with one party or another give reason to believe and hope that the perspective of what could be the way towards the solution has now become relatively clear and concrete.
I—The aim is and remains that of installing a just, global and durable peace ensuring full security for all and an atmosphere of quiet and stability for the region.
[Page 531]II—The means, as well as the terms and conditions, of achieving it must be negotiated between all the parties interested or concerned.
III—In the negotiations to be held, the Palestinian people will be represented by the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative, de facto and de jure. In this respect, my deep conviction—based on utterly objective motives and rejecting any puerile sentimentality—is that it would be illusive and absolutely useless to think that the Arabs—and particularly the Palestinian people—could be involved and validly committed through the appointment or the imposition of representatives other than those legitimately acting on behalf of the Palestinian people for over ten years now.
IV—Negotiations should be accompanied with an official statement recognizing the Palestinian People’s inalienable right for self-determination within a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, in concordance with the agreements concluded in Amman between His Majesty the King of Jordan and the PLO Chairman. Simultaneously, the PLO would confirm its adherence to the United Nations and Security Council resolutions relevant to the Middle East conflict, including Resolutions 242 and 338.
V—The valid and appropriate framework for the negotiations should be that of an international conference which would group, apart from the parties directly interested or concerned, the Security Council members.
In my estimation, these suggestions have the advantage and the merit of drawing a nearly total consensus. In any event, so far as Mr. Gorbachev concerned, he expresses the following in his reply of 6 December 1985 and in response to the message I had addressed to him on the occasion of your Geneva Summit: “It is only according to the extent to which the interests and the rights of all parties are reciprocally taken into account that deadlocks could be avoided in the Middle East settlement. Actually, such an objective can be reached only within the framework of an international conference with the participation of all parties interested, including the PLO, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people who are the greatest victims of the Middle East tragedy. In our opinion, there is no other alternative.”
Since the cardinal virtue of clarity has always made relations easier among men, allowing for dialogue to proceed further, there is a point which, I believe, needs clarifying.
The Israeli air-raid against the PLO headquarters aimed at the physical elimination of its chairman. Wrongly or rightly, the American responsibility has been implicated. I personally find it difficult to think, one moment, that the President of the United States, whom I know and appreciate, could have allowed to be involved in such a blatant aggression act; however, I believe that a clarification from you would [Page 532] efficiently enhance and comfort the feelings of the Arab masses and their leaders which the role attributed to the United States in the Israeli aggression has unfortunately not left unaltered.
In this respect, the PLO Chairman has asked me this: “must I still be considered sentenced to death by those who are Israel’s support? I want to know so that the PLO could draw the adequate conclusions. Isn’t there a contradiction between the death sentence which I still may continue to be the object of and the fact that I am personally and persistently asked to recognize, on behalf of the organization I lead, Resolutions 242 and 338 so as to allow the peace process to prosper?”
The suggestions which I submit to the friend and the official who, to a large degree, holds the fate and destiny of the peoples of the countries of the Middle East, result from a ripe reflection and a steady concentration the various responsibilities have allowed me to undertake.
Should these suggestions meet with your approval, we could join forces so as to bring together, and unify around them, all the parties interested or concerned.
Please accept, Mr. President and great friend, the assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.
Most sincerely yours, Hassan II, King of Morocco. End text.
4. Begin text of response. Your Majesty, Ambassador Nassif has delivered your message of February 7. I appreciate your thoughts on the requirements for a peace settlement in the Middle East.
As you know, a just and enduring peace in the Middle East remains a paramount objective of my government. It is of great concern to me personally, as well. I can only agree with you that a dispassionate analysis of all the factors involved must underlie any effort to resolve this complex and difficult problem. Otherwise, those efforts are doomed to failure.
You write of “a just, global and durable peace ensuring full security for all.” That is indeed our common goal. You also note that such a peace must be a negotiated peace. I fully concur: an imposed solution would not be a lasting peace. I would add, however, that such a peace must be negotiated directly by the parties. This could take place under international auspices, if the parties so decided and according to mutually agreeable arrangements.
The internationally recognized basis for any such negotiations are those contained in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is my view, Your Majesty, that all parties to negotiations would logically have to subscribe to these fundamental principles. This includes, of course, the representatives of the Palestinian people. [Page 533] During the course of negotiations those principles—as well as others, such as the legitimate rights of the Palestinians—would be brought to bear.
We in the United States followed the recent discussions in Amman with great interest. I can only accept His Majesty King Hussein’s assessment of the causes of the failure of those talks as he detailed them in his speech of February 19.2 I take particular note of his judgement that he is “unable to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their word becomes their bond, characterized by commitment, credibility and constancy.” I believe that the breakdown of the Amman negotiations, despite the valiant efforts of King Hussein, was a significant event in the search for peace in the Middle East. It has brought us to a period of reflection on all sides.
You refer in your letter, Your Majesty, to lingering suspicion that the United States Government may have played a role in the attack by Israeli military aircraft on the Tunis headquarters of the PLO. I can only state once again that such accusations are totally unfounded. My government had no advance knowledge nor in any way facilitated the Israeli raid on the capital of a friendly state. I would be grateful if you would convey this message to any who remain in doubt.
I have long admired your efforts to encourage understanding on both sides of the Middle East conflict. Your letter reflects your continuing dedication to the cause of peace in that region. During this period of reflection, in particular, the candid expression of your views is most welcome. Please accept my sincere appreciation and best wishes.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
End text.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Josiah Rosenblat (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Hill, McKinley, Gregory Talcott (S/S–O), Pearson, and Brian Curran (P); approved by Murphy.↩
- Reference is to King Hussein of Jordan’s February 19 speech in Amman, in which he announced “he was ending a yearlong effort to devise a joint speech strategy” with the PLO. (“Hussein Drops a Yearlong Effort to Join In Peace Bid With Arafat,” New York Times, February 20, 1986, pp. A1, A4)↩