Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

204. Note From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, May 17, 1982

Dear Bill,

I am sending you personally this copy of “Prospects for Morocco,” an Intelligence Community production which focuses on King Hassan and his regime. Although published the morning of Monday, 17 May, I wish to ensure it reaches you prior to the King’s upcoming visit. I believe the study projects a particularly balanced view of internal and regional issues at stake for us in Morocco.

William J. Casey²

Enclosure

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum³

NI IIM 82–10004

Washington, May 1982

PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO

[Omitted here are a Scope Note and the Table of Contents.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

In the coming year, King Hassan II is likely to maintain firm control of Morocco’s political system. Hassan probably will continue to use his proven techniques of divide-and-rule, manipulation, and co-option of political parties to regulate the activities of the opposition. His domestic security apparatus will keep a close eye on dissident activity and we expect the armed forces will remain loyal. The military and security service will obey orders to suppress sporadic civil disturbances. Neither Morocco’s established political parties and labor unions, which prefer to operate within the system, nor fringe opposition groups pose a serious threat to the monarchy in the short run.⁴

Over the next several years, however, Morocco will face a number of extremely difficult socioeconomic and political problems as well as the seemingly interminable conflict in Western Sahara that cumulatively could pose a serious threat to domestic stability and King Hassan’s survival. Many of these problems—rapidly growing population, rising expectations, inflation, and international debt—are common to most developing states. Although Morocco’s economy has considerable potential for growth, for the next several years it faces the prospect of—at best—slow growth, austerity, and a declining standard of living.

Over the long term, the strains and pressures in Moroccan society portend serious difficulty for the King, the monarchy as an institution, and Morocco’s political system, which is heavily based on patronage.⁵ We question whether this system and Morocco’s limited resources will enable Rabat to cope with its serious problems. If, as seems probable, the present system fails to satisfy rising popular aspirations, societal pressures probably will generate demands for major political change.

It is impossible to predict how severe the pressures must be before serious instability develops. The situation is not irretrievable, but Hassan will have to demonstrate astute managerial skills to deal with existing economic and social problems.

In international affairs, Western Sahara will remain the primary focus of Moroccan attention. The threats Morocco perceives from Algeria, Libya, and the Soviet Union also will absorb Moroccan attention. In pursuit of Moroccan interests, King Hassan will continue to adopt foreign policies that often parallel or coincide with US interests.

Neither a military nor a political solution to the Western Sahara quagmire is in the offing.⁶ The economic burden of the war will remain bearable for Morocco so long as Saudi Arabia continues to provide financial assistance to cover the bulk of the war’s costs. The Moroccan armed forces should be able to resist Polisario attacks but will not be able to defeat the guerrilla forces so long as they have sanctuary in Algeria and external sources of military assistance. For their part, the Polisario will not be able to take control of the Sahara by military means. Barring greater flexibility by all parties and in the absence of minimal mutual confidence, the wide divergence of views leaves little hope for a negotiated settlement. None of the parties would support a referendum that did not appear to ensure an outcome favorable to its interests.

Parallel interests have contributed to a recent effort by both the United States and Morocco to intensify their close relations. The accelerated pace of cooperation, however, risks serious regional and bilateral misunderstandings. In the short run, and especially among elements of the Moroccan military, the prospect of augmented US help could lead to unrealistic expectations regarding the extent of US support and strengthen the conviction that military victory in the Sahara is attainable. Interest in a negotiated, settlement consequently could be set back.⁷ Regionally, Portugal and Spain might misperceive US intentions and assume lessened US interest in established bases in Iberia.

In the longer run, unmet expectations could produce a reaction in Morocco dangerous both to US interests and to those of the King. An impression that the United States had made promises to Morocco it could not keep, or that the King had proved inept in his dealings with the United States, might harm close US-Moroccan relations and undermine military and popular confidence in Hassan.

A close US-Moroccan relationship—especially one involving increased military aid and the granting of air transit facilities—will complicate efforts to improve US-Algerian relations. Algerian leaders consider US military aid to Morocco evidence that the United States supports a Moroccan military solution to the Western Sahara dispute. They also are concerned that US-provided equipment may ultimately be used against Algeria. Although Algeria’s leaders are more interested than in the past in reaching an accommodation with Morocco, they will not abandon the Polisario and will continue to view the developing US-Moroccan relationship with suspicion.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Morocco (12/23/1981–11/19/1982). No classification marking.
2. Casey signed “Bill” above this typed signature.
3. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Issued by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officers for Near East Asia and South Asia, Central Intelligence Agency. Prepared by and coordinated with the CIA, DIA, INR, Treasury, and the Intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Information as of May 11 was used in its preparation.
4. An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “Morocco” and ending with “which.”
5. An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “Over the long term” and ending with “an institution.”
6. An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
7. An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.