Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

47. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy (Lehman) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 18, 1983

SUBJECT

• Senator Cohen’s Arms Control Proposal

Senator Cohen’s two for one reduction proposal is ambiguous, but, however interpreted, works against the US largely because of differences in modernization requirements of the superpowers and the impact of counting rules and categories.

The newspaper article by Senator Cohen² does not make clear whether or not the 2 for 1 reduction applies to warheads and bombs or delivery systems. Because SALT II does not contain a direct aggregate limit on warheads and bombs one could assume that his proposed reductions in “the level of strategic weapons contained in the SALT II treaty” means missiles and bombers rather than warheads. If so:

• the actual number of warheads could increase dramatically as it does under SALT II as both sides replace non-MIRVed systems with MIRVed systems. Remember, much of the increase projected in real Soviet RVs comes from placing 10 RVs (or 12 or 14 if they cheat) on SS–18s which under SALT II rules are already credited with having 10 RVs.

• The US would face by far the greatest reductions because we have a greater need to modernize our forces (MX, D–5, C–4, B–1, ATB) whereas the Soviets could do quite nicely with their newly modernized force of SS–17s, 18s, & 19s. They have many old non-MIRVed SLBMs which could easily be sacrificed for MIRVed Typhoons. Backfire addresses their bomber program.

• A two for one trade in delivery systems hurts the US most because we have more modernization requirements and work from a smaller base. Depending on whether or not we get credit for retiring mothballed B–52s, we could end up with 500 to 1000 fewer delivery systems than the USSR in implementing the President’s modernization program.

If Senator Cohen means warheads and bombs when he says “weapons” the situation is just as bad. Because of the counting rules I’ve mentioned and because we have far more older RVs and bombs which need to be replaced we would suffer significantly as the attached paper shows.

Please feel free to call me if you have questions.

Ron Lehman

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy³

Washington, undated

The following is a rough, but revealing, analysis of the impact of Senator Cohen’s Build-Down proposal.

1. The Bomber Force:

• With the B–52D phase out, the bomber force without modernization would carry:

—SRAM	1,128
—GRAV[G]	604
—GRAV[H]	360
—GRAV[FB–111]	120
	2,212 weapons

• By 1984 the FYDP calls for 1,080 ALCM, so as 2 for 1 phase out would eliminate 2,160 gravity and SRAM weapons, roughly the entire force.

• As a result non-ALCM modified aircraft would have no weapons available for loading, i.e., the 60 B–52Gs not due to be modified, the 90 B–52Hs not yet modified, and the entire FB–111 force. The soon to be deployed B–1 force would complete with the B–52Gs for the few ALCM available, and would not be a penetrator since no weapons would be available.

2. The SLBM force:

• With six Tridents scheduled by 1985, the new weapons would be:

6 × 24 × 8 = 1,152

• A 2 for 1 build down demands elimination of 2,304 warheads, or 15 Poseidon C–3 boats by 1985.

3. The ICBM modernization:

• The ICBM modernization would replace the approximately 2,100 Minuteman warheads with 1,000 MX warheads.

4. USSR force:

Except for a small amount of medium solids by 1984, the USSR ICBM force is a modified force, not a new system. Their bomber force is relatively constant in this timeframe. Deployment of the Typhoon with the SS–N–20 would be impeded: by 1986 the Typhoon, with 980 warheads, would demand a 1,960 reduction, but current Soviet SLBM warheads are roughly 1,500, so only 5 rather than 6 Typhoons could be built.

As can be seen, the U.S. modernization of the SLBM and bomber force in the early years, needed to offset the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force, would result in a near-disarmament in the day-to-day alert scenario in terms of survivable warheads. The U.S. would lose 500 alert bomber warheads and about 1,200 alert SLBM warheads as a result of the proposal.

If Senator Cohen was referring to delivery vehicles, the U.S. in deploying 20 Tridents, 100 MX, and 250 modern bombers would deploy 830 new vehicles, and need to give up 1,660 in a 2 for 1 draw down. Depending upon which delivery vehicles count (i.e., those B–52s in the boneyard, the U.S. has from 1,929 (with no B–52Ds) to as high as 2,273 as accountable by SALT II. The U.S. could keep 613 older systems plus the 830 newer ones for a total of 1,443.

The Soviets begin at a higher base of around 2,400. Since their force is already modernized, they could freeze at the current level while the U.S. reduced to nearly half that level.

1. Source: Reagan Library, McFarlane Files, Nunn-Cohen Proposal (1). Secret.
2. Reference is to Cohen’s proposal that the United States “agree with the level of strategic weapons contained in the SALT II treaty and then insist that for every new weapon added to the force by either side, two older, less stabilizing weapons must be eliminated. (William S. Cohen, “A Guaranteed Arms Build-Down,” The Washington Post, January 3, 1983, p. A13)
3. Secret. Brackets are in the original.