Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, October 5, 1988, 0143Z

325164. Subject: Official—informal.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is the draft of the final memorandum of conversation for the Ministerial Experts meeting during the morning of September 23, 1988.

3. Begin text:

Memorandum of Conversation

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Amb Nitze
  • Amb Kampelman
  • Amb Hanmer
  • Amb Cooper
  • Amb Rowny
  • Adm Howe
  • Gen Burns
  • DAS Harrison
  • DAS Joseph
  • Col Linhard
  • Mr. Castillo
  • Dr. Timbie
  • Dr. Graham
  • Mr. Toye
  • Mr. Ramee
  • Mr. Walpole
  • Mr. Afanasenko (interpreter)
  • Mr. Starr (notetaker)

  SUBJECT

  • Defense and Space, START

• USSR

  • Amb Obukhov
  • Amb Masterkov
  • Amb Kuznetsov
  • Gen Kuklev
  • Gen Lebedev
  • Mr. Roslyakov
  • Mr. Khromov
  • Mr. Groshev (int)

Ambassador Nitze opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Obukhov if he had any points with which to begin the discussion.

Obukhov responded that the sides should agree on the work objectives for today. It would be just a few hours until the ministers called upon the experts to report on the work underway to finalize the text of a statement. Apparently, the results of our work in this group will be reflected in the final document. Therefore, we need to agree upon provisions on the basis of yesterday’s discussions.² We should reserve time to prepare our report to the ministers. What is your view?

Nitze responded that he agreed with Obukhov’s points. He suggested that the sides might begin with the Soviet reaction to the points that the U.S. had made about ALCMs and mobiles to see if there was any common ground to report to the ministers. The next issue that the U.S. wanted to raise was that there ought to be some discussion of Mr. Shevardnadze’s letter³ regarding limitations on ballistic missile RVs. The U.S. has some questions to ask about the language of that proposal. The sides should also consider whether there would be any language inserted on the basis of recommendations made by Roz and Bessmertnykh.

Obukhov said that this was a reasonable approach, but added that the sides should not take too much time discussing these details. Bearing this in mind, his comments would be brief and specific. Regarding the proposal made by the U.S. on the protocol of the future agreement on compliance and nonwithdrawal from the ABM treaty, the Soviet point of view is that the issues raised by the U.S. side required additional consideration. Such consideration might be provided at the negotiations in Geneva. If we have time, as a matter of principle, we will express the additional considerations of Ambassador Kuznetsov.

Regarding the discussion about ALCMs and heavy bombers, both sides have introduced proposals which have been sufficiently detailed by both sides. Today, the Soviet side will express its point of view on what was derived from yesterday’s discussions in order to include it in the final document by way of expressing common ground. At the same time, we intend to do the same with regard to mobiles. The Soviet side is aware of the exchange of points of view regarding the separate agreement on non-increase of the number of warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles. The Soviet side will answer any question today or in the future. These aspects could also be recorded in a final document.

These are the Soviet remarks in general terms. We should put these remarks in the final draft. The U.S. questions on the Krasnoyarsk radar station will be specifically examined by Karpov and Kampelman.

Here are the approximate ideas that the Soviet side is ready to suggest. (Obukhov handed over to Amb. Hanmer copies of a Soviet draft of the final joint statement.)

Nitze handed to Obukhov the U.S. draft final joint statement.⁴

Obukhov observed that the U.S. suggestion was far more laconic, briefer.

(The sides took a short break to read the statements of the other side)

Obukhov noted to Nitze, by way of clarification, that when the Soviet side speaks of a mutual understanding of deployed areas for mobiles, the Soviet side proceeds from the understanding that exercises would not be limited in area.

Nitze asked if the Soviet side was suggesting that exercises be permitted outside of deployment areas.

Obukhov said that the Soviet proposal does not provide for a limitation of the area in which one can exercise.

Nitze responded that the U.S. does provide for such a limitation.

Obukhov said yes, the sides have different views on that point. He thought, though, that the sides could record agreement in other areas, such as the use of the deployment area concept. This was his first point. His second, in anticipation of U.S. proposals, might record the following: that the ministers directed the negotiations in Geneva to continue to work on a final agreement of documents on all problems of nuclear and space weapons, including possible agreement on the issue of the non-increase of warheads on ballistic missiles of existing types. These are the Soviet proposals.

Nitze suggested that the U.S. experts needed to discuss these points among themselves. The Soviet proposal went more to the heart of the matter than the U.S. draft. Nitze asked if the sides should break at this point to discuss the drafts. Nitze said that he would prefer to put this issue aside for now, go on to discuss long range ALCMs and mobiles, spend a few minutes on some questions that he had on Shevardnadze’s letter, then go back to consideration of the statements.

Obukhov told Nitze that the Soviet side’s reaction to the U.S. proposals on the verification of mobiles and on the issue of limitations on ALCMs and heavy bombers are contained in the document that he had just passed over. If the sides start to analyze the U.S.-Soviet proposals again, we will cover the same trails. We decided to select for this document only that which can be recorded now. All the rest is subject to further discussion or analysis.

Hanmer noted that at the Moscow summit, the sides took the approach that the material that added to common ground, but not all of the specifics, would go in the public document. He proposed to put the specifics in the Soviet text aside into a separate paper.

Obukhov said that the Soviet side could go along with this. He suggested that it would be appropriate to have a ten minute break to examine the document.

Nitze agreed on taking a ten minute break.

* * *

Nitze opened after the break suggesting that Kuznetsov and Cooper should go off to discuss the Defense and Space portion of the two draft joint statements, and that Hanmer and Masterkov should go off to discuss the START text. If he and Obukhov tried to reach agreement on both START and Defense and Space, then it would take too long.

Obukhov agreed, and the four ambassadors left the room.

Nitze said that he would ask some questions about the Soviet proposal on ballistic missile RV limits. We have begun to examine the proposal on ballistic missile RVs contained in Minister Shevardnadze’s letter to Secretary Shultz. As we understand it, the proposal contains the following basic elements:

—The sides would reaffirm their intention to continue their efforts for early completion of a START treaty.

—The sides would agree not to deploy or flight test more RVs on each type of existing ICBM and SLBM than the number declared for that type in the Washington summit joint statement.

—During flight testing of each type of existing ICBM and SLBM, the number of procedures for releasing or dispensing RVs would not exceed the number of RVs declared for that type in the Washington summit joint statement.

—Verification would be carried out by national technical means and on-site inspection.

—Agreement on these provisions would take the form of an exchange of letters between the ministers.

—The agreement would enter into force on the date of the return letter from Secretary Shultz and would remain in effect until replaced by a START treaty.

—Each side would have the right to withdraw from the agreement upon six months’ written notice.

Nitze continued that the U.S. would like to clarify some aspects of such a possible agreement before we decide on our response. First, there would have to be a clear understanding that any such agreement will not affect existing patterns of cooperation with our allies; we will not enter into such an agreement on any other basis.

Obukhov said that Nitze had correctly described the Soviet proposal. Regarding the issue of cooperation with the allies, the Soviet side had a question. How could this point affect compliance with this agreement? What additional rights did the U.S. request for itself?

Nitze responded that the U.S. was asking for no additional rights. He noted that it was traditional that agreements not affect patterns of cooperation, as in the case of INF.

Obukhov had one more question. Do you imply that the obligations assumed by the U.S. under this agreement could be strictly complied with by the U.S., but not by its allies?

Nitze answered that the U.S. would not test more warheads on missiles than would be permitted under this agreement, but that such an agreement would not affect existing patterns of cooperation. Nitze then continued with his points on the proposal.

Second, we should be clear on the purpose of and procedures for the on-site inspections incorporated into the verification regime for any such agreement. We believe that the purpose of the on-site inspections would be to help verify that deployed ICBMs and SLBMs carried no more than the permitted number of RVs.

Obukhov asked if his understanding was correct that the U.S. could positively view the Soviet proposal if it provided details on the inspection procedures for the RV limitations.

Nitze said that this question raised his next point. The procedures for such inspections should follow the approach that we have proposed in the START JDT. The details of these procedures would have to be agreed prior to completion of this agreement. Third, the prohibition on launching missiles with more reentry vehicles than the declared number should be applied to all launches, not just flight tests. National technical means of verification would be used for this prohibition.

Obukhov asked if this implied that the ban would apply to launches from test ranges and elsewhere.

Nitze said that this was exactly what he was asking, that it was not clear from Shevardnadze’s letter. To facilitate the use of national technical means, any such agreement could only be reached if we had agreement on a requirement to broadcast telemetry during all launches and flights of these missiles and a ban on denial of full access to the data thus broadcast, including through the use of encryption. Nitze asked Obukhov if this seemed possible to him.

Obukhov asked if Nitze had provided any provision to pass over telemetry on all launches. This provision seemed to be missing in Nitze’s text.

Nitze stated that he was just asking a question.

Obukhov concluded then that Nitze’s question did not contain an obligation to transmit telemetry.

Nitze said no, that he was saying that an agreement could only be reached with agreement to broadcast telemetry and to guarantee access to this telemetry.

Rowny added that the answer to Obukhov’s question was “yes”, that the ban would apply to all flight tests and to all other launches.

Obukhov said that this question would require study. The Soviet side would propose to provide a clarification in the course of the negotiations in Geneva.

Nitze said that he had some additional points to make. Fourth, if there were to be an agreement, it could not be open-ended; despite statements indicating otherwise, an open-ended agreement could create the impression that the sides were no longer seeking a START treaty with the same degree of urgency. Instead, any such agreement should be of a specified duration, unless superseded earlier by a START treaty.

Obukhov asked what specific ideas the U.S. had about time limitations.

Nitze said that he was not suggesting a particular time, but maybe something like three years would be appropriate.

Obukhov said “good”.

Nitze continued his presentation: fifth, the proposal deals only with existing ballistic missiles; to ensure that nothing happened during the duration of any such agreement to undermine the agreement’s effects, we should discuss a provision for future ballistic missiles as well.

Obukhov acknowledged that he understood.

Nitze said sixth, the question of the form of the agreement also requires further study. We have to be sure that the form of the agreement is consistent with the applicable laws of the United States.

Obukhov asked Nitze to speak more specifically about this point.

Nitze said that any agreement worked out by the Executive Branch could not enter into force without positive action by the Congress.

Obukhov said that he understood that point, but wanted to know how this fact might affect the format of the agreement.

Nitze responded that one option was to record this agreement in the form of a treaty, which would require approval by two-thirds of the Senate. A second option would be an executive agreement that could be approved by a joint resolution of Congress.

Obukhov summarized that either the treaty option or an exchange of letters would require approval by both chambers of Congress. Was Ambassador Nitze implying that a provision related to the form of the agreement be included in the text?

Nitze answered no, that he had just pointed out that the issue required consideration, not that it should be included in the text. Nitze continued with his presentation, saying finally, there is the question of the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel radars. As the Soviet side knows, the President has stated that the U.S. will enter into no new strategic agreements until the violations at Krasnoyarsk and Gomel are resolved.

Obukhov said that on this question, the Soviet side can provide an answer. General Burns and Ambassador Karpov are discussing this now.

Nitze concluded that these were the U.S. questions.

Obukhov said that he would provide the only reasonable answer now. The questions posed by the American side required study and well thought out answers that would be provided in Geneva.

Nitze responded “good” and asked if anyone else (on the U.S. side) had any comments.

Rowny, after a couple minutes of private conversation among members of the Soviet delegation, said that, without repeating all six points, the first and the last point should be given special attention, that is, that cooperation with the allies would be preserved in any agreement reached and that any agreement would need the approval of our Congress.

Obukhov asked the U.S. to clarify one point with respect to cooperation with the allies. He asked if it were possible, in line with the U.S. approach, that if the Trident II were shipped to Great Britain for deployment in submarines, that the British could have not 8 but 14 warheads on that missile.

Nitze responded yes it was possible, but that he did not think it was possible that Great Britain would conduct such testing in the next two to three years.

Obukhov suggested that the sides break to see about progress in the next room.

* * *

(The meeting adjourned while the sides separately discussed the progress made in the subgroup meetings on the draft joint statements.)

* * *

Obukhov asked the U.S. side what were the results of its discussion?

Nitze responded that the U.S. [has] a minor point to deal with first, in the last sentence of the first paragraph. In English the phrase “new progress” is confusing. It would be better to say “further progress.”

Obukhov said that he agreed to this change.

Hanmer said that he had a couple of points regarding the paper on ALCMs. Both sides spoke of package approval with respect to the issue of ALCMs and heavy bombers. While Hanmer did not have a substantive difference with respect to the particular points in the current draft joint paper describing the status of ALCMs, to ascribe the points of agreement on ALCMs as common ground without resolving the other issues is not appropriate at this time. His second point was that the U.S. would be prepared to ban conversion (of existing types of aircraft that are not heavy bombers into heavy bombers) if the Soviet side could accept the U.S. point on attribution. But the sides are not yet agreed on the “maximum equipped” issue. Given the overall dispute about how the number should be assigned or attributed, this issue could not be described as common ground. But this does not mean that the sides cannot record further progress.

Obukhov asked if the U.S. side proposed just to have the issue in mind without putting it on paper.

Hanmer said yes, it would be a non-paper. With regard to common ground on mobile missiles, since the sides have different meanings regarding deployment areas, again he would not have the ministers issue this as a point of common ground at this time.

Obukhov said well in these two non-papers, we have reflected certain positive outcomes in our discussions. We will take these papers to Geneva and take note of them in our work, treating them as non-papers. The language here reflects what has been done. Then we may consider our work completed. We must report back about the work that we have done. Obukhov proposed to make the report quite brief by saying that the outcome of the work was summarized in the text (of the joint statement) to be provided. In addition, both sides have expressed certain considerations on certain issues which will be examined in the negotiations in Geneva.

Nitze said that in the past, the sides have reported to ministers differently; the sides have reported separately. Nitze proposed that Obukhov give his report and that Nitze would give his.

Obukhov said that he was proposing a different approach. If they take a different approach than what he had suggested, then it will be the task of the sides to make complete reports on all of our previous work and to enumerate the quite numerous points of diversion. Obukhov said that his idea was to limit the reports to refer to these papers, noting that each side had made proposals that would be subjected to analysis to see if they increased the common ground. If this approach reflects the U.S. views, Obukhov said that he could agree to such a report made by Ambassador Nitze. If the U.S. goes into greater detail, then the Soviet side may respond with greater detail of their own.

Nitze said that he envisioned summarizing ALCMs, mobiles and the other subjects discussed and that he would conclude that there was no basic change in either side’s position.

Obukhov said that Nitze favored a more detailed report.

Nitze said yes, slightly.

Obukhov concluded that they should make separate reports.

Nitze responded yes.

Nitze and Obukhov agreed to adjourn the meeting at 12:00.

End text.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 2, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Starr; cleared by Collins and in S/S-O; approved by Stafford.
2. No minutes of the experts’ discussions on September 22, 1988 were found.
3. Shevardnadze’s letter was not found.
4. Neither draft was found. In their joint statement of September 23, Shultz and Shevardnadze “noted the active and serious effort underway to resolve outstanding issues in the Geneva nuclear and space talks. They received updated joint draft texts of a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and its associated documents. They welcomed the further elaboration since the Moscow summit of these drafts. The sides discussed a range of issues including air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and the problem of verification of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Some further progress was achieved in the first two areas.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 1988, p. 29.)