Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

312. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 10, 1988

SUBJECT

• WHETHER TO GO FOR A START TREATY

Our stated position—a correct one—following the Summit is that we will continue our efforts to make progress on START and see how far we can get; we would like to conclude a START Treaty in this Administration; but we will not be rushed to decision by the calendar.

It will come as no surprise to you that many in and out of Government have concluded that “the air is out of the souffle” and there is virtually no chance of concluding a START Treaty this year. Some welcome this outcome as avoiding a “rush to decision” on difficult START issues.

I am concerned we not drift into a situation where drift alone makes a Treaty impossible. We should make a conscious decision now whether to press for a Treaty or concentrate instead on consolidating the maximum amount of agreement to pass on to the next Administration.

A START Treaty this year is, in my opinion, not achievable unless the Soviets agree at the final end game to put aside the two most difficult issues—SLCMs and SDI. This is quite possible, but even with this Soviet acquiescence, it is highly uncertain whether Washington can organize itself to make the extraordinary effort necessary to arrive at decisions on the range of other remaining difficult START issues, such as suspect site inspections, mobile ICBM verification, ALCMs, bombers, and a throw-weight protocol.

The list of obstacles is daunting, but the Soviets may still want to conclude a START agreement with the Reagan administration. If we were within sight of agreement on all other START issues, they just might settle for a declaration on SLCMs and a ban on deployment of SDI for a certain number of years. But even if the Soviets do not agree, we would have a package and could use it to our advantage when the issue of “blame” for no agreement is raised. I fully expect the Soviets to come in with their initiatives in a public way on July 12. (I expect to be in Geneva that first week.)

Whatever slim chance there may be now for a Treaty in 1988, the odds will decrease quickly with time. We should decide now, therefore, whether or not to go for it. We should also recognize that if we are to have a shot at it, a maximum effort from the top will be required. That will mean, among other things, forcing decisions out of a reluctant inter-agency bureaucracy. This will require the personal commitment and direction of the President with those who would prefer to go slow, such as JCS. The JCS should understand that in a Dukakis Presidency, there is unlikely to be a 2/3 Senate ratification vote. We would then be left with no Soviet 50% reductions and unilateral US reductions by virtue of budget cuts.

I recommend that in your next private meeting with the President, you discuss START prospects frankly. Whatever his decision, we can then execute it politically and organize ourselves accordingly.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, June 1988 Meeting w/ President. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.