309. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
-
US
- AMB Nitze
- AMB Rowny
- AMB Cooper
- AMB Hanmer
- AMB Lehman
- VADM Howe
- Dr. Graham
- Col Linhard
- LtCol Richardson (Note taker)
- Korobovsky (Interpreter)
-
USSR
- Marshall Akhromeyev
- Col Gen Chervov
- AMB Karpov
- AMB Masterkov
- AMB Obukhov
- Batruschev (Interpreter)
1. AKHROMEYEV began by suggesting that the group organize its work for the afternoon session in the following way: Karpov would explain the Soviet view of the linkage between the ABM Treaty and reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms; following this, the Soviet side would pass over its version of language to be inserted in the joint statement on the START and ABM Treaty areas. Then he, Akhromeyev, and Karpov would be absent for approximately 45 minutes, after which the group would resume work until 6:00 pm, if the US side had no objection.
2. KARPOV said that he wanted to discuss the core issue of the work before the group. The Soviet side had been very attentive to Nitze’s previous remarks on Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA) and linkage, but Karpov believed that channeling energies to the minor details would result in deviation from the final goal. Karpov said that the gist, the fundamental basis is the Dec. 10, 1987 WSJS language, whose main idea is to insure compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 and to insure an agreed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This is the core of the understanding reached by the leaders. Karpov acknowledged both sides had accomplished useful work in Geneva; the Soviet side had agreed to elaborate a separate agreement on compliance and non-withdrawal for an agreed period, and a protocol on predictability and verification. The Soviet side recognized the necessity for a separate protocol based on the text agreed in Washington, and holds that any other view which envisages replacement of [Page 1432] the ABM Treaty is in violation of the agreement expressed in the WSJS, and an obstacle to reductions in SOA. Karpov wanted to remind the US side that the Soviets had taken US concerns into account in the form of a draft protocol on predictability and verification, which now offer a good possibility for agreement based on the USJS. The Soviet side believes that, if each side accepts such an agreement without deviation, it would be possible to complete at least a joint draft agreement (JDA) even in Moscow. This would be a notable advance. In any case, Karpov said, preservation of the ABM Treaty as an instrument of stability is the basis for 50% reductions in SOA. The main task before the group is to reach accord on the agreed period: it must be at least more “durable” than the period of SOA reductions, and it requires precise and complete compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, including verification, predictability, and consultation measures guaranteeing the treaty will not be violated. If both sides act on this basis, other questions will be quickly resolvable and this will cease to be a problem in Geneva.
3. NITZE said that the US side wholly agrees with the nature of the Dec 10 WSJS. The US wishes to include every word of the WSJS pertinent language in its version of the draft treaty. But Karpov had emphasized only certain parts of the WSJS. From the beginning, Nitze said, there have been three sets of problems with matters relating to the ABM Treaty. One question is the length of the agreed period. The US doubts the sides are far apart on the length, and believe this can be specified after the other issues are concluded. A second question is what happens after expiration of the agreed period. This, the WSJS says, is that each side is “free to decide its own course of action.” These were GS Gorbachev’s words referred to by Shultz and Shevardnadze on the final morning of the Washington summit. In the context of President Reagan’s exchange with Gorbachev, the clear meaning was that each side, without further discussion, would deploy after expiration of the period. Gorbachev said he didn’t like this but would accept it in exchange for a commitment to comply for a specified period. Carlucci had confirmed with Shevardnadze on the final morning of the summit, in the presence of both Nitze and Akhromeyev, that this meant a right to deploy. So the pertinent issue is how to include this agreement in the appropriate legal context of the treaty or agreement. That is the purpose of the notification provision which supercedes Article XV. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the US draft Article III constitute the legal package of the WSJS pertaining to what happens after the period. Finally, on the third question, Nitze said, Karpov had emphasized only the phrase pertaining to what happens during the specified period. He emphasized the words “comply with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972;” he did not refer to the succeeding phrase, “conduct [Page 1433] research, development and testing, as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” The US side recognizes there have been questions as to what was and was not covered by the language.
4. AKHROMEYEV interrupted to say that there is always a question, indeed a constant disagreement, between the sides on this matter. That is to say, the Soviet understanding is different from that of the US.
5. NITZE said this is why Secretary Shultz said he wants to narrow differences on this matter. US proposals on predictability, in which the Soviet side has joined in developing, contribute much toward resolving these differences. The US believes its proposals on sensors would resolve potential misunderstandings as to the relationship of a given sensor to an ABM system. Certain sensors now deployed or contemplated by both sides give precise, timely information on ballistic missile launches. They may be capable of giving ballistic missile tracking information as well. The US proposal is that we not object to Soviet satellite sensors and the Soviet side will not object to ours. One further issue, Nitze said, with respect to the discussion of the ABM treaty, is that it is important to clarify the matter of extraordinary events affecting the national security of a side. This is a provision recognized by international law and part of every treaty previously agreed between the two countries. The US envisions that such a provision is not to be invoked lightly without a compelling declared reason. But the US side believes it must be protected during the period, if such extraordinary circumstances do arise. As to the contention by the Soviet side that exercise of the right to deploy after the non-withdrawal period requires invocation of the supreme interest clause of the ABM treaty, this is counter to Gorbachev’s stated intent in the WSJS agreement.
6. AKHROMEYEV said that since this was the second time Nitze had raised ABM and START linkage during these meetings, and since Karpov had not satisfied US concerns, the Soviet side would weigh US remarks carefully and answer each point tomorrow. Akhromeyev then announced it was time for him and Karpov to recess for approximately 45 minutes to attend a meeting with Shevardnadze. [The Soviet side handed over its draft version of joint statement language on START/D&S matters]2
7. After return of Akhromeyev and Karpov, NITZE began a review of US positions on SLCMs. He said that despite an intensive effort over many years, the US had not yet been able to devise an acceptable, reliable means of giving confidence on SLCMs. The Geneva experts’ meetings should continue to address this problem, but at this point, the only solution the US side can envision is a non-binding declaration [Page 1434] of plans for nuclear-armed SLCMs. If the issue can be resolved on the basis of a declaratory approach, the US and Soviet sides would make a statement about the number of nuclear armed SLCMs it plans for, with the right to change plans as necessary. The Soviet side, Nitze said, has responded negatively to a declaratory approach, but has not been clear about its objections. If the Soviet side could be more specific about its objections, perhaps those objections could be addressed.
8. AKHROMEV said that he had already set forth Soviet views on SLCMs, including some new ones. The Soviet side requests the US to consider these views and not rule them out point blank. Further, the US stand on declaratory statements for SLCMs contradicts the US position on other issues. The Soviet side is sure that the problem is not that SLCMs cannot be verified, but that the US does not want to subject its “assets” to verification. This is “unimaginable.” If the sides agree to two or three classes of submarines and one or two classes of surface ships on which to deploy SLCMs, this will amount to approximately 100 “units” to be verified, in contrast to the case in INF where the Soviets will have close to 200 installations subject to verification. This illustrates that the problem is manageable. The problem is an obvious lack of desire on the part of the US side, and no one can convince the Soviet side that this is not the case. Even US leaders say that the US Navy is reluctant to subject its assets to verification. It is up to the US administration to deal with the US Navy; the Soviet side cannot control this. The US is familiar with General Secretary Gorbachev’s statement that only if SLCMs are constrained with verification can there be an agreement on reduction of SOAs. If there is no agreement to control SLCMs, the Soviet side would wait for the Americans to change its mind. On ABM Treaty linkage, Akhromeyev said he had nothing further to add.
9. NITZE replied that from the outset, it was agreed that SLCMs represented a different case; this is why they were not included under the 6000 weapon limit. Akhromeyev would recall that at Reykjavik, Nitze had said he could not envisage an acceptable verification regime for SLCMs, that the best imaginable scheme would be unilateral declarations. At that time, the US had agreed to seek mutually acceptable limitations on SLCMs. Now, Nitze said, he could assure Akhromeyev that the US had sought such limitations but had not succeeded. He then asked Amb Rowny to elaborate.
10. ROWNY said he wanted to emphasize it was not a matter of reluctance, but rather inability to find a solution, which has led the US to its conclusions on SLCMs. Although Rowny had spent a career in the Army, he said, he was familiar with naval operational concepts. Modern navies rely to a large degree on conventional sea-launched cruise missiles. Flexibility is the hallmark of modern navies of all [Page 1435] nations; limiting SLCMs to certain types of ships violates this principle. The US has worked long and hard to solve the problem of SLCM verification, but we have found no answer. The US has been promised a solution by the Soviet side, but it is clear that Soviet ideas do not offer a workable approach. Whereas certain systems lend themselves to verification, naval vessels do not. In an absence of a workable solution, or a better answer from the Soviet side, declarations appear to be the only feasible approach. This would give some degree of predictability. To repeat, Rowny said, the US position reflects not reluctance, but an inability to find an acceptable verification regime.
11. HOWE then stated he endorsed everything Nitze and Rowny had said, which illustrates that the problem of SLCMs is not simply the case of the US Navy being “out of control”, but is rather a joint, unified position of the US Government.
12. AKHROMEYEV interrupted to say that he had not used the words “out of control” in his presentation.
13. HOWE acknowledged this and thanked Akhromeyev for the correction. He continued that the USN has difficult problems with verification of the SLCM system, which has both nuclear and conventional applications, in contrast to SLBMs, which of course pose a much more significant strategic potential. On SLBMs, the US Navy has demonstrated its full cooperativeness in being willing to demonstrate to the Soviets the number of deployed missiles and warheads. He continued that, despite the fact that US coasts are more exposed, the US side does not consider SLCMs to be in the same category of threat as fast-flying ICBMs or SLBMs. On the matter of Akhromeyev’s comparison of INF base verification with SLCM verification, Howe wanted to point out that these are very different cases. Verification of the eventual total absence of INF systems from facilities on land is fundamentally different from distinguishing and counting SLCMs on operational, multi-purpose platforms. While the Soviet side may have elected to deploy its SLCMs on a small number of platforms, the US has already chosen to spread them over a large number of vessels; this proliferation which is inherent in the problem. As a final point, Howe said, US compliance with a declaratory approach would be assured by the combination of a free press in our open society and the scrutiny of the US Congress. For these reasons, the US bears, and is willing to accept, the greater risk from adopting declaratory statements.
14. AKHROMEYEV said he had a couple of comments on the general US approach. He suggested that the US side recall that the Dec. 10 WSJS, the leaders instructed the negotiators to set mutually agreed SLCM limitations and to seek mutually acceptable and effective verification measures. This means the sides should continue the search. Akhromeyev said that he wished to speak frankly on the US SLCM [Page 1436] position, and to a certain extent, on the US ALCM position. It was not his intent to offend, and he had not used the language Howe had cited, but simply wished to give the Soviet assessment, on which the Soviet side is firmly convinced. Looking at the problem as a whole, the US side want to “maximally reduce” Soviet ballistic missiles while deploying cruise missiles en masse, by the thousands. In this manner, the US will have used legal instruments to achieve military superiority over the USSR. The US wished to have a verbally determined number of cruise missiles, but an actual number greatly in excess of this, and to remove SLCMs from the verification framework entirely. The US side cannot convince the Soviets that this is not the US aim. In the two years since Reykjavik the US has offered no specific proposals on SLCMs. Soviet proposals on SLCM verification have not been seriously analyzed by the US, but rather, ruled out. The Soviet side simply wants the US side to understand and recognize the concerns of the Soviet MOD and General Staff, which the Soviet military is obligated to report to its government. Such a situation would be dangerous for the security interests of the USSR. It is clear that unless the US changes its position, this is an impediment to progress. On this current discussion, Akhromeyev said it was not his intention to launch another dispute, since each knows the other’s position. Rather, it is necessary to prepare the ground to move on. His aim in elaborating at length was to dwell on General Secretary Gorbachev’s statement that without SLCM resolution, there can be no solution to START. He then asked Nitze if the US had any further issues to raise.
15. NITZE said that the US takes the Soviet position seriously, but that we differ on the US motivation. He, Nitze, had personally dealt with these issues over many years; it is clear that the US concern over ballistic missiles, especially large MIRVs, is fundamental. Karpov will confirm this, that the US has longed viewed a strategic distinction between ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The US acknowledges the different Soviet view, but our motivation is to reduce not just Soviet ICBMs, but all ballistic missiles. We believe cruise missiles are more suited to retaliation than to executing a first strike, and are inherently more stabilizing. On the question of long range ALCMs, the US side has tried to be fair to both sides. The count suggested by the US for heavy bombers is fair, and equal to the number of warheads on the most powerful ICBM of either side. It may be possible to discuss other numbers to be attributed if the Soviets do not believe that US and Soviet numbers should be the same. In the meantime the US side will review the Soviet SLCM proposals, and see if further progress can be achieved.
16. NITZE then turned to the issue of compliance with existing agreements. Nitze emphasized the importance of the compliance prob [Page 1437] lem, and said he wished to make it clear that the US cannot conclude further agreements in the strategic area unless and until the Soviet record on non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, especially the problems of Krasnoyarsk and Gomel, are rectified. The sort of response provided by General Detinov at the last meeting on Krasnoyarsk is insufficient. Everyone who has studied this problem in the West concludes that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty; both Houses of Congress have called for its dismantlement. Nitze said he wished to note again the upcoming ABM Treaty review, that this compliance problem should not be allowed to fester, but should be resolved by effectively verifiable dismantlement of the ABM radar. Stopping construction of the radar is a step in the right direction, but is not enough. The only solution which will dispel the mistrust caused by Krasnoyarsk is to dismantle the radar, including the structure. Similarly, the violation involving radar facilities at Gomel must be corrected by verifiable dismantling. Finally, Nitze said he wished to discuss another topic—modernization of Soviet heavy ICBMS. Nitze noted that the START Treaty’s provisions must result in an equal outcome over the long term. The current Soviet proposal would not do that, but would preserve a unilateral Soviet right to retain a heavy ICBM force indefinitely. The US proposal, banning flight testing, modernization, and new types, would achieve a balanced result. The Soviet side would gradually phase out existing heavy ICBMs as they aged, and both sides would be precluded from deploying new heavy ICBMs in the future. The US side cannot agree to any proposal on heavy ICBMs which does not create a balanced outcome over time. Nitze asked if Akhromeyev had any comments.
17. AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side would reply on compliance and linkage to reduction of SOA at the next meeting. As to Soviet heavy ICBMs, the US presentation illustrates the point he was making earlier. The US aim, it is clear, is to liquidate Soviet ICBMs, while the US itself deploys many cruise missiles. Akhromeyev said he meant no offense, but this is his assessment. At Reykjavik, the sides agreed to cut heavy ICBMs by 50%; later, with due regard for US concerns, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to a prohibition of new types of heavy ICBMs. The Soviet Union does not intend to forego necessary modernization and thereby disarm. The US proposal is unacceptable; the Soviet position is legitimate, and the Soviet side will stand by it. For now, Akhromeyev said, the meeting time is running short. Some of the group, he suggested, should be detailed to work on the joint statement, with the objective of reporting common ground by the following morning. At that time, the respective heads of the Arms Control groups could hear reports from the CST, Nuclear Testing, and CW groups. Following these reports, Akhomeyev said he could [Page 1438] respond to the US presentations on linkage and compliance. The Soviet side would also expect to hear US reaction to Soviet proposals on ALCMs and mobile ICBMs. It should therefore be possible to complete the tasks in time to report to ministers at 2:15 pm on the next day.
18. NITZE then proposed the group reconvene the next day, 31 May, at 9:00 am. Akhromeyev agreed.