Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

306. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 29, 1988, 9:25–11:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • AMB Nitze
  • AMB Kampelman
  • AMB Hanmer
  • AMB Cooper
  • AMB Rowny
  • AS Lehman
  • ADM Howe
  • COL Linhard
  • Mr. Castillo
  • Dr. Timbie
  • Dr. Graham
  • LTC Richardson
  • Mr. Mozur (Interpreter)
  • Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

• USSR

  • MSU Akhromeyev
  • AMB Obukhov
  • AMB Kuznetsov
  • AMB Masterkov
  • AMB Karpov
  • AMB Dubinin
  • GEN Chervov
  • GEN Starodubov
  • GEN Lebedev
  • CPT Beketov
  • Mr. Khromov
  • Mr. Batrushev (Int)

NITZE said he would like to begin by addressing START. The instructions to the U.S. side from the President were to see what could be done during the next few days to add to the important elements of the START Treaty that were already agreed. In this spirit, the U.S. side proposed to focus the START discussions especially on ALCMs, building on the progress the sides had achieved at their last meeting, and mobile ICBMs. The sides should also review the other key outstanding START issues and, of course, the U.S. side would be prepared to concentrate on any issue on which the Soviet side felt progress could be made. The U.S. side would also like to continue the data exchange on strategic forces that was begun in Moscow in April. Finally, at some point, the sides would need to turn to the question of the joint statement.

The sides had made some progress on ALCMs in Geneva; they should continue their efforts on that subject in this meeting. On the distinguishability problem, they agreed on three points:

1. All currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be considered to be nuclear-armed.

2. Future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

3. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers.

The sides should try at this meeting to expand this list. There appeared to be two additional points on which they already agreed:

—Any long-range air-to-surface cruise missile which has been tested and deployed with a nuclear variant—all existing such missiles—may be carried only by a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

—Nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles will not be located at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

With regard to other points, the Soviet side had proposed that the means of distinguishing between conventionally armed and nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and between heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles and other heavy bombers, be functionally related, externally observable differences. The U.S. side would be interested in Soviet ideas as to what such differences could be.

The U.S. side had made some additional proposals to aid in distinguishing between bomber types:

—The sides would base at separate locations their heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, their heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and their former heavy bombers.

—Visits of each such class of heavy bomber to airbases of the other classes would be subject to notification.

—The sides would be permitted to conduct on-site inspections of bases for heavy bombers of a type from which nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles had been tested, but which were not so equipped, to confirm that they were not so equipped.

The U.S. side would be interested in the Soviet reaction to these proposals. By way of explanation, the U.S. side did not see how the sides could make functionally related observable differences. To overcome this difficulty, the U.S. side was proposing OSI, as he had just described.

If the sides could agree on these provisions, they would have a good foundation for handling ALCM distinguishability.

The sides should also see if they could reach closure on the ALCM counting rules. The U.S. proposal would attribute an agreed number of warheads to a heavy bomber as follows:

—Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would count as 10.

—Heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, i.e. those equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs, would count as 1.

—Those bombers defined in the U.S. draft Treaty as “former heavy bombers” would not count, although conversion would be limited.

The number of ALCMs counted in START would be determined by the number of aircraft equipped to carry nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, multiplied by 10. There would be no limit on the total inventory of ALCMs.

As the U.S. side understood the Soviet approach, the Soviet side differed with it on three points:

—For each type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, the Soviet side would count the number of such missiles for which bombers of that type were equipped.

—The Soviet side would count each heavy bomber equipped for conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles as 1 delivery vehicle and the complement of conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles carried by that bomber as 1 warhead. In other words, the Soviet side would count heavy bombers equipped for conventionally-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles the same way the sides had agreed to count heavy bombers equipped for nuclear bombs and SRAMs.

—The Soviet side would limit the total number of nuclear-armed ALCMs to the number for which heavy bombers would be equipped for one operational mission plus an agreed percentage of non-deployed ALCMs.

On the first point, the U.S. side had made clear its rationale for attributing an agreed number to bombers equipped for ALCMs and basing the count on the number of such bombers. This made sense for both operational and verification reasons. The U.S. side had also made clear its views on the fairness of the number it proposed—10. It believed this number fairly represented the combat potential of the bombers of both sides.

The Soviet side had objected to this number, arguing that it was too low for U.S. bombers and too high for Soviet bombers. The U.S. side didn’t think the number was too low for its bombers; it would attribute to a B–52 equipped for ALCMs the same number of warheads as the largest ICBMs on both sides. Bombers and ballistic missiles differed in speed and in the defenses they faced. Given these differences, the U.S. proposal to count heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs at 10, in the context of the U.S. package proposal, represented a substantial effort to accommodate Soviet concerns.

The Soviet side said that ten was too high a number for its bombers. If so, what did it think the right number would be? The U.S. side could not address this problem while the Soviet side continued to refuse to say what number it would propose for its bombers.

With regard to the second difference, the U.S. side saw no justification for counting a bomber that carried no nuclear weapons, either as 1 delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit or as 1 warhead against the 6000 limit. The sides had already agreed that the bombers and the conventionally armed ALCMs would be distinguishable and that there would be agreed procedures for conversion. There could be no rationale for counting such clearly conventionally armed systems as nuclear delivery vehicles or as nuclear warheads. The U.S. side would note, however, that it had proposed to limit the number of converted, former heavy bombers that a side could possess.

With respect to the third difference, the U.S. side continued to believe that limits on ALCM inventories were inappropriate and would create unnecessary verification difficulties. By counting heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, and by attributing an agreed number to each bomber, the sides would sufficiently limit the capability of each side’s ALCM force.

The sides should see if they could close on numbers of warheads to attribute to heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

If the sides could resolve the distinguishability provisions and reach closure on the counting rules, they could discuss the range threshold issue. As the U.S. side had said before, 600 KM was too low and it preferred that the threshold be 1500 KM, but once the rest of the ALCM package was agreed, the U.S. side could consider a range threshold somewhat lower than 1500 KM.

In this context, the Soviet-proposed sublimit on heavy bomber weapons would be dropped, as the Soviet side had said.

Finally, the sides should try to resolve their differences on bomber conversion. Both sides agreed that a limited number of nuclear-armed heavy bombers could be converted using agreed procedures and thus be removed from the 1600 and 6000 limits. Both sides would permit conversion to reconnaissance, jamming, and tanker aircraft. But the sides should also agree to allow some conversion to bombers capable of carrying only conventional armaments. Nitze wanted to emphasize that these bombers would be converted according to agreed procedures and would be distinguishable from nuclear-armed heavy bombers.

In sum, the U.S. side envisaged the following compromise package for ALCMs:

—A set of agreed distinguishability rules; no restrictions on future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles.

—Counting rules attributing a number of warheads per heavy bomber equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, 1 warhead per heavy bomber equipped for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs, and zero for bombers equipped only for conventional arms.

—No constraints on the ALCM inventory.

—No sublimit on heavy bomber weapons.

—Agreement that ALCM bombers could be converted to non-ALCM bombers and that a limited number of nuclear-armed heavy bombers could be converted to reconnaissance aircraft, jamming aircraft, tankers, or bombers capable of carrying only conventional armaments.

—A range threshold somewhat lower than 1500 KM.

As Nitze had said two weeks previously in Geneva, resolution of the ALCM question would be a significant step toward completion of a START Treaty, and would be a positive and concrete result of this Summit.

Nitze said the U.S. side had a paper (Tab 1)² summarizing the points he had just made, which it wanted to pass to the Soviet side. This paper was in English; the U.S. side would provide a Russian version the next morning.

Turning to the question of mobile ICBMs, Nitze stated that the US position was to ban mobile ICBMs. The U.S. side had said that, if the sides could agree on specific measures that would provide for effective verification of limits on mobile ICBMs, it could consider allowing a strictly limited number of such systems. And the U.S. side had sketched out the approach it had in mind for a mobile ICBM verification package. It was now prepared to address how it would verify the declared mobile ICBMs, launchers and infrastructure.

Conversion of SLBMs into mobile ICBMs and deployment of liquid-fueled mobile ICBMs would be prohibited. For road-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

—The missiles and their launchers would be confined to small “Restricted Deployment Areas,” or RDAs, specified in the MOU. The U.S. side had in mind that an RDA would be approximately 25 square kilometers in size. Each RDA would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

—Within each RDA, the number of structures unique to mobile ICBM launchers would be limited to no more than the number of missiles on launchers specified for that RDA in the MOU. These structures would be described in the MOU.

—A limited number of times per year, each side would be required, at the request of the other, to carry out measures at the RDAs to enhance observation by NTM.

—Missiles would be allowed to depart RDAs for routine movements, e.g., movements for training, maintenance and testing. Such movements would be subject to prior notification and would involve no more than an agreed percentage of the total mobile force at any one time.

—Dispersal of mobile ICBMs and launchers from the RDAs would be permitted. Such dispersals would be of two types:

• Exercise dispersals, which would be limited in duration and frequency.

• Operational dispersals, which would be for national security purposes; there would be no constraints on duration and frequency of operational dispersals, but, in practice, they should occur only rarely.

—Notification of a dispersal would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal began and notification of return would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal ended. All dispersals would be assumed to be exercise dispersals, unless the dispersing party notified otherwise.

—When a force was one day from the mandated end of an exercise dispersal, the dispersing side would have the option of returning it to its base or notifying that an operational dispersal was in progress. Upon such notification, the dispersing side would be required to state the reason for the operational dispersal.

—Upon return of a dispersed force to RDAs, the other side would have the right to designate a percentage of the total deployed road-mobile ICBM force for enhanced NTM measures and/or on-site inspection.

• NTM enhancement measures would involve either moving launchers halfway out of their structures or opening the roofs of the structures, at the discretion of the inspected side.

• Post-dispersal OSI would be additional to those inspections conducted under the quota for short-notice OSI.

—Non-deployed ICBMs of types that had been deployed in road-mobile launchers, and road-mobile launchers that did not contain ICBMs, would be restricted to facilities listed in the MOU or in transit between permitted facilities.

—The non-deployed ICBMs would be limited in number and, except for an agreed number of missiles, would have to be stored at least an agreed distance from any RDA and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBM launchers were stored.

—A side could possess no more than an agreed percentage of its road-mobile launchers that would be considered as operational spares not containing deployed ICBMs; such launchers would be located at least an agreed distance from any RDA and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBMs were stored.

—Dedicated mobile resupply vehicles for road-mobile ICBMs would be prohibited.

—There would be a limit on the number of road-mobile training launchers; these training launchers could not be capable of launching ICBMs and would have to be distinguishable from commercial road-mobile vehicles and from road-mobile ICBM launchers by NTM.

For rail-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

—The missiles and their launchers would be confined to a limited number of small rail garrisons, specified in the MOU. Each rail garrison would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

—Within each garrison, the number of unique shelters for trains would be limited to no more than the number of trains specified for that garrison in the MOU. No shelter would be capable of holding more cars than the number on a standard train.

—Each garrison would have no more than a specified number of rail entrance/exits.

—Missiles would be allowed to depart rail garrisons for routine movements and dispersals, subject to notification requirements and limitations comparable to those for departure of road-mobile ICBMs from RDAs.

—Trains with missiles and their launchers would be maintained in one standard configuration, as specified in the MOU, while in the garrison.

—Trains with missiles and their launchers would be allowed to vary from their standard configuration during notified transit to declared maintenance and testing facilities, and during routine movement for training, provided that such variations were reported upon completion of the movement.

—There would be no restriction on the configuration of trains during dispersals.

—Non-deployed rail-mobile missiles and launchers, resupply vehicles and training launchers would be limited in a manner similar to that for the comparable road-mobile items.

In addition to these provisions, the sides would have the right to implement perimeter portal monitoring, at a minimum, at all facilities producing solid rocket motor stages as large as the smallest accountable stage of a treaty-limited mobile ICBM. All accountable stages of mobile ICBMs, and their launchers, would be tagged.

The sides also had to address the possibility of a covert infrastructure. One element for dealing with that would be suspect-site inspection. Two weeks previously in Geneva, the U.S. side had laid out its thinking on suspect-site inspection. It had also expressed its readiness to work with the Soviet side on appropriate procedures to both protect legitimate security interests and assure strengthened confidence in compliance with the agreement. As the Soviet side knew, the Washington Summit Joint Statement included language stating the agreement of the sides on “the right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.” The sides should see if they could agree in this meeting on additional guidelines for SSI that could apply to mobile ICBMs as well as other ballistic missiles, so that further details could be added to the language agreed in Washington.

This was Nitze’s review of the U.S. proposals for a mobile ICBM verification regime. The U.S. side proposed to try to reach agreement in this meeting on the general provisions Nitze had just outlined; the details would then be negotiated in Geneva.

In sum, the sides should see if they could close on the key elements of mobile ICBM verification. They could then consider the numerical limit for such systems should such systems be permitted. As it had said in Geneva, the U.S. side believed that number should be much lower than the Soviet-proposed number of 1600 mobile ICBM warheads.

While Nitze had the floor, he wanted to address the question of the ICBM warhead sublimit. The positions of the two sides on an ICBM warhead sublimit had been thoroughly discussed; the sides did not need to repeat all the arguments. Instead, they should seek a practical solution that addressed the concerns of both sides. To the U.S. side, the path to such a solution still seemed to lie in Akhromeyev’s statement that the Soviet Union would not exceed 3300 ICBM warheads if there was a START agreement. The U.S. side had said it was willing to consider various ways to record this statement, but the Soviet side had not followed up on the U.S. suggestion. It would be helpful to ascertain the exact nature of the Soviet problem with the U.S. suggestion.

This concluded Nitze’s presentation. He now wanted to pass to the Soviet side a non-paper that described the points he had made on mobile ICBM verification (Tab 2).³

AKHROMEYEV replied that the Soviet side now had enough homework to do for that night. It would do its best to study the U.S. documents and provide answers the next day. He could say immediately, however, that some issues would remain unresolved. The next day, the sides would have an opportunity to address those issues. They must work hard to reach agreement on mobile ICBM verification, and he was sure that their work would be useful. These thoughts applied equally to the ALCM problem, but there the sides were confronted with difficult problems. He was not sure they could reach agreement on all ALCM questions during this meeting.

After addressing these issues, the Soviet side would present its position on SLCMs and SLCM verification, and its ideas on how to push forward the interconnection between the START Treaty and the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. He would try to compress his views to 1-½ hours, leaving another 1-½ hours in the next session to a discussion of views.

NITZE said he would look forward to the next day’s discussion.

The meeting adjourned at 11:10 pm.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place at the Foreign Ministry Guest House.
2. Attached but not printed, at Tab 1, is a May 29 paper entitled “ALCM WORKSHEET.”
3. Attached but not printed, at Tab 2, is an undated paper entitled “Mobile ICBM Verification Points.”