Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

303. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 20, 1988

I. PURPOSE

To conduct a final review of U.S. arms reduction positions on START, Defense and Space, and Soviet ABM Treaty compliance in preparation for the impending Moscow summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Your Moscow meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will deal with all four aspects of the U.S.–Soviet relationship: human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as well as arms control. The principal focus of this NSPG, however, is arms control since you had the opportunity to review other areas last week.

I believe the meeting should focus on START, Defense and Space, Soviet ABM Treaty Compliance, and the impending ABM Treaty Review. These are the areas which I believe will occupy the most attention in Moscow; in other areas we will simply be reviewing existing positions during the summit.

In START there are three significant issues to discuss:

—How much detail to provide the Soviets on our declaratory approach to limiting sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). All agree that our approach ultimately should be based on reciprocal declarations covering nuclear-armed SLCM of all ranges and that we could state our intent not to acquire more than 1500 such nuclear-armed SLCMs. At issue is the tactical question of whether to provide the Soviets with details now, or wait until closer to end-game. This issue is largely moot since the Soviets show little interest in our declaratory approach.

—How to induce the Soviets to accept our position on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). We seek to attribute 10 ALCM to each ALCM-carrying bomber. This is less than the maximum load but approximates the actual operational load. Thus far the Soviets have insisted on attributing unrealisticly high (20+) numbers of ALCMs to our bombers. Recently, however, they have shown interest in an approach close to ours, but where their bombers would be attributed a smaller number than ours, reflecting their actual lesser capability. Most of your advisors favor pursuing this approach in Moscow. Agreement on such a counting rule could open the way for reaching agreement on other disputed elements of our ALCM position.

—How to proceed with regard to mobile ICBMs. This is the most complex START issue. Our proposed mobile ICBM verification scheme has been completed. There are a number of issues requiring resolution; we are working to have details completed before the summit so that they can be presented in Moscow. Assuming that we do, your advisors disagree on whether to propose specific numerical limits for mobile ICBMs and if so what numbers to use. Secretary Carlucci, supported by the JCS, would not discuss numbers until the Soviets accept our verification scheme. He also recommends advance consultations with Congress to ensure their support for our own mobile ICBM programs. Secretary Shultz and ACDA Director Burns would discuss specific numbers once our verification scheme is tabled, without waiting for a Soviet reaction. All agree that a range of 500–700 mobile ICBM warheads is an appropriate limit, although Secretary Carlucci, supported by Ambassador Rowny, would require the Soviets to eliminate one heavy ICBM warhead for each mobile ICBM warhead they deploy.

In Defense and Space, the issue is how to deal with Soviet suggestions for some form of abbreviated agreement based on the deliberately ambiguous language of the Washington summit statement. I expect the Soviets may push for some form of signed document in this area in Moscow. We are working to complete our own draft, but have not resolved all issues. All agree we should counter with a joint summit statement (as at the Washington summit) and should reject Soviet attempts to include Defense and Space in the separate report we will complete on START. Additional details are at Tab D.²

The final issue is how to deal with the 5-year ABM Treaty review in the context of Soviet ABM Treaty violations (e.g. Krasnoyarsk and Gomel). Under the ABM Treaty, we are required to conduct a review before October 3, 1988, at which point, if Soviet violations are not corrected, some might favor declaring that there has been a material breach of the ABM Treaty by the Soviets and taking appropriate (and as yet undetermined) U.S. actions in response. Others believe that we should simply conduct the ABM Treaty review at the summit, making it clear to the Soviets that we will conclude no further agreements on strategic arms until Soviet ABM violations are corrected. We have been deferring a decision on the ABM Treaty review for some time; I have included in your opening talking points the suggestion that it is time to reach a decision. At a minimum, we must decide now if we want to conduct the review at the summit so that the necessary preparations can be completed expeditiously. Additional details are at Tab E.³

III. PARTICIPANTS

Participants at Tab B.⁴

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The agenda is at Tab A.⁵ I will open by asking for your comments; suggested talking points are at Tab C.⁶ We will then review, in turn, START issues, Defense and Space issues and ABM Treaty compliance. No decisions are required at the meeting; decisions are needed prior to the summit.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 190, 05/32/1988. Secret. Prepared by Brooks and Tobey. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.
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