Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

301. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 12, 1988, 2:40–4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Working Group Reports

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • Amb. Kampelman
  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Matlock
  • Amb. Glitman
  • Mr. Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Afanasenko (Interp.)

• U.S.S.R.

  • SHEVARDNADZE
  • Dep. FM Bessmertnykh
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Gen. Chervov
  • Amb. Obukhov
  • Mr. Stepanov
  • Mr. Tarasenko
  • Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by suggesting it be used to take stock. THE SECRETARY agreed. SHEVARDNADZE asked Amb. Nitze to lead off with a report of his working group’s discussion² of NST issues.

NITZE indicated that the two sides had begun by addressing nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet side had made a proposal responding to the proposal the U.S. had made in Moscow on distinguishing nuclear-armed ALCM’s covered by START from conventional air-to-surface cruise missiles. As a result, there had been some convergence on this question, and the U.S. had given the Soviet side a paper³ documenting what it believed to be areas of commonality in ALCM limitations.

In particular, Nitze could report that: all currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be considered nuclear armed; future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface missiles; and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from other bombers. While a number of questions remained to be resolved, including the nature of the differences that would distinguish conventional from nuclear systems, agreement on the basic point that conventional missiles were not subject to START constraints was a significant step forward.

Nitze said that the two sides had also discussed approaches to attributing numbers of ALCM’s to heavy bombers. The U.S. proposed to attribute ten warheads to each bomber equipped for ALCM’s. The Soviet Union proposed to attribute a number that reflected the number of ALCM’s that could be carried for one operational mission.

There had also been extensive exchanges on mobile ICBM verification, suspect site inspection, and sea-launched nuclear armed cruise missiles. While these discussions had been useful in clarifying each side’s concerns, Nitze could not report convergence of views on these subjects at the present meeting.

In response to the data the U.S. had provided in Moscow on its strategic forces, Nitze continued, the Soviet side in Geneva had provided certain data of its own. The U.S. had welcomed the start of exchange of data, and looked forward to further exchanges of more detailed information on a reciprocal basis.

On defense and space, Nitze said that the working group had discussed an agreement which would build on the Washington Joint Statement. The U.S. had put forward its ideas for reflecting in the agreement the standard right to respond in the event supreme national interests were jeopardized, and the concept that the two sides’ leaders had agreed upon in Washington that, after the expiration of the nonwithdrawal period, each side would be free to decide its course of action. The U.S. ideas had taken into account and responded to the proposal made by the Soviet side the previous Sunday.⁴ We hoped that the Soviet side would carefully examine the U.S. counterproposal to resolve the issues standing in the way of working out a joint draft treaty text by the time of the summit. While there had been a useful exchange of views, Nitze could not report progress on the subject at that time.

Nitze said that the U.S. team had elaborated further its idea that neither side object to the other side’s space-based sensors. The Soviet response was to distinguish between sensors which were ABM-capable and those which were not. The U.S. proposal was to agree not to object to any space-based sensors.

The U.S. had also emphasized the need to correct Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the particular importance of dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar prior to the ABM Treaty Review, which is required to begin by October of the current year.

Asked by SHEVARDNADZE to respond, Obukhov read a statement of his own, key points of which included:

—A reiteration of the Soviet position on dealing with the ABM Treaty in a separate agreement, and of the Soviet offer to discuss the threshold between activities permitted and not permitted by the ABM Treaty;

—Acknowledgement that there had been some convergence of views on mobile missiles;

—Confirmation that SLCM’s remained an area of dispute, despite Soviet urging in the working group that the U.S. respond seriously to previous verification proposals and provide a number. Obukhov said that the U.S. proposal for a unilateral declaration offered no basis for an agreement.

—ICBM and SLCM sublimits had been discussed, with the U.S. still insisting upon excluding SLCM’s;

—The view that the two sides seemed to be thinking along similar lines with respect to suspect sites, with the U.S. to provide additional data, including the criteria for identifying suspect sites;

—A statement that the Soviet side would study the U.S. proposal for an agreement on mutual notification of test launches;

—Agreement that agreement had been reached in the areas Nitze had indicated on ALCM counting.

THE SECRETARY commented that three things emerged from the two presentations. Building on work done at the Washington summit, further work since then had clearly produced further progress. The most significant advances had come in the area of verification. It was no mean achievement to have pulled together a joint draft text for the verification protocols and MOU, and to have gotten well into an exchange of data. So there was a need to work on how to express this at the summit.

The Secretary recalled that the two leaders had also emphasized in Washington the importance of completing a START agreement. Ultimately, that goal would be achieved. But it was now apparent that it would not be by the time of the summit. In their previous meetings, the Secretary and Shevardnadze had always said that they would keep trying to conclude a treaty by the time of the Moscow visit. They both understood that, once one admitted that the goal could not be reached, there would be a slackening of efforts. But at some point they had to start briefing in such way that the public would focus not on the absence of a treaty, but on the progress already made and both sides’ determination to keep working on the problems that remained.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the working group report underscored the progress which had been made in some important areas since the Washington summit. The Foreign Minister’s view was that delegations in Geneva should now direct their efforts to seeking more progress between then and the summit in key areas. They should also begin intensive work to prepare documents for the Moscow summit. Such documents could give some sense of how much had been done both before and after the Washington summit. Shevardnadze agreed there had been progress; a good foundation had been built for future work.

The two sides’ representatives should now work hard to prepare the necessary documents, Shevardnadze repeated. It would also be a good idea to have a good document on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The fundamental issues had already been discussed. There was agreement that the basis for an agreement should be the Washington statement; everything else should be in the protocol. The object should be to have the agreement itself in time for the summit. It might be possible to agree on the period of non-withdrawal at the summit itself.

As for mobile ICBM’s, Shevardnadze sensed some progress had been made. Now was the time to complete things, especially if the U.S. came forward with a number on launchers and warheads. Given the progress already achieved on verifying mobiles, it should be possible to develop some concrete language on the issue in Moscow. Any document should also reflect the progress made on ALCM’s. On verification, Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that much had been achieved.

Shevardnadze said he remained concerned over the “passive” situation with respect to SLCM’s. There had been no movement at all on this issue; it would be well if there were some before Moscow. Everything at this point depended on the U.S. The Soviets had put forward their ideas and were ready for a serious discussion.

That then, Shevardnadze concluded, was the task to be set before the negotiators—to work toward these objectives by the summit. The Foreign Minister agreed with the Secretary that the time had come to admit there would be no START agreement by then. But the progress which had been achieved could be noted. It would be possible to state that there should be a Treaty.

Responding to some of the areas Shevardnadze had singled out, THE SECRETARY noted that the U.S. thought the Washington Statement’s language on the ABM Treaty was fine. Unfortunately the two sides differed over what it meant. So that language could not simply stand alone. That was what lay behind our desire to discuss the issue. The Secretary did not believe that the question of where to put what as between the agreement itself and a protocol was as important as reaching agreement on the substance of the matter. But the key was to agree on the main points of what we were discussing. The Secretary felt that some progress had been made. Since the last ministerial, there had been movement on developing a joint draft text. That was a good sign, but there was still work to do.

As for mobile ICBM’s, there was progress being made. We did have a number in mind. We were ready to share it when we were comfortable with verification. The Secretary could tell Shevardnadze our number was substantially lower than that the Soviet side had put forward. But we felt that if verification could be dealt with satisfactorily, mobiles could be a positive element in the strategic structure. So we were prepared to continue to work on the issues between Geneva and the summit. This could lead to a discussion of numbers.

The Secretary noted that there seemed to be some convergence of views on ALCM’s. On SLCM’s, we had already advised the Soviet side of our view that the verification schemes which had been advanced were, on the one hand, not sufficiently reliable, and, on the other, very intrusive. They gave insufficient confidence but would impose serious operational difficulties on our Navy. These considerations had led us to propose that the issue be dealt with by means of unilateral declarations. We had not been able to put a number to the verification concept proposed by Moscow. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union could accept our concept, we could provide a number.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not understand one thing. The Soviet side had made SLCM verification proposals which covered the main elements. Why could not a discussion begin on that basis, maybe even after the summit, with the objective of identifying positive and negative elements in the Soviet proposal.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze seemed to be suggesting something between a unilateral declaration and a verifiable number, i.e., a situation where there would be a number established and there would be things which gave comfort on verification, even though there was agreement that the verification regime was not totally satisfactory.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the declaratory approach was not consistent with dealing with the problem. Moscow saw SLCM’s as a component part of all other strategic offensive arms. They should therefore be treated the same as other such weapons. A unilateral declaration was not sufficient. That was why there was a need for discussion.

THE SECRETARY said that we were working on this within the USG. As we had something new to say on the subject, we would want to talk about it. But the question did arise as to whether the standard of verification both sides had thus far demanded could realistically be applied to SLCM’s.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that unless the discussion began, there would never be an answer. He asked what the ministers should take up next.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Glitman report on the work he and Chervov had done.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission, and followed a meeting from 9:10–11:30 a.m. at the U.S. Mission, the memorandum of conversation for which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–88, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 151. The full memorandum of conversation of this meeting is printed in ibid., Document 152. From Geneva, Shultz flew to Brussels before returning to Washington.
2. No minutes were found.
3. Not found.
4. May 8.