295. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
9725. Subject: Soviets lowering sights from goal of signing treaty at Moscow summit.
1. Confidential—Entire text.
Summary
2. With the Moscow summit approaching and significant unresolved issues remaining at the Nuclear and Space Talks, the Soviets have begun to back away publically from the goal of having a START treaty (accompanied by an accord on the ABM Treaty) ready to sign when the President travels to the USSR. Soviet leaders are clearly lowering their sights and no longer repeating the earlier hope that a agreement will be ready by the summit.
3. Soviet MFA and institute arms control experts are paralleling this shift in private, evincing little belief that a treaty can be finished in time. They note, however, that NST work can continue after the summit and that the meeting could give the talks a useful impetus. Their comments—plus relatively upbeat Soviet public treatment of the prospects for eventually achieving an accord—suggest the Soviets will be prepared to carry on in Geneva through the summer and into the fall.
4. Motives for the shift in the Soviet public stance likely include: the recognition that simply too much work remains to be done to conclude a treaty by the end of May, a desire not to fuel a Soviet domestic expectation that will not be fulfilled, and a desire not to appear overeager for an agreement.
End summary
Soviet Public Statements—Lowering Their Sights
5. The Washington Summit Joint Statement set down the objective of concluding a START treaty (presumably to be accompanied by an [Page 1332] accord on Defense and Space) by the Moscow summit. This objective was espoused by senior Soviet leaders—including Gorbachev—in the aftermath of the December meeting and the first months of 1988. One of the most recent examples was the notes of the March 31 Politburo meeting which, in the discussion of the March ministerial, said in part:
“The firm intention of the Soviet side to continue intensive work toward the earliest working out of a set of documents on strategic offensive arms and ABM, so that they could as far as possible be ready for signing during the course of the Soviet-American summit from 29 May to 2 June, was confirmed.
6. Subsequent Soviet leadership statements on the subject have shown a marked lowering of the public goal. For example, in his April 11 dinner speech for visiting Czech President Husak, Gromyko noted that the question of a fifty percent strategic offensive arms reduction (conditioned on ABM Treaty observance) was in the center of world attention, and added:
“It would be hoped that the visit of the USA president to the Soviet Union planned for the end of May-beginning of June will be marked by progress in this direction.”
7. When addressing the Soviet-American joint commercial commission on April 13, Gorbachev stated that the Soviets “were convinced that this goal (a fifty percent strategic arms cut) was achievable in the very near future” if the sides were governed by the principled approach agreed upon at earlier summits. Gorbachev avoided, however, defining a time line for conclusion of a treaty, and did not relate this goal to the upcoming summit.
Soviet Arms Control Experts—A Parallel Shift
8. This public lowering of sights for the summit has been paralleled by Soviet arms control experts in private. MFA arms control experts—while making a pro forma endorsement of the possibility to conclude a treaty by the summit—evince little faith in the possibility to do so.
But keep working after the summit
9. In recent discussions, MFA USA desk officers Palazhchenko and Berdennikov and Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Officer Kortunov looked to continuing work in Geneva after the Moscow summit, saying that the Soviets would be ready to continue intense efforts toward conclusion of a START treaty and an accord on the ABM Treaty. Kortunov commented that past summits had given the negotiations valuable impulses and instructions, and that this could also be the case with the Moscow meeting.
10. In a recent discussion with Emboff, USA and Canada Institute Political-Military Section Head Vasil’yev stated plainly that he did not [Page 1333] believe a treaty was doable by the summit. But he also saw the possibility that the President and General Secretary would give the negotiators new instructions that would be the basis for continued work in the summer.
11. The Soviet experts with whom we have been speaking seem to see the question as one of when more than “if.” Palazhchenko felt the question of a treaty was merely one of pace, i.e. how quickly it would be finished. Similarly, Vasil’yev professed himself to be very optimistic that progress could be made at the Moscow summit and that a START agreement would eventually be concluded.
12. What we hear from these experts—combined with the relatively upbeat public treatment of the NST talks and prospects for progress—suggests that the Soviets do not see the Moscow summit as any kind of deadline. No one is saying publicly that, if the summit does not produce an agreement, the Soviets should write off this administration and wait for the next. Quite the contrary, the Soviets appear to be planning to continue work after the summit.
13. This seems to be a sensible policy from Gorbachev’s point of view. If he wants an agreement (and we believe he does, albeit on certain terms), a summer-fall hiatus in the negotiations would appear to do him little good. And the Soviets have noticed (and some have pointed out) the possibility suggested by the President of one more summit post-Moscow to conclude a START treaty.
Motives for Lowering their Sights
14. There are likely several motives that have led the Soviets to lower their sights for NST at the Moscow summit:
—First, they likely realize that too much work remains on the table to have a treaty (or two treaties) wrapped up in six weeks time.
—Second, Gorbachev probably does not want to raise domestic expectations for a treaty in a way that would make the summit (which comes on the eve of an extraordinary Party Conference that is very important to him) appear to be a failure, particularly as compared to Washington.
—Third, the Soviets likely do not want to put themselves in a position of appearing overeager, especially as they have interpreted some of Washington’s recent commentary on NST as trying to dampen down U.S. expectations.
15. Leningrad minimize considered.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880330-0236. Confidential; Priority. Also sent Priority to Moscow Political Collective and Leningrad.↩