264. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Heading Off Criticism of START
SUMMARY. Several well-known members of the strategic “establishment,” including Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Bill Hyland, and Jim Woolsey, have begun to criticize the emerging START agreement on the grounds that 50 percent reductions will concentrate U.S. retaliatory weapons on a precariously small number of platforms and therefore will increase Soviet incentives to strike first in a crisis. They [Page 1174] are correct that the number of U.S. strategic launch platforms (especially submarines) will shrink. But the critics exaggerate our potential vulnerability problem, and they misleadingly attribute it to START rather than to our own procurement decisions (e.g., 24-missile TRIDENT submarine, ICBM basing difficulties), which could be remedied, at least in part, under a START treaty. Moreover, the critics ignore the contribution of deep cuts in Soviet forces to our survivability goals.
Public criticism of START, especially from respected centrists, could increase the obstacles to finalizing a START treaty this year, and could even have an adverse effect on INF ratification. These problems would be compounded if we have no coherent and widely supported plan to enhance ICBM survivability. In the next few months, therefore, we should:
—make a major effort publicly to refute the arguments of the critics regarding START’s impact on stability;
—undercut criticism by ensuring that our START positions are consistent with our survivability goals (e.g., permit mobile and MPS basing for ICBMs); and
—consider near-term and longer-term force structuring steps that could help maintain the survivability of our deterrent under START constraints (e.g., explore various means of distributing allotted warheads over a larger number of SSBN platforms; develop a politically sustainable ICBM basing plan; etc.). END SUMMARY.
ICBM Vulnerability. Henry Kissinger, in his December 21 Newsweek article,2 warns that signing START at a late spring summit would be a “fateful step.” Kissinger attaches substantial importance to the vulnerability of U.S. silo-based ICBMs, arguing that START reductions would adversely affect stability by shifting the ratio of Soviet silo-busting SS–18 warheads to U.S. ICBM silos from the current 3 to 1 to at least 4 to 1.
Kissinger is not necessarily correct that this ratio would shift adversely. He gets his result by specifying that we would deploy only silo-based MIRVs: MX and Minuteman IIIs. But even if we assumed (as Kissinger does) that we would deploy no mobile or MPS ICBMs, we could shift the ratio favorably simply by including a substantial number of single-warhead ICBMs (either Minuteman II or fixed-silo Midgetman) in our treaty-constrained mix of forces.
In a more fundamental sense, however, the vulnerability of U.S. silo-based ICBMs (as well as the related ratio of Soviet silo-busting warheads to U.S. silos) is becoming less and less meaningful as a [Page 1175] measure of Soviet first-strike incentives. This is because silo-based ICBMs are declining as a share of overall U.S. retaliatory capabilities. When SALT II was signed, about [amount not declassified] of our strategic weapons were deployed in silos. Now the figure is about [amount not declassified]. The principal reason for this decline has been the sharp growth in relatively survivable, non-ICBM capabilities—an increase of well over 3000 U.S. sea-based and bomber-delivered weapons since 1979. Mobile ICBMs would further reduce the share deployed in vulnerable silos. Indeed, under a START agreement permitting mobiles, the number could fall below [amount not declassified], depending on our mix of forces.
Moreover, silo-based ICBMs are not just declining in numbers compared to other U.S. strategic forces—they are also declining in terms of their relative contribution to our deterrent strategy. In the late 1970s, only silo-based ICBMs gave us the capability to threaten fortified Soviet military and leadership targets with flexible and accurate retaliatory strikes. (This, incidentally, was at the heart of the “window of vulnerability” concerns, not the vulnerability of silos per se. It was feared that, if our ICBMs were wiped out in a Soviet first strike, we would have no militarily effective response, only the option of destroying industrial and civilian targets, a threat which the Soviets might not consider credible.) However, within the next few years, we will have deployed a large number of relatively survivable systems (e.g., D–5, ALCMs, SLCMs, and perhaps eventually mobile ICBMs) that, taken together, will be capable of performing a full range of U.S. deterrent missions. Fixed ICBMs, such as the 50 MX now being deployed in Minuteman silos, will still make an important—and in some respects unique—contribution to our strategy. But with their relative decline both in numbers and strategic value, we need no longer fear that their vulnerability would present the Soviets with a compelling incentive to strike first.
SSBN Vulnerability. Under START, we would probably deploy no more than 18 TRIDENT ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), with only 12 of them patrolling at sea on a day-to-day basis. According to critics, this would present a dangerously small number of targets to Soviet ASW forces.
It is true that our SSBN force will shrink. But this is primarily the result not of arms control constraints but of our own force procurement choices. We decided years ago that, in order to realize substantial economies of scale in the acquisition and operation of SSBNs, we would move from 41 POSEIDON and POLARIS boats, each with 16 SLBM launch-tubes, to an all-TRIDENT force of about 20–24 boats, each with 24 tubes. (Currently we have 36 SSBNs; 28 POSEIDONs and 8 TRIDENTs.) Thus, even in the absence of arms control, we would deploy [Page 1176] only a few more submarines than the number we are likely to deploy under START.
So, with or without START, we will need to cope with a decreasing number of SSBNs. Fortunately, the problem is not as urgent or irreparable as some of the critics suggest.
—Soviet ASW does not currently pose a threat to U.S. SSBNs. And while the Navy and intelligence community cannot (by definition) rule out unexpected ASW developments, they do not see anything on the technological horizon that would make our submarines vulnerable at sea. The Soviets lack the means both to detect U.S. boats and to destroy them once detected. Major technological breakthroughs would be required to alter this situation.
—The idea of only 12 TRIDENTs on patrol is somewhat misleading because, with sufficient warning (e.g., in a deep crisis), the Navy would put about 90% of the SSBN force out to sea (i.e., all boats not in overhaul).
—If we became concerned about having “too many eggs in too few baskets,” we would have various options for distributing our SLBM warheads over a larger number of submarines. Although most options would have long lead-times, the absence of an imminent ASW threat would give us considerable time to deal with the problem.
• As originally recommended by the Scowcroft Commission, we should consider the desirability (especially the cost) of a new, smaller class of SSBNs with fewer launch tubes (e.g., 8–12) as a complement to TRIDENT.
• We could explore a modified D–5 missile with fewer than 8 warheads (e.g., 4) but extended range (to enhance survivability). Because TRIDENTs loaded with 4-warhead missiles would contain only 96 (vice 192) warheads, we could deploy more boats under the START ceiling (e.g., 14 with the original D–5 and 8 with the variant).
• We could render several launch tubes per TRIDENT verifiably inoperable (e.g., by filling them with concrete in the presence of Soviet observers), thereby enabling us to deploy more subs under the START ceiling. This could be implemented quickly, and perhaps serve as an interim step.
Improvements in U.S. Deterrent Capabilities. While focusing on the vulnerability of fixed ICBMs and the potential threat to U.S. SSBNs, the critics have tended to ignore recent developments that have strengthened the ability of our forces to survive a Soviet attack and retaliate effectively.
—Survivability is improved by the B–1’s ability to escape from base more quickly, by the greater quietness of TRIDENT, by basing SLCMs on diverse naval platforms and, if current programs proceed to deployment, by mobile basing of ICBMs.
[Page 1177]—Penetrativity of Soviet defenses is enhanced by the deployment of ALCMs, SLCMs, and B–1 and by development of the Stealth bomber and advanced cruise missiles.
—In addition to the qualitative measures mentioned above, deterrence is strengthened by the recent numerical growth in U.S. non-ICBM forces, much of it in bomber weapons including ALCMs. Moreover, START, with its highly permissive treatment of bomber capabilities, will reinforce this development. (Given START counting rules, we could deploy well over 5000 bomber weapons which, added to 4900 missile warheads, could mean well over 10,000 total strategic weapons. While this is a far cry from the nominal ceiling of 6000 and the canonical 50% cuts, it enhances stability. Indeed, START’s contribution to stability may lie less in its reductions than in its reshaping of Soviet and U.S. force structures toward more survivable, retaliatory systems. We may not wish to advertise the 10,000 figure publicly, but it and related stability implications of the counting rules could help in discussions with critics.)
Benefits of START Reductions. The critics tend to minimize the significance of the START-mandated reductions in Soviet forces. For example, Kissinger states that, because the Soviets will retain more than enough silo-busting warheads to destroy all remaining U.S. fixed ICBMs (and may even increase the ratio of warheads to silos), “the much advertised halving of Soviet missiles is therefore irrelevant. The number of U.S. targets will shrink faster than the number of Soviet warheads or heavy missiles.”
But reductions in Soviet forces should not be considered “irrelevant” just because they are not sufficient to restore the survivability of U.S. fixed ICBMs. Under that criterion, no remotely plausible agreement, even one providing for 90% cuts, would be adequate. A more sensible test, especially with U.S. fixed ICBMs declining in relative numbers and strategic value, is how START reductions will affect overall U.S. retaliatory capabilities.
According to that test, 50% cuts in Soviet missile forces will be highly significant because they will make it easier for us to ensure the continued survivability of that (increasingly large) portion of U.S. retaliatory weapons that is not deployed in fixed silos. In particular, START’s ceilings, especially on heavy ICBMs, will severely curtail Soviet ability to defeat MPS or to barrage mobile ICBM deployment areas, bomber fly-out zones, and ocean areas in which SSBNs are suspected. By reducing and predictably bounding these (and possible future) threats to our forces, START would enable us to make weapon acquisition decisions and design deployment arrangements (e.g. mobile or MPS basing for ICBMs) with confidence in our ability to ensure survivability.
[Page 1178]The Risks Ahead. Criticism of START by centrists with credibility on arms control matters could adversely affect public and Congressional reactions to the treaty when it is eventually completed. But such criticism, if it continues to build, could also do damage over the next few months. In particular, it could hinder our efforts to complete a treaty by the time of the Moscow summit or even this year. The White House, concerned about how the treaty would be received, might become reluctant to push hard for closure. And the Soviets, sensing obstacles in the U.S. to finishing and ratifying the treaty, might begin shying away from the tough decisions needed to wrap up negotiations. START criticism could also spill over onto INF ratification, as INF opponents gained new ammunition to attack the Administration’s overall approach to arms control.
These problems would be compounded if we are seen, once again, to be floundering around on ICBM basing. (Even with the relative decline of ICBMs in numbers and deterrent value, we cannot afford—politically if not strategically—to have only vulnerably-based ICBMs.) Indeed, if the Midgetman program is deleted from the budget and we have nothing convincing to take its place, START ratification could be jeopardized.
Heading Off START Criticism. Given these near-term risks, we should not put off dealing with the criticism until the treaty is concluded. We should take steps now to try to prevent the attacks from gaining momentum.
—We should make a substantial public effort (e.g., in op-ed pieces, speeches, specialized journal articles) to rebut the critics and demonstrate START’s stabilizing impact.
—We should ensure that our START positions are consistent with our stability/survivability goals. In particular, we should agree, without further delay, to permit mobile ICBMs and MPS basing (which appears precluded by our current proposal). We should also consider proposing additional START measures that could promote survivability (e.g., bans on depressed trajectory SLBMs, water penetrating warheads, etc.).
—We should encourage serious internal USG consideration of near-term and long-term force structuring steps aimed at enhancing survivability under START constraints (e.g., explore options mentioned above for distributing SLBM warheads over a larger number of SSBNs). Although decisions on some such steps might not be taken for some time (and indeed may not prove necessary), public indications that we were pursuing them internally could help deal with criticism.
—In cooperation with key Congressional players, we should develop an ICBM basing plan that enhances survivability through such approaches as rail/off-road mobility, MPS, and/or fixed single-war [Page 1179] head deployments. It is not enough to say we are studying this problem. By the time START is submitted for ratification, we must not only have devised a plan, we must also have secured the necessary political support for it.