Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

256. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

START

With the basic structure of a START Treaty now set, we face four major problems, all related to verification:

—How to verify the number of mobile ICBMs;

—How to verify the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs;

—How to distinguish nuclear-armed ALCMs from conventional ALCMs;

—What to propose in the START Inspection Protocol.

On one of these we are close to having a position to propose to the Soviets—the interagency verification group is working hard on a START Inspection Protocol with the objective of tabling it early in the next round, drawing upon the INF inspection protocol, the concepts agreed to in the Joint Statement, and the special requirements of START. On mobile ICBM’s work has been done in the Support Group to develop further the ideas that were once considered for counting SS–20’s, but we do not have a scheme which is judged to give us effective verification; this effort will continue on a priority basis. Verification of SLCMs and ALCMs will be taken up in January.

In addition to the verification issues, there is another tier of problems, including the number of mobile ICBM warheads to be permitted, the range threshhold for ALCMs, the ALCM counting rule, throw weight definition, and non-deployed missiles. Two more issues—Backfire and heavy ICBM modernization—are not resolved with the Soviets but the summit NSDD² provides adequate guidance. Finally, the Delegation will continue to push for a 3300 ICBM RV sublimit.

Overall, we find ourselves in a position where the basic questions of the structure of the agreement, the key numbers, most of the counting rules, and the verification approach, which have been the center of attention since Reykjavik, are now agreed. Many of the problems which now come to the fore have received relatively little attention, and it will take a major effort to develop our positions. There is much homework to be done.

US Strategic Force under START

The principal criticism of START is that it would result in a more vulnerable US strategic force. Kissinger, Scowcroft, Woolsey, and others hold up the specter of a US force consisting of a handful of submarines, a few bombers, and some vulnerable fixed ICBMs. The structure of the agreement we are working out by no means requires this result. The best counter to these charges would be to put forward the sort of force we would intend to deploy under the START agreement. Such an exercise raises tricky questions, but is well worth doing.

The small numbers of submarines that critics cite come from attributing 12 warheads to each Trident II missile and 24 missiles to each Trident submarine. The agreement at the summit to attribute 8 warheads to each Trident II missile increases the number of submarines by 50% [less than 7 lines not declassified] (Note that the Soviets quote 4 for their latest SLBM, a sensible number in a reductions environment.) The point is we can have any number of submarines we want, and we should decide at least roughly what that number is and how we want to achieve it, and make sure the agreement preserves our option to move in that direction.

As for ICBMs, the M–X is now in favor as an inexpensive way to deploy large numbers of warheads. The small ICBM is on the chopping block, but with tight limits on RVs it would make a lot of sense. A plausible number of ICBM RVs under START would be 1400. The force in the late 1990’s could consist of 50 M–X, 100 MM–III, and 600 small ICBMs (some fixed, some mobile). Many other combinations are possible; the small, single RV ICBM would make a major contribution by keeping the number of aim-points high, giving a portion of the ICBM force survivability through mobility, and replacing the Minuteman II which will be 30 years old in the late 1990’s.

Our bomber force could consist of 100 B–1’s and 150 stealth bombers, with 850 stealth ALCMs deployed on the B–1’s.

Such a force would be far more survivable and effective than the ones postulated by Kissinger, Scowcroft, and the critics, and would fit well within the 6000, 4900, and 1600 limits of START. There is a natural resistance, especially in JCS, to thinking now about how we would allocate the reductions between the services, but some thinking along lines can help us in deciding what options to preserve and in countering the main thrust of our critics.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the paper. Timbie sent the paper to Shultz under cover of a December 31 note: “Some thoughts for the New Year on START.” A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the note. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 244.