Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 10, 1987, 8 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz at Soviet Embassy—8:00 A.M., December 10, 1987

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

The subject then turned to the NST talks. Shevardnadze said he had given over the statement except for the guidelines and instructions to the negotiators. Everything seemed to be in order. The NST discussions reached a deadlock at 12:30 a.m. There are differences of opinion in the basic text. There isn’t time now to change; the statement will affect progress. Shultz said we were not finished but we were in pretty [good] shape. On the strategic offensive arms, there was a problem. The language Akhromeyev had was tabled last night on SLCMs. He will be meeting with Admiral Crowe this morning. When they would emerge, he didn’t know. But in a general way, we see it as follows: the unbracketed language says we will be addressing SLCMs on-site to 6000 and we are committed to consider verification, which we consider to be more difficult than you do, but we are ready to work at it. This language goes further than we have gone before and represents some advantages. I suggest we wait to hear what the two military men report after their meeting. Shevardnadze said very well; let us wait. We are not trying to set a specific number. This is one thing we cannot settle at this time.

Shultz said no, the unbracketed contains the word “limited.” This is broad and includes numbers and other things as well, such as range. Shevardnadze said that SLCMs are a fundamental problem; the Secretary General has emphasized this. Shultz said he had two suggestions to make on the paragraph concerning the ABM Treaty. These would remove not all, but most of the brackets. Both sides agree that it is desirable to have discussion of stability as we get near end of ______; he said he would look at the memorandum of conversation with General Secretary. General Secretary said should the American side ultimately decide to deploy, that would be alright. At the end of the period, US could decide what to do. Soviets could accept that. Shultz said he had taken a look at stability and the General Secretary’s thought and committed them into a clause that could be inserted at the end of the bracketed section at end of first long sentence. He would read it and give to Shevardnadze, which he did.

After reading it, Karpov asked about the bracketed section on the end of the first sentence. Shultz said no, we can solve some problems, but not all. Shevardnadze said at Shultz’s suggestion, it does not appear to raise a problem but their side must study. Shultz said we are dealing with another issue where there is a difference of opinion, but we are trying to narrow it. The two suggestions were the insert in the first sentence after the word “testing” and before the words “as required.” The bracketed phrase at the end of sentence would remain. No suggestion for it. Shultz noted that with these changes, one could drop all the rest of bracketed language. Shevardnadze said if you accept the language, we will have only one bracketed. Shultz said yes, I will express my preliminary opinion. I don’t think the military will ______. Shevardnadze said I have to talk to higher authorities.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Washington Summit Day Three, December 10, 1987 (2). Secret. The meeting took place in the Soviet Embassy. All blank underscores are in the original. Another memorandum of conversation for this meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 112.