Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

250. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9–10, 1987, 11:05 p.m.–12:40 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Kampelman
  • Amb. Lehman
  • Amb. Cooper
  • Amb. Rowny
  • Amb. Hanmer
  • Dir. Adelman
  • AS Holmes
  • Mr. Castillo
  • Adm. Howe
  • DAS Thomas
  • DAS Joseph
  • Col. Linhard
  • Dr. Graham
  • Mr. Timbie
  • Ms. Sutter
  • Mr. McConnell
  • Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Marshall Akhromeyev
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Amb. Obukhov
  • Amb. Masterkov
  • Amb. Nazarkin
  • Gen. Medvedev
  • Gen. Chervov
  • Mr. Popov
  • Mr. Shebalin

SUBJECT

• Draft Joint Text on START, Defense and Space

The sides proceeded with a page-by-page review of the draft joint text (attached). AKHROMEYEV asked why the word “nuclear-armed” was bracketed in the paragraph on ALCMs. LINHARD replied that the brackets had been placed there by the Soviet side; the U.S. side would like to remove them. After a side conversation with Karpov, AKHROMEYEV said he understood.

NITZE referred to the two sentences on throwweight and noted that the second sentence left open how the commitment on throwweight would be recorded. In view of the fact that this would be a mutual obligation, it seemed that it should be part of the Treaty, perhaps an agreed statement within the Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV said he had no objection in principle. It should be recorded in some common or joint document. The delegations could determine the form in the course of their work.

Referring to the paragraph on sublimits, NITZE noted the phrase “number to be agreed” regarding a ballistic missile warhead sublimit, and said the sides would need to reach agreement on that number. Was the Soviet side not yet ready to agree to a number between 4800 and 5100? AKHROMEYEV replied that they were not.

NITZE continued that the U.S. side would like to see a 3300 sublimit on ICBM warheads. The Soviet side had said it would not be going above 3300 ICBM warheads. How the sides might codify that was an issue that remained.

AKHROMEYEV said this was covered by the phrase “number to be agreed,” but added that this phrase spoke of an aggregate ceiling, not a separate ceiling on any leg. NITZE said this was another matter to discuss further, and AKHROMEYEV said he understood the wording of this paragraph to reserve the right of the U.S. side to raise an ICBM warhead sublimit of 3300 in the future. He had no objection to this.

NITZE said the main questions left open in the ALCM paragraph were whether only nuclear-armed ALCMs would be counted, the definition of “long range,” and the number of ALCMs to attribute to each type of heavy bomber. These issues would need work, either in the Working Group or in Geneva. AKHROMEYEV replied that the last two questions the Working Group would not be able to address; they should be referred to the delegations. He would reply the next morning on the “nuclear-armed” question.

Continuing to the ballistic missile counting rule paragraph, NITZE noted that there were still blanks to fill in for Soviet SLBM warhead numbers; also the SS–N–23 needed to be added to the list. Would it be possible to get the numbers by the next morning?

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side would consider this question and provide answers the next morning. Turning to the SLCM paragraph, he proposed inserting at the beginning of the last sentence the following phrase: “The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles on certain types of submarines and surface ships, and to seek . . .”

NITZE replied that the U.S. side had difficulty with this language, for reasons he had outlined earlier. HOWE added that the U.S. side simply was not ready at this time to commit itself on types, ceilings, etc. The language it had proposed, pushing toward finding a solution by finding a verification method, was as far as the U.S. side could go at this time.

AKHROMEYEV retorted that the current paragraph was diplomatic language creating the appearance that the sides were deciding something on SLCMs when, as a matter of fact, they were deciding nothing and making no commitments. On other issues, the sides had given working instructions to the delegations. The U.S. side would be able to use this language as the basis for removing the SLCM problem from these talks, leaving the SLCMs deployed on ships while concluding a START Treaty that omitted SLCMs. Certain commitments should be made here. This was the argument Akhromeyev had had with Perle in Reykjavik. The Soviet side had made verification proposals; he did not know why the U.S. side considered them ineffective. Without a solution on SLCMs, there could be no treaty. But the U.S. side was now suggesting a general provision. The sides had not yet agreed on a specific number of missiles or specific types of ships, but it was necessary to stipulate the principle here.

NITZE repeated that the U.S. side could not agree with that approach. One alternative was to keep the language in brackets, so the Soviet position would be known.

AKHROMEYEV agreed to put the language in brackets and report it as not agreed to the leaders. He had no comments on the rest of the START text. It was up to the leaders to decide, but his opinion was that, without a provision on SLCMs like that the Soviet side had proposed, the text would not be acceptable for the Soviet side. He would report that as well. He thought the Soviet-proposed language on SLCMs was an absolute minimum to indicate a commitment by both sides.

NITZE said he would report these remarks to Secretary Shultz.

AKHROMEYEV summed up the review of the START text by saying there were two brackets, with the rest of the text agreed. He asked how the U.S. side wished to handle conventional arms. CHERVOV noted that he had discussed this in general terms, in the Vienna context, with Holmes and Thomas. The question of how to handle this section here had already been agreed by Ridgway and Bessmertnykh, based on the results of the conversation between the leaders. The sides had agreed on the need to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe. With that goal in mind, the U.S. and Soviet delegations would be instructed to intensify work on a mandate for negotiations by the 23 countries and on a final document. The Soviet side believed the negotiations should cover conventional arms and tactical nuclear weapons. Taking account of NATO views, the Soviet side had agreed to formulate the subject matter so as to include dual-capable systems. Thomas had not objected.

Turning to the Defense and Space text,² AKHROMEYEV said he thought the two sides had failed to prepare mutually acceptable language on the ABM Treaty. The language in the draft text represented mutually exclusive obligations. The Soviet side did not see how to arrive at an agreement here. The sides thus had failed to work out a paper for the President and the General Secretary.

NITZE said he thought all the Group could do was refer this to the leaders the next morning.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, adding that he was prepared to work immediately to find solutions, but the content of the draft ruled out the possibility of agreement. He saw nothing to be done here. If the U.S. side disagreed, he was prepared to stay and work. KARPOV said there was one possible radical solution: everything in brackets could be deleted.

NITZE said the U.S. side would prefer to leave the bracketed material in. The sides could see if the Ministers wanted to remove it.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, but stated that unilateral statements were included in the brackets. The General Secretary could not sign a statement incorporating unilateral positions of the U.S. side. So the sides had failed to elaborate a document.

COOPER said the U.S. side would be happy to have the Soviet side make a unilateral statement of its position.

AKHROMEYEV replied that the sides were talking about joint instructions to delegations. But the draft text was just a conglomeration of unilateral statements. The first half of the document was more or less acceptable, with only two brackets, only one of a principled nature. However, the second part was a failure. When he had flown to Washington, he had thought there was a greater degree of agreement than was reflected in this document. He had heard positions here that were contrary to what he had heard before. Previously, the sides had emphasized areas of agreement, but this document had accented disagreements.

NITZE suggested that what the sides had done was clarify positions. AKHROMEYEV agreed that the positions of the sides were now perfectly clear.

NITZE said that, at Reykjavik, he had suggested that there were three questions for the Ministers: the length of the agreed period, what would happen during the period, and what would happen after. The sides were still not agreed on any of the three.

COOPER added that the sides were also not agreed on what a nonwithdrawal commitment meant. He and Obukhov had worked hard to bridge the positions of the sides, to get language not prejudicial to the positions of either side. There were no new positions here.

AKHROMEYEV voiced concern that now there would be mutual recriminations; this was not what the sides should do. Their work should be positive, but they had failed. He suggested the Group adjourn and report later that morning to Ministers. Then the Ministers, the General Secretary and the President could make the necessary decisions. NITZE agreed.

Attachment

Draft Joint Text³

Washington, December 9, 1987, 9 p.m.

JOINT TEXT

START: The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union’s ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling, the number to be agreed, on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range [nuclear-armed] air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The Delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. In the Soviet Union: SS–17:4, SS–19:6, SS–18:10, SS–24:10, SS–25:1, SS–11:______, SS–13:______, SS–N–6______:, SS–N–8:______, SS–N–17:______. SS–N–18:______, and SS–N–20:______. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

(d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

(e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place at the Department of State.
2. Attached but not printed is a December 9 draft joint text on Defense and Space.
3. No classification marking.