Office of the Historian

235. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz1

Washington, November 27, 1987

SUBJECT

  • START

Akhromeyev made the following points on START:2

—He suggested a ballistic missile warhead limit “in the ballpark” of 5100. He later said the difference between 4800 and 5100 was the key remaining issue.

—The Soviets want no other sublimit (except the 1540). When told that in addition to a ballistic missile warhead limit, the U.S. wants an ICBM warhead limit but not an SLBM warhead limit, he burst out laughing.

[Page 1014]

—He said there will be no START Treaty if we take the position that the Navy cannot be inspected and there can be no limits on SLCMs. He said he personally has given this subject a lot of thought since Reykjavik, and SLCM limits can be verified by inspection of ships.

—The Soviets are prepared to record both 154 heavy ICBM and 1540 heavy ICBM warhead limits in the Treaty. (This is the best solution.)

We can conclude the following:

—The underlying outcome the Soviets are working toward is 5000 ballistic missile warheads with freedom-to-mix except for the 1540 heavy ICBM warhead constraint. This is a big step forward; the ideas you gave Gorbachev in Moscow are beginning to pay off.

—At the end of the day, they may accept 4800 with freedom-to-mix, or 5000 with a 3300 ICBM warhead sublimit, but we will have to work hard to achieve either of these.

—The counting rules for attributing the number of warheads to each type of missile and the number of ALCMs to each type of bomber are as important as the ceilings. Akhromeyev agreed that it was important to settle on the counting rules.

—The Soviets will come at us hard on SLCMs, and would be happy to go public that they are prepared to have their ships inspected, that the U.S. is not, and this is one reason there is no START Treaty. If we are not prepared to have our ships inspected, we need to understand and be able to articulate the reasons.

  1. Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 92D52, Super-Sensitive November 17–30 (1987). Secret.↩
  2. See Document 232.↩