Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

233. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 25, 1987

SUBJECT

• Achieving an Early START Agreement

SUMMARY. Our highest arms control negotiating priority over the next several months will be to work toward signature of the START agreement at a Moscow summit. The Soviets also seem to want to finish START as soon as possible. But finalizing an agreement in the first half of 1988 will be a tall order. If we are to have a reasonable chance of meeting that target, we need:

—to persuade the Soviets in December to drop their START-SDI linkage altogether or settle for much less than they have proposed;

—to resolve several first-order START issues at the Washington summit (e.g., sublimits, SLCMs, mobile ICBMs);

—to supplement NST with regular high-level negotiating sessions throughout the winter and spring; and

—to adopt special internal USG procedures capable of supporting an expedited negotiating process. END SUMMARY.

Soviet incentives for early agreement. For a variety of reasons, the Soviets have recently been calling, both publicly and in private, for rapid completion of START.

—One might assume the Soviets are once again trying to generate pressures on us to accept restrictive limits on SDI testing. But by now, they probably recognize such an effort is futile. Instead, they seem to be coming around to the view that specific, negotiated limits on SDI experimentation are unnecessary for their purposes, and that they can depend on budgetary pressures, the Democratic Congress, and technological obstacles to keep the program within acceptance bounds. Indeed, they may now believe their leverage against SDI would be improved by temporarily setting aside our differences on ABM issues and allowing START to enter into force, and then threatening to terminate START if we depart from the ABM Treaty (as they interpret it). If this analysis is correct, we can expect the Soviets to drop or substantially relax their START-SDI linkage.

—One of the main criticisms of the INF treaty is that it will have little military impact, and indeed can be circumvented through a buildup in strategic forces. By achieving an early START agreement, or simply appearing to be headed toward one, the Soviets may hope to improve chances for INF ratification in the U.S.

—To legitimize the arms control process and make it politically sustainable for succeeding U.S. administrations, the Soviets would like Reagan’s signature on an arms control agreement. While INF serves this function, START (because it is more important, because it will contain more controversial provisions) would be infinitely better.

—To support their anti-SDI campaign, the Soviets have, for several years, sought to create the public impression that deep strategic cuts are a major Soviet sacrifice that could only be justified by strict limits on U.S. defenses. However, the Soviets probably see benefits in 50% reductions even in the absense of SDI limits (i.e., curbs on threatening U.S. systems such as D–5, movement toward denuclearization and stigmatization of nuclear deterrence in Western public opinion, creation of an East-West climate more conducive to internal reform efforts, etc.). And given their doctrinal shift away from heavy reliance on nuclear capabilities, as well as their ability to meet military requirements more efficiently with more modern systems, they are unlikely to view START reductions as a major sacrifice.

Is early completion realistic? There are significant obstacles to wrapping up a START agreement by late spring.

—Agreement in START will require early and major Soviet concessions, including on START-SDI linkage. If it is true that Gorbachev’s room for maneuver is narrowing because of opposition within the Kremlin, the Soviets may not show the flexibility needed to close a deal soon.

—The INF ratification process will be an impediment to rapid START progress. Not only will the ratification fight absorb the time and energies of the same senior-level officials required to push START ahead, but the dynamics of ratification will make it hard politically to take controversial decisions necessary to keep START on schedule. (For example, with Senators criticizing INF verification provisions and arguing that those provisions must not be a model for the much harder START verification tasks, we might be reluctant to show the necessary flexibility on START verification for fear of adversely affecting INF ratification prospects.)

—START is simply much more complex than INF. It is not just that START addresses a large number of systems or that there will be no “zero” solution to simplify verification and other provisions. In addition, START requires us to deal with a multitude of technically complicated and bureaucratically contentious issues that we were able to avoid in INF (e.g., warhead counting rules, defining and limiting throw-weight, etc.).

—Given the much higher stakes for U.S. security of a START agreement, the negotiating endgame in START will be much more difficult politically than in INF.

The Soviets presumably recognize that it will be very difficult to finish START by late spring. Nonetheless, they have talked up the possibility of early completion (Vorontsov mentioned April to Max Kampelman). Among their reasons for doing so is the desire to give a boost to INF ratification, to make a record that they are as supportive of START as the U.S., and to pressure us to cut back on some of our negotiating requirements (in order to facilitate an early deal). But they may also genuinely wish to generate momentum in START. They may reason that, even if an agreement cannot be completed and ratified in 1988, it would be desirable to make as much headway as possible—because the farther along the process, the more likely it would be for a successor administration simply to pick up where Reagan left off. In this connection, the Soviets probably have in mind that, if a final agreement proves unreachable in 1988, the two sides could find some suitable format for recording (and thereby hopefully preserving) the progress achieved under the Reagan Administration.

Promoting rapid progress. Our highest arms control priority continues to be a sound START agreement, and we should push hard for signature of a complete treaty text at a Moscow summit during the first half of 1988, as envisaged in the October 30 joint statement. But if we are to have much hope of meeting that target, we will have to do several things.

—We will have to persuade the Soviets at the upcoming summit to drop or substantially relax their START-SDI linkage. Either they will have to abandon their insistence on a Defense and Space agreement altogether or settle for an ABM non-withdrawal commitment (7–10 years) that leaves unresolved the question of permitted ABM activities.

—We will have to resolve several first-order START issues, and we should do so in December if we want to keep on schedule.

• Nailing down sublimits is obviously the most important task. Without them, progress on other issues will be minimal.

• We also have to agree on the treatment of mobile ICBMs, because the sublimits and verification measures are fundamentally affected by how this is resolved.

• Similarly, we cannot duck the seemingly technical issues of ALCM range and armament any longer because the Soviets will be reluctant to go very far as long as they fear we may be creating a major loophole.

• SLCMs may also require early treatment because of their potentially far-reaching implications for the verification regime.

—We should propose periodic meetings of senior-level U.S. and Soviet officials from the two capitals (including you and Shevardnadze occasionally) to help resolve problems encountered by the Geneva NST delegations.

—We will have to strengthen our internal procedures for supporting the negotiations in a manner that would help expedite the decision-making process and build Congressional support (e.g., frequent high-level interagency meetings with strong White House guidance and involvement, extensive Congressional consultations and briefings, etc.).

While pushing hard for completing the treaty by late spring, we should not proceed on the assumption that our START efforts will be wasted if we cannot meet that target date. Indeed, if we are unable to finish in 1988 but can nonetheless produce a detailed treaty text with most of the issues resolved, that will be a major accomplishment—one that is likely to survive and be built upon by our successors.

1. Source: Department of State, Memoranda/Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron—November 1987. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on Solomon’s behalf. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.