Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

229. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 21, 1987, 1044Z

12411. Subject: START: Ifft-Roslyakov Dinner Conversation, November 19, 1987.

1. This is NST/START MEMCON VIII–M–169. Secret—entire text.

2. Meeting date: November 19, 1987

Time: 8:45 p.m.–11:00 p.m.

Place: Restaurant Palais de Justice, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S.	USSR
Dr. Edward Ifft	Mr. Yuri Roslyakov

4. Summary: Roslyakov addressed a number of broad NST issues. On INF, he expressed concern about completing the treaty on time and about asymmetries which were developing in the area of verification. He confirmed that the Soviet side no longer requires a separate Defense & Space agreement and gave his personal view that the D&S negotiations are not productive and should be discontinued. It is implicit in the Soviet position that the sides would abide by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, but the U.S. would not be required to state this explicitly. On START, Roslyakov said that the Soviet side has decided that it can generally live with the restructuring required by the U.S. sublimits, but only if the U.S. is required to make similar sacrifices in the structuring of its strategic forces. This is the reason for the low SLBM warhead sublimit in the new Soviet proposal. When asked why the Soviet side refused to merge language on sublimits in the JDT, Roslyakov replied that Gorbachev wants to do some things himself at the summit. Also in reference to the summit, Roslyakov said that the sides should consider INF a thing of the past and focus on START and space issues. He said that Gorbachev very much wants to have serious discussions on these two subjects with President Reagan. End summary.

INF

5. Roslyakov apologized for being 45 minutes late, explaining that he had been working on a cable to Moscow containing some new INF proposals. Ifft said that probably he should be the one to apologize, since he feared that he was interfering with very important INF matters this evening. Roslyakov protested that, on the contrary, he was glad for the opportunity to talk and, in any case, the Soviet delegation meeting would still be going on when he returned after dinner, noting that he and others had been up until 2:00 A.M. more than once recently.

6. Roslyakov immediately began talking in a rather agitated manner about the INF negotiations, showing considerable concern about how things would turn out and whether the summit deadline could be met. He made a number of sharply negative remarks about the way in which things were going, but praised the work of Ambassador Kampelman and the atmosphere he had created this week. He noted that Shultz and Shevardnadze would be meeting in Geneva November 23 to attempt once again to wrap up the remaining problems.

7. Noting that Vorontsov would have to defend the INF treaty to the Politburo, Roslyakov remarked that, just as the question in the U.S. used to be, “who lost China?”, people in the Soviet Union might one day be asking who was responsible for that INF agreement. For example, the emerging verification provisions provide for something like 129 support facilities in the Soviet Union to be subject to inspection, as opposed to only about 24 in the U.S. and NATO. This meant that, on the average, about every 2-½ days a Soviet facility would be inspected. When the Soviet leadership becomes aware of this, it could be unpleasant for those who agreed to such an arrangement. Ifft remarked that these inspections should become rather routine events and there should be no need to disturb the leadership on such matters. Roslyakov was skeptical, noting that these are sensitive sites. Ifft pointed out that the U.S. side is also concerned that the agreement be well received at home and, in particular, in the area of verification. The U.S. public and Congress have come to expect a very high standard of verification, perhaps unrealistically so, and this could become a problem. Roslyakov said that he understood the point.

8. Roslyakov did have two positive observations to make. He expressed amazement at the huge volume of sensitive data which the Soviet side had just passed over, noting that even a short time ago any Soviet citizen who had passed over even a single page of such data would have been considered a traitor. Ifft agreed that great progress had been made in this regard. When he remarked that the Soviet data had been slow in arriving, Roslyakov said that the U.S. side must realize the huge Soviet bureaucracy through which the data had to pass. Roslyakov also noted that the work being done in INF would be a big help to START, since much of the detailed language now being worked out could be carried over into START.

Defense and Space

9. Roslyakov gave a negative assessment of the entire D&S negotiation. He said he thought this negotiation should be discontinued and that Obukhov shares this view. Ifft asked whether the Soviet side intended to make a proposal along these lines. Roslyakov replied that a recommendation had been made to Vorontsov but he did not know what decision might be made. Ifft observed that this was a rather ironic situation, since it had been the Soviet side that insisted on a D&S component to NST in the first place.

10. On the substance of D&S, Roslyakov said that the Soviet side had fallen back quite far, and he hoped the U.S. side realized the significance of this. The Soviet side is no longer asking the U.S. to give up the SDI program and has decided that theoretical, theological discussions on this subject are not productive and instead would like to work out a pragmatic solution. Ifft remarked that he had the impression that the Soviet leadership no longer views the U.S. SDI program as the threat it had perceived some time ago. Roslyakov said that was also his impression. Ifft then asked whether his understanding was correct that the Soviet side is no longer seeking a separate D&S agreement. Roslyakov confirmed this. He went on to explain that all the Soviet side seeks now is a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty, with any problems of interpretation to be resolved as they arise in the SCC. If desired, a list of technical parameters which clearly distinguish between activities which are allowed and not allowed could be worked out by a group of scientists meeting elsewhere.

11. Ifft asked whether Roslyakov would be comfortable with leaving the broad vs. narrow interpretation issue unresolved. Roslyakov granted that this was a problem, but said he did not see how it could be resolved now. Ifft said that the new Soviet position also seems to require that the sides observe the narrow interpretation during the nonwithdrawal period. Roslyakov replied that the Soviet side hopes that the U.S. will continue to abide by the narrow interpretation. Ifft noted that there is an important difference between hoping that something will happen and requiring it as part of an agreement. Roslyakov then elaborated his earlier remark by saying that observance of the narrow interpretation is implicit in the Soviet position. However, the Soviet side does not require that the U.S. administration say this explicitly, recognizing the political difficulties that this would entail. Ifft asked what would happen under this scenario if the U.S. at some point began to conduct its SDI activities in accordance with the broad interpretation. Roslyakov replied that this would create a very difficult situation.

12. Ifft asked, under the approach Roslyakov was suggesting, if there were no separate D&S agreement, how would the sides record the nonwithdrawal commitment? Roslyakov suggested that it could be incorporated into the START treaty. Ifft said that this was not a good idea. Roslyakov then said that some other way could be found—for example, a short separate agreement of some kind. Ifft then asked whether, if there were no D&S agreement, this would mean that the Soviet side would put all of its offense-defense linkage, what was left of it, into START. Roslyakov confirmed that this would be the case. Ifft then pointed out that the current Soviet position has embedded in the START treaty an automatic termination clause linked to the ABM treaty. This was neither a wise nor acceptable approach. He then ventured the purely personal opinion that the Soviet side should be able to live with nothing more than some sort of unilateral statement and did not really need anything on linkage in the START treaty. Roslyakov looked startled and asked if Ifft was a mind reader. In fact, this is exactly the solution that he has been recommending. He noted that Obukhov is also thinking about such a possibility.

START

13. Ifft asked whether the Soviet leadership has definitely decided to go for a START agreement during this administration. Roslyakov said that the answer was definitely affirmative. However, speaking personally, he was highly skeptical that this would be possible, although, of course, he hoped that it would be. Both sides agree that START is much more important than INF, but it is also much more complicated, and he personally doubted whether the USG could make the tough decisions needed in the short time remaining. In any case, Moscow had decided to seek a summit in Moscow in April. Ifft remarked that this seems too early to have a START agreement completed. Roslyakov shrugged. Ifft observed that there was a dilemma regarding the setting of deadlines. On the one hand, without a deadline it was very difficult to accomplish anything. On the other hand, deadlines can also lead to moving too fast and making mistakes, as Roslyakov seemed to think was now taking place in INF. Ifft remarked that he saw some truth in both sides of this issue and did not know what the correct answer was. Roslyakov agreed that this was the dilemma, and he also could not suggest a solution. In any case, if a deadline had not been set for INF, the negotiations would undoubtedly be far behind where they are today.

14. Roslyakov said that the Soviet side is awaiting U.S. responses to the moves which it had made during the Moscow meetings. Ifft asked whether Roslyakov meant in the area of the new proposals on sublimits and Roslyakov confirmed this. Ifft said that he viewed these new Soviet sublimits as a step toward the U.S. position, but that the Soviet side surely understood that, in their present form, they are unacceptable. In particular, it was difficult to understand the reason for the very low limit on SLBM warheads. For years the Soviet side has argued that all weapons are equally destabilizing and equally threatening. It follows that the Soviet side should not particularly care how the U.S. allocates its ballistic warheads between ICBMs and SLBMs. Roslyakov objected that, on the contrary, the Soviet side is very concerned about sea-based U.S. forces, both SLBMs and SLCMs. Ifft countered that this concern about SLBMs, as opposed to ICBMs, had not been apparent in the Soviet position before the latest proposals and, therefore, Roslyakov’s argument was not credible. Roslyakov then explained that neither the political leadership nor the military on the Soviet side wanted sublimits. The U.S. proposals would, to a greater or lesser extent, restructure Soviet strategic forces. The Soviet side had finally decided that it could live with some restructuring, but only if the U.S. makes a similar sacrifice. Thus, it had devised sublimits which hurt the U.S. as much as the U.S. sublimits hurt the Soviet Union. Ifft replied that he had suspected that this was the Soviet motivation. However much the Soviet side might enjoy poking the U.S. in an eye in this way, it would not lead to an agreement. Was the Soviet side, with these clearly unacceptable numbers, trying to force the negotiations back to the 60-percent approach, or are these sublimits just an opening position? Roslyakov denied that the Soviet side is trying to force the negotiations back to its previous position, but he was also unwilling to show any flexibility on the Soviet numbers, other than saying that the sides must now find some compromise. He singled out the 4800 sublimit as particularly troublesome because the Soviet side simply does not want 1200 ALCMs and sees no reason why it should be forced to build them. Ifft noted that the U.S. side had been disappointed that the Soviet side was not willing to merge the language related to the two sides’ sublimits in the JDT. Roslyakov dismissed this by saying that Gorbachev wants to do some things himself at the summit.

Conduct of Negotiations

15. Roslyakov complained strongly about the growing tendency of some on the U.S. side to introduce statements from other discussions—for example, Shultz-Shevardnadze discussions—into the meetings here. Such a practice will make it impossible to carry on frank negotiations in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Ifft replied that his strict personal code in U.S.-Soviet negotiations is never to introduce sensitive attributed statements made elsewhere into a discussion. Although this sometimes meant not being able to use attractive arguments, he felt it made for more productive relations in the long run. However, others had different views on this matter. Roslyakov said that he definitely agreed with Ifft’s approach, and he strongly recommended that it be applied more broadly.

16. Ifft remarked that he was distressed at the misunderstandings which seem to arise in our negotiations despite the best efforts of the two sides to communicate clearly. For example, in mid-October the U.S. side had gained the impression that the Soviet side had withdrawn certain aspects of its parameter approach in the D&S negotiations. Roslyakov emphatically denied that anything had been withdrawn in the Soviet proposals and stated that it must have been due to a lack of understanding on the U.S. side. Ifft then raised another example closer to home. Today on the fringes of a working group meeting he had asked Colonel Kuklev a number of questions about the Soviet position on its 1540 limit. When the U.S. side returned to its offices, it turned out that people had differing versions of what the answers to the questions had been. Perhaps Roslyakov could clarify the point. Ifft then briefly reviewed his understanding of the Soviet position. The Soviet side proposes a limit of 154 heavy ICBM launchers. It also proposes that a counting rule of 10 warheads per heavy ICBM be adopted. If such a counting rule is adopted, the Soviet side would accept a sublimit of 1540 warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs, having the same legal status as the other warhead sublimits. Furthermore, the counting rule of 10 warheads per heavy ICBM would mean that it would be forbidden to deploy more than 10 warheads on any heavy ICBM. Roslyakov confirmed each step of Ifft’s understanding.

17. Roslyakov then remarked that the Soviet side had exactly the same problem Ifft has described. Frequently when the Soviet delegation returns to its offices after a meeting, it is unable to agree on exactly what had been said by the U.S. negotiators. Roslyakov thought that a major contribution to this situation is poor translations. For example, he has to pay attention to the English translation which is given of his remarks, because mistakes or at least different nuances are sometimes introduced.

Summit

18. Ifft asked what understanding Roslyakov had of the sort of language on START which might be agreed at the summit. Roslyakov said he did not have much to offer on this subject, noting that Vorontsov had said very little on this point. Evidently some sort of framework agreement was being considered. Ifft noted that the U.S. side does not think that a framework is a good idea at this stage. Roslyakov replied that it could take a different form. He then emphasized that Gorbachev very much wants to have serious discussions with President Reagan on START and space. The sides should take the view that INF is a thing of the past at this summit and concentrate on these two topics. This is the reason why Vorontsov had ended the round early—i.e., in order to allow better preparation for the summit discussions. Ifft said that he was sure that the U.S. side also is looking forward to serious discussions at the summit, but he hoped that there would be no surprises of the sort that Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. Although one should not be against all surprises in principle, in a three-day meeting one could not expect to succeed with dramatic new initiatives. In addition, as Roslyakov knew, the Reykjavik experience would make people suspicious of anything that looked like an attempt on the part of Gorbachev to trick the President in some way. Ifft said that he thought the summit could have a positive impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and it was extremely important that it go well. Roslyakov agreed. Ifft asked whether Gorbachev was especially concerned about his personal security. Roslyakov said that Gorbachev was not personally concerned—he is a natural politician who likes personal contact with ordinary people. However, this does make the people around Gorbachev somewhat nervous. People in Moscow have the impression that the U.S. is a rather dangerous and violent place, and this is the reason why the duration of the summit is being kept short.

Perestroyka

19. Ifft asked whether Perestroyka was alive and well in Moscow. Roslyakov assured Ifft that it was. Ifft asked what Roslyakov would consider the most significant aspect of the recent 70th anniversary events. Roslyakov did not answer directly but did emphasize his view of what was not significant. In particular, all the attention given in the west to the revision of Soviet history, such as the rehabilitation of Bukharin and Trotsky, misses the point completely. Ordinary people in the Soviet Union do not care in the least about such questions. Ifft noted that a commission has been created to reexamine Party history. Roslyakov said that this did not mean anything and would not lead anywhere. Ifft expressed the view that the question of history is important, at least to intellectuals, in both the West and the Soviet Union. Roslyakov agreed, but emphasized that it would be a mistake to focus on such matters. What is needed is to improve the lot of the average Soviet citizen and not to agitate the entire country about historical questions. Ifft replied that this was probably true, but why could not certain archives be opened and historians be allowed to write objectively about historical periods such as the 20’s and 30’s and fill in the missing pages? Roslyakov assured Ifft that this will in fact happen. Roslyakov continued with his theme that the situation of the average Soviet citizen must be the focus of Perestroyka. Ifft had recently gone to a conference in Baku where he had been wined and dined and lived as a rich Western tourist. This did not give an accurate impression of life in the Soviet Union. Roslyakov went on to say that, while he personally lives very well in Moscow, he was genuinely concerned about the life of the average Soviet citizen, which is in fact rather miserable.

20. Roslyakov had his usual high praise for Gorbachev. However, in contrast to earlier conversations, he said that there is the danger that Gorbachev could begin to lose his popular support if things do not begin to move forward in ways which improve life in the country. There had been much talk, but now things must begin to happen. In this connection, the Yeltsin affair was somewhat disturbing. Yeltsin had made certain mistakes, but he did not deserve the humiliation which he had been forced to undergo. In this connection, Roslyakov urged Ifft to read the speeches denouncing Yeltsin which had been carried by Pravda, which reminded him almost of what had happened to people in the 20’s and 30’s or in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. One could not expect people to speak up freely if there was the danger of being humiliated later as a result.

Future Negotiations

21. In response to Ifft’s question, Roslyakov said that he certainly hoped to return to the START negotiations in January, although he was concerned that he might be required to engage in further work related to INF in Moscow. He recognized that the Soviet START delegation needs to be augmented. He thought that this would be done in January by transferring a significant number of INF people to START. He asked whether the U.S. side would also move its INF people into START. Ifft said that he did not expect this to happen, because a significant pool of START experts already exists which can be drawn upon and because a lot of work related to INF ratification will still be needed in the new year in Washington. Roslyakov thanked Ifft for the dinner, conveyed his best wishes to the U.S. START delegation, and said that he would now return to the INF meetings at the Soviet mission, which he was sure would last far into the night.

22. Moscow minimize considered.

Lehman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870960–0341. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.