214. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Guidance on Talking Summit with the Soviets
Before we depart for Moscow on Monday,2 we need guidance from the President on how to handle the relationship between substantive negotiations, especially INF and START, and setting of the next summit’s exact dates and venue. This will require specifying what we absolutely demand (if anything), absolutely reject (e.g., a non-US summit?), and where we can be flexible.
Notwithstanding his reluctance to sign up for whatever reason, Gorbachev has much more to gain at home and abroad from a summit than does the President. Therefore, we must be firm in refusing to pay any price in substance for the summit. What the President has to gain is the image of moving ahead on US-Soviet relations; but this will be a temporary effect. Sustaining that political image will turn much more on substantive developments in succeeding months, especially INF ratification. At the same time, a major danger looms: Any appearance that somehow the event, timing, venue and theatrics of a summit were more important to the President than the substantive outcome, and actually drove the latter—especially the endgame on INF, could be very damaging in ratification. Moreover, while their calculations are somewhat opaque, it is clear that the Soviets are trying to manipulate summit decisions for political/substantive gain. It would be damaging for the President to appear to have been manipulated.
The first danger is rushing the INF Treaty to meet a summit deadline. There are two ways to minimize this. One is to give ourselves more time by opening December, or even early 1988, as a possible period for the next summit. We have not been thinking in these terms, but need to know if this is possible. Secondly, we need to make clear to the Soviets and, as needed in public, that we do not insist on signing anything at a summit. If the Soviets do, then we in turn insist that the products be fully and satisfactorily completed—or within a resolvable issue or two—before the meeting is actually on. Since it is likely that [Page 921] the Soviets will retain one or two issues in INF until the summit itself, even this stance will leave us to decide on the eve of the summit whether we can manage their satisfactory resolution at the summit.
A second danger would arise if the Soviets try to condition the US venue of the next summit on “something substantial” beyond INF, leaving it vague at the beginning what this is but then try to get us to buy into a START/Space “framework” as the “something substantial.” In contrast to our interest in getting more time for INF completion, our interest in avoiding the “framework” trap argues for having the next summit as soon as possible. The more time that passes, the closer we might be to a Vladivostok-type accord which the Soviets would urge signing at the next summit. We best manage this issue by simply refusing to consider an alternative to the US as a venue—INF can be signed by other than the top leaders anytime it’s ready, anywhere—and pledge to do no more than work hard on a START treaty and to reference whatever progress has been made by summit time in a communique that entails no obligations.
If the Soviets are themselves open-minded or undecided, do we prefer a “small” summit limited to Washington, a “big” tour-the-country summit (the President’s image apparently), or something in-between? With large downside risks and little upside gain, a “small” scenario is preferable. We suspect the Soviets prefer it too for their own reasons, but may be wrong. No summit scenario will be finalized in Moscow, but we would do well to have our preferences in mind.
The following guidance points emerge:
We shall consider no alternatives to the United States, including Washington, as the next summit venue.
To reduce the risk that important technical details in INF will be negotiated under excessive time pressure, we would prefer to fix the date of the next summit in early-to-mid December, or later. Late November remains a possibility if we are highly confident of our ability to complete the treaty.
If the Soviets insist on signing INF at the summit, its actual occurrence and timing must be considered tentative pending virtual completion of the agreement.
We shall accept no other conditions, e.g., START/Space agreements, as a condition for a summit, but pledge to work all parts of our agenda diligently.
We shall not lobby for a “big” summit in the US, but accept one if that’s what Gorbachev wants.
RECOMMENDATION
That you discuss these points with the President and Secretary Shultz in a preliminary way this afternoon and plan to bring more [Page 922] definitive guidance on them to the pre-Moscow consultations in Helsinki.3