Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

21. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 21, 1982, 9:43 a.m.

Bud McF: review earlier decision—here today to cover 5 remaining agenda items—(1) interim restraints (substantive & public affairs context—to ratify SALT II would legitimize buildup, legitimize gross inequalities, delay getting on w/reductions—review pros & cons—any comments? [no]

Pres: what’s good, if anything, in SALT II?

Bud: counting rules

Haig: preclude breakout they could do—we’re not abiding by SALT II per se—political element

Meese: strategic planning not constrained

Weinberger: densepack/ALCM—I don’t think the Soviets could do more than they’ve done now—if we say we’ll abide by SALT II, I don’t think we’ll get on with START

Meese: I was assuming that what the Pres. said earlier—we’ll not be constrained in planning

Rostow: for the moment, it’s in our interest to abide—no advantage to change policy—SFRC

Weinberger: I’m not advocating public announcement—we need to be clear internally

Meese: but when we advance basing moved for MX, we must be prepared

Haig: problem at moment is a political problem—getting on w/START will resolve issue—if we raise issue now, it will complicate MX

Weinberger: ensure our budget planning

Inman: answer question (1) DELTA III testing—have to take out YANKEES—168? (2) at least 2 new ICBMS underway, can only test 1 (3) BACKFIRE production less than it could be (4) SS–18 MIRVs (5) future verification—encryption of telemetry

Reagan: are they going ahead w/new sub programs

Inman:

Meese: I think we’re agreed (1) no [change] in public formulation (2) resist any attempt to revive SALT II (3) as a matter of policy, no constraints . . . when

Rostow: don’t violate until deploy . . .

McFarlane: we have words that capture this—IG—get back to you

Rowny: whatever we say, distance ourselves from SALT II—help negotiate

McFarlane: 2nd issue

Weinberger: would hope paper not intended for dissemination—“some believe . . .”

Murphy: does this paper assume we’re satisfied w/ telemetry we’re getting now

McFarlane: isn’t intended to—next issue mobiles—propose we reserve judgment in our position although Rowny wishes to build in from start

Rowny: everyone’s agreed we want to keep open options re MX—issue is true mobile—if we don’t want, time to decide is now

McFarlane: you have paper to consider—move on—do we want to ban heavies first, etc.—number of issues—to IG, w/ your approval, for report within two weeks

Weinberger: I thought original paper did include banning of heavies

Pres: MXs?

Weinberger: less than heavy

Pres: Titans—trading chip?

Ikle: Soviets don’t worry about Titans

Pres: heavier than MX?

(chorus): 18s

Pres: 18 heavier than 19?

(chorus): yes

Rostow: comment

Pres.: if we go for heavier 1st, don’t we have negotiation problems

Ikle: it’s like SS-20/zero-option

Hayward: get at 18s indirectly

McFarlane: final issue—phasing—single or two agreements

Weinberger: Phase II as important as Phase I—worried procedurally—would argue for single treaty, one process, because of strong importance we attach to TW as only way to achieve equality at lower levels—if treaty w/ Phase I, doubt get them back

Haig: thought this was issue you decided last time, Mr. Pres—if we can get objectives in I, sign Treaty—I read decision memo that way & briefed on Hill, allies briefed that way—easy matter—have, for instance, 5 year review tied to good faith on Phase II—must keep credibility

Weinberger: no one intends to undercut credibility

Haig: must be clean or clear

Weinberger: I’m worried—5 years/ ALCMs . . .

Haig: if achieve everything in Phase I, then don’t sign, we’d be laughed out of court

Hayward: if you get Phase I, substantial cut TW

Rowny: announcement of whether or not we seek agreement in Phase I should be kept open, from negotiating point of view (discuss Soviet tactics)

Pres: when we talked about it, I didn’t think we meant 2 separate treaties—when we achieve 1st, then see what’s needed in phase II, where we stand (asks question)—am I being Boy Scout

Haig: you said it better than anybody

McFarlane: will you sign

Meese: can’t you reserve question until then

Haig: it’s already been asked: Congress, allies—don’t want to reverse decision already made, via this esoteric discussion

Weinberger: don’t bind us because we’ve briefed w/o clarification of decision

Rostow: explain as in INF, depends on how Soviets play it—don’t create impression we’re out to get one treaty quickly

Haig: great danger is that it looks like you waffling on what you said: Phase I warheads—if bureaucracy’s confused, will emerge

Pres: couldn’t part of negotiations be this

Haig: yes, call it interim, or whatever

Meese: Phase I—reserve decision

McFarlane: precedent—conclude,

Bush: do we then go to Senate, ask ratify I?

Ilke: do like test bans

Weinberger: procedural matter—don’t tie hands by saying that once Phase I done, go to Senate

Pres: until completed on Phase I, don’t know what TW problem is in Phase II

Haig: want to be careful of what has been bureaucratic hassle—don’t undercut Phase I unit of measure

Pres: continuing negotiation

Rostow: don’t fix on 2 agreements

Meese: think we’re agreed

McFarlane: yes

Baker: on last, prepare written guidance

Pres: consensus items

McFarlane:

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 49A. Secret. Drafted by Wheeler. The original text is handwritten. Brackets and ellipses are in the original text. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix B. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and ended at approximately 10:45 a.m. No formal minutes of this meeting were found.