202. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- START Agreement
On August 27, GPS raised START with the President. The President agreed we should make a major push on START, but it was not entirely clear that what George was advocating was a revision of the position he had carried to Moscow. I clarified for the President that this was, in fact, the case and sought from him a specific mandate to work the interagency process to give him options that might enable START to begin to move. He agreed.
The next day I told him he had to phone Cap Weinberger to tell him of his decision. Otherwise, Defense would simply refuse to consider any changes in our position. The talking points the President used were the following:
[Page 880]—Cap, as you know, we are very close to an INF agreement, and I appreciate your cooperation in making this possible.
—I consider it extremely important that we now move on to a START agreement. I believe we have a chance of getting such an agreement in the next 18 months if we play our cards right.
—In order to do this, I have asked Frank to have the interagency group take a fresh look at our position on START, and on defense and space.
—As you know, I am thoroughly committed to SDI and do not want to do anything to hinder our very good progress on SDI.
—But it seems to me it may be possible to make some changes in our position that would get the negotiations moving without damaging SDI. We need to be creative to do this, but I know I can count on your full support.
—Frank can provide you with additional details. I am sure you will be hearing from him soon.
After the President called CWW, I talked to Cap by phone. Cap said it was clear the President wanted a START agreement, but Cap had told him we should not revise our position on defense and space as long as the Soviets continue to link these talks with START. The President responded, according to Cap, that perhaps we could find some cosmetic changes. It was clear from this conversation that Cap would be, at best, a reluctant participant.
On August 29, I told the President of my conversation with Cap. I indicated that it would be very difficult to get Cap to go along with any changes.
I told the President I considered it essential that he make progress on START for three reasons:
a) it was needed on the merits. As he well knew, he needs to bring about some reduction in strategic nuclear weapons.
b) without progress on START, ratification of an INF treaty would be in jeopardy. The Soviets could compensate from the SS–20s by building more strategic systems. INF simply could not stand alone.2
c) a START agreement might be the best—possibly the only—guarantee of SDI’s long-term survival. SDI was not cost-effective at the margin. For the foreseeable future, a given unit of offense would be cheaper than a given unit of defense. Hence, SDI could be overwhelmed. Somewhat to my surprise, the President seemed familiar [Page 881] with this point. I added that progress on START could also help SDI on the Hill since it would weaken advocates of arms control amendments.3
I consider it most unlikely that the President could get a START agreement if he stuck to his current position. What did the Soviets want? Kill SDI so they can build their own systems, the President responded. I said that was true, but they were coming to realize they couldn’t achieve this. They did have, however, a legitimate concern which we might be able to meet. They wanted predictability on deployment. Their concern was that once we got to the 50 percent reduction level, the U.S. would suddenly deploy SDI and achieve nuclear superiority.
I told the President I thought we could accommodate this concern without doing damage to SDI, and without getting into permitted and prohibited activities. I was not a wealthy man, but I said I would bet every penny I had that SDI would not be deployed until 1996 or 1997 at the earliest. For illustrative purposes, I told him we could come up with a formula that would have a seven year non-withdrawal pledge, a 10 year non-deployment pledge and a three year notification provision. We would have to drop the novation provision in our current position since the USSR would never sign up for a deployment commitment now.
The President seemed receptive to this kind of an approach. I told him we were coming down to the wire. If we were to modify our position in time for the Shevardnadze meeting, this would require his personal intervention. What it was coming down to was a choice between START and not overruling Cap. After I received some help from Duberstein and Nancy, the President indicated he would be willing to overrule Cap.
We then discussed a hypothetical timetable: introduce some flexibility in our position at the Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting, move the ball forward with perhaps a memo of understanding at a summit in November (Nancy is absolutely adamant that this be over Thanksgiving) and sign an agreement when the President goes to Moscow next year—a fair amount of enthusiasm was generated for this scenario.4
Howard Baker wishes to work with me to bring Cap along. The only way I can see that we can accomplish this is for us to develop a position and present it to Cap. Working with the DOD bureaucracy [Page 882] seems to me to be hopeless. Please reflect on this and let’s talk on Monday.5 Perhaps a secure conference call would be in order.
- Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, ACSG [Arms Control Support Group] September 1 [1987] (2 of 4). Secret.↩
- Linhard wrote in the right-hand margin beside this point: “START NEEDED FOR INF RAT. (RAND ARGUMENT).”↩
- Linhard bracketed the three points and wrote in the left-hand margin beside them: “—fundamentally disagree with Rand on assessment;—agree to press for START.”↩
- Linhard wrote in the left-hand margin beside this paragraph: “*instructions to START negotiators.”↩
- August 31.↩
- Printed from a copy bearing Carlucci’s typed signature.↩