Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

171. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, November 12, 1986, 1739Z

10392. Subject: START—End of Round VI Report Part I—Overview.

1. This is NST/START-VI-032. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: This is Part I of the START Negotiating Group’s end-of-round report. This cable reviews developments during Round VI. A separate analysis containing the Negotiating Group’s recommendations for future interagency work and needed guidance for Round VII is being sent septel.² Round VI ran from September 18 to November 12. Early in the round, the U.S. Negotiating Group sought to stimulate progress and address Soviet concerns by tabling new proposals for both 30-percent and 50-percent reductions. On October 22, following the Reykjavik discussions, we made a new 50-percent reductions proposal. This proposal incorporated the agreements reached in Reykjavik, and offered compromise solutions on the issue of sublimits in the weapons aggregate. On November 7, immediately after the Shultz-Shevardnadze discussions in Vienna, the Soviets also made a new proposal. The Soviet proposal confirmed the 1600 SNDV and 6000 weapon aggregates, as well as the counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs agreed to at Reykjavik. However, while the document on “key provisions” handed over by the Soviets in Vienna confirmed the language on finding a mutually acceptable solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs also agreed in Iceland, their new proposals did not differentiate between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs. The Soviets opposed the three U.S. sublimits on warheads, but offered for the first time a specific sublimit on heavy missiles (apparently counting launchers) which would represent a 50-percent reduction in the current Soviet level.

3. Round VI saw major progress in the form of agreement on an aggregate of 1600 SNDVs, an aggregate of 6000 warheads, removal of U.S. “FBS” from the category of strategic arms under 50-percent START reductions, a counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs, and an agreement to seek a solution to the SLCM issue outside of the SNDV and warhead aggregates. A number of outstanding issues, however, remain at the end of the round. The most significant of these issues include the question of linkage of START to the ABM Treaty, an INF agreement, and negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing; agreement on sublimits in the warhead aggregate; the question of banning mobile ICBMs; a specific solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs; and the precise means of codifying 50-percent throw-weight reductions. END SUMMARY.

4. Schedule

—Round VI ran from September 18 to November 12.

—Eight START plenary meetings were held in addition to two joint plenaries.

—There were also numerous informal meetings at all levels. The two START negotiators continued their pattern of the previous round by having frequent informal one-on-one luncheons.

5. U.S. Approach Pre-Reykjavik

The U.S. Negotiating Group sought to stimulate immediate progress in Round VI by tabling new proposals at the initial joint plenary on September 18. Our objectives for the round were to reach agreement on certain key elements of a START agreement, including specific numerical limits. Our September 18 proposals both modified our preferred 50-percent reduction proposal tabled last fall, and offered a new first-step proposal of 30-percent reductions as a response to the Soviet proposal of June 11. Our modified 50-percent reduction proposal included as its major provisions:

—1600 SNDV aggregate with full freedom-to-mix, subject to Soviet acceptance of our proposed warhead sublimits;

—6000 aggregate on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs;

—4500 sublimit on ballistic missile warheads;

—3000 sublimit on ICBM warheads;

—1500 sublimit on warheads on all permitted ICBMS, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with 6 or fewer warheads.

All other elements of the previous U.S. proposal for 50-percent reductions remained unchanged.

Our first-step proposal for 30-percent reductions included the following provisions:

—1600 SNDV aggregate, with full freedom-to-mix;

—7500 aggregate on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, contingent on Soviet acceptance of our proposed weapon sublimits;

—5500 sublimit on ballistic missile warheads;

—3300 sublimit on ICBM warheads;

—1650 sublimit on warheads on all permitted ICBMs, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads;

—Other provisions would remain as in our 50-percent reduction proposal.

Reductions under this agreement would be carried out over a period of five years.

The U.S. proposals represented major moves on our part to meet Soviet concerns and to narrow differences in all areas, including the structure, levels and scope of an agreement. In later plenaries, we also expressed additional flexibility. Specifically, we stated our willingness to accept a mutual sublimit of 350 heavy bombers in the SNDV aggregate as an indirect limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs, and to listen to any serious Soviet proposals on mobile ICBMs that addressed our concerns with regard to verification and stability. In addition, we expressed our willingness to consider a separate treatment of SLCMs under certain conditions. We made clear to the Soviet delegation our belief that our new proposals created additional areas of common ground and laid a foundation on which efforts to reconcile remaining differences could be built.

6. Soviet Approach Pre-Reykjavik

Soviet priorities for the round may have been presaged when delegation lists were exchanged and showed only three Soviet advisors listed for the START Negotiating Group. At the first START plenary on September 24, however, the Soviets did offer for consideration a number of additional elements to their June 11 interim proposal. Several of these elements had been first previewed at the experts meeting in Washington prior to the beginning of the round. They included:

—A new limit permitting a maximum of 80–85 percent of the total weapons aggregate to be deployed on ballistic missiles;

—The question of long-range SLCMs would be subject to a mutually acceptable solution—separate from the aggregate limits on SNDVs and weapons—on the basis of the approach tabled by the Soviets on June 11;

—The question of “medium-range” arms capable of reaching the territory of the other side, including long-range GLCMs, would be resolved separately.

Tabling of the new Soviet elements followed the U.S. presentation of its new proposals on September 18. The Soviets attempted to use this fact to argue that their new elements constituted a response to our September 18 proposals and that the ball was now back in the U.S. court.

Probably for tactical reasons, the Soviets remained largely negative on the U.S. approach to START in general, and our September 18 proposals in particular. They argued that the new U.S. proposals did not fundamentally change the U.S. approach. The Soviets focused, in particular, on the 1500/1650 sublimit which was not a part of our previous position, and the fact that the ICBM and ballistic missile sublimits under our 30-percent reduction proposal would permit a smaller percentage of the total weapons aggregate in these categories than under our 50-percent reduction proposal, ignoring the fact that the absolute numbers had been raised. In addition, the Soviets continued to object strongly to the U.S. position on the issues of including gravity bombs and SRAMs in the weapons aggregate, the treatment of SLCMs, and whether to ban mobile ICBMs.

The other main development of the pre-Reykjavik period was Obukhov’s statement on October 1 that the Soviet side was prepared for substantive work on drafting provisions for the verification of mobile ICBMs and SLCMs. While the Soviets never formally proposed the creation of a verification working group, Obukhov suggested in informal conversations that the Soviet statement constituted a formal offer for such discussions. Over the course of the next week, the Soviets continued to press us on our reluctance to engage in discussions on SLCM and mobile ICBM verification, stating that the U.S. had to be a “participant”, not an “observer” or “arbiter” in this process.

In the wake of the Reykjavik meeting, the Soviet delegation argued that a qualitatively new situation had been created. Apparently as a consequence, they did not return either to their September 24 proposals or to their offer that the sides discuss the verification of mobile ICBMs and SLCMs.

7. U.S. Approach Post-Reykjavik

Building upon the Reykjavik discussions, we presented a new proposal October 22 with the following major provisions:

—Aggregate of 1600 SNDVs (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers),

—Aggregate of 6000 warheads (ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads and ALCMs; in addition, each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would be counted as one warhead),

—Within the 6000 warhead aggregate, there would continue to be three sublimits permitting:

—No more than 4800 ballistic missile warheads,

—No more than 3300 ICBM warheads, and

—No more than 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads,

In addition:

—Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would be reduced by 50 percent,

—Mobile ICBMs would be banned, and

—The sides would find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

The U.S. START Negotiating Group did not directly address the time period for achieving these 50-percent reductions, nor what further reductions would come after this first stage. However, on October 28, the U.S. Defense and Space Negotiating Group formally tabled a proposal calling for 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms within five years (by 1991), and the complete elimination of offensive ballistic missiles within ten years (by 1996).

We stressed that our October 22 proposal incorporated the relevant agreements reached at Reykjavik and the compromise nature of our proposals in areas where agreement was not reached at Reykjavik. We pressed the Soviets for a prompt and constructive response.

8. Soviet Approach Post-Reykjavik

Ambassador Karpov did not return to Geneva during the period between the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings, and the Soviet delegation apparently had no substantive instructions on how to proceed in the period prior to the Shultz—Shevardnadze meeting in Vienna. They were, therefore, rather cautious, relying heavily on the Gorbachev press conference in Reykjavik and on subsequent Gorbachev speeches for the substance of their plenary statements and informal discussions. The Soviets focused heavily on the linkage of a START agreement to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty and, with some exceptions, steered clear of discussing their interpretation of what was agreed on strategic arms reduction at Reykjavik. In his October 15 plenary statement, Ambassador Obukhov did state that at Reykjavik, “the Soviet side advocated reducing every component of strategic offensive arms by one-half—ICBMs, SLCMs and heavy bombers. The U.S. side agreed with this.” Faced with the contrary U.S. account of what had been agreed in Reykjavik, the Soviet side never repeated, formally or informally, the claim that the United States had agreed with this Soviet proposal. They did continue to refer to their proposal to reduce each component by 50 percent, but only in the past tense as something they advocated at Reykjavik (which is correct).

Prior to the Vienna meeting, the Soviets never confirmed or denied our statements regarding other areas of agreement at Reykjavik—1600, 6000, the gravity bomb/SRAM counting rule or the new formulation on SLCMs. In his plenary statement of November 5, Obukhov criticized our emphasis on the phrase “nuclear-armed” in this SLCM formulation and several Soviets informally put down a marker that any solution to the SLCM issue would have to address verification and circumvention concerns related to the deployment of long-range, conventionally-armed SLCMs.

The public controversy regarding whether “offensive ballistic missiles,” “strategic offensive arms,” or “all nuclear weapons” are to be eliminated at the end of ten years was reflected in Geneva. In his plenary statement of October 29, Ambassador Obukhov referred to “the agreed goal in Reykjavik of the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in the course of two five-year periods.” However, the Soviet delegation did not seem to distinguish clearly between “nuclear weapons” and “strategic nuclear weapons” and often appeared to use the two formulations interchangeably. At least two Soviet members stated informally that Gorbachev’s January 15 proposal remains valid, but that the timetable for eliminating all nuclear arms has been advanced from the year 2000 to 1996.

The Soviets largely avoided addressing our October 22 proposals. They were consistent in opposing the concept of sublimits, sometimes taking their cue from Gorbachev’s statement that sublimits are “moth-eaten trash.”

9. Post-Vienna Situation.

At the Vienna meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and then at the final joint plenary meeting of the round on November 7, the Soviets confirmed the 1600 and 6000 aggregates, and the counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs that had been agreed at Reykjavik. While the document of “key provisions” handed over by the Soviets in Vienna confirmed the language on finding a mutually acceptable solution to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs that was agreed upon in Reykjavik, the Soviet proposal of November 7 did not distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs. Instead, the proposal called for limiting deployment of SLCMs of over 600 km in range to two types of submarines on each side and banning their deployment on surface ships. These proposals represented no change from the SLCM proposals the Soviets made on June 11. What was new in the Soviet November 7 proposals was the inclusion of a specific counting rule based on maximum loading capability and their formally providing for limitations on SLCMs outside the SNDV and weapon aggregates, an idea they first [garble] based on a 50-percent reduction from the current Soviet level. In addition, the Soviet proposal incorporated in the START context the verification language agreed to in Reykjavik in conjunction with INF systems. The verification measure providing for on-site inspection of dismantlement and destruction, however, was excluded from the Soviet proposal.

Other key provisions of the Soviet November 7 proposal included:

—The elimination of all strategic offensive arms would be carried out in two stages over a period of 10 years. Reductions to no more than 1600 SNDVs and 6000 weapons on those SNDVs would be accomplished by 1991.

—During the first stage, development, testing and deployment of “new kinds” of strategic offensive arms would be prohibited.

—By 1996 the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive arms would be eliminated. Timing and terms of elimination of these forces would be agreed upon by 1991.

—By 1991 procedures for and timing of the elimination of “operational-tactical” systems would also be agreed upon and appropriate agreements would be reached with other countries that possess nuclear weapons.

—The sides would undertake not to develop, test, or deploy after January 1992 “new kinds and new types” of strategic offensive arms. Qualitative improvements of existing strategic arms would also be prohibited after this date.

—While retaining their previously proposed counting rule for ballistic missile RVS, the Soviets proposed an ALCM counting rule based on the number of cruise missiles a bomber has been “equipped for.”

—The initiation of negotiations on an agreement completely banning nuclear tests was made a prerequisite for working out an agreement on strategic arms.

The Soviet proposal, consistent with the view they have presented since Reykjavik, contained no sublimits other than the one proposed on heavy missiles. A preliminary analysis of the November 7 proposal by the U.S. START Negotiating Group is being provided septel.³

10. Outstanding issues

Round VI saw major progress in the form of an agreement on an aggregate of 1600 SNDVs, an aggregate of 6000 warheads, removal of “FBS” from 50-percent START reductions, a counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs, and agreement to seek a solution to the SLCM issue outside the SNDV and warhead aggregates. The outstanding issues remaining at the end of Round VI are:

—The linkage of START to the ABM treaty, an INF agreement, and negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear testing,

—The question of sublimits in the warhead aggregate,

—A ban on mobile ICBMs,

—A specific solution to limiting nuclear-armed SLCMs, as agreed at Reykjavik, and

—The precise means of codifying 50-percent throw-weight reductions

Minimize considered.

Kampelman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860863–0732. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.
2. Part II of the START negotiating group’s end-of-round report is in telegram 10393 from NST Geneva, November 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860863–0745)
3. See Document 172.